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T ~he centennial of the Sherman Act1 provides a suitable occasion to
I evaluate American antitrust law. Although I certainly prefer this
body of law to its extant alternatives-to the various systems of cartel
law other countries have adopted, to legal regimes that reduce the role of
antitrust in favor of the kind of system that is often referred to as an
industrial policy, to the regulation of private enterprises as "public" utili-
ties, or to public production, this Article will focus on the deficiencies of
our approach-i.e., will compare American antitrust law to my concep-
1. 26 STAT 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
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tion of the ideal antitrust regime rather than to its extant alternatives.2
In particular, after Part I delineates various basic concepts, distinctions,
and relationships on which the rest of the Article relies, Part II analyzes
various deficiencies of the Sherman and Clayton3 Acts themselves, Part
III criticizes various interpretations the courts have given to those stat-
utes, and Part IV attacks various ways in which the courts (and/or their
company) have operationalized the tests the courts have interpreted the
statutes to have promulgated.
But before proceeding to my substantive arguments, I would like to
provide some guidance to this article's prospective readers. I have tried
to make all sections of this article comprehensible to readers with only
modest backgrounds in economics. For this reason, the exposition is en-
tirely non-mathematical. However, the technical complexity and terse-
ness of some sections-particularly sections IA, IIA2, IVB, and IVC-
make them far more difficult than the remainder of the article. Readers
who do not have the time to study these sections carefully should proba-
bly skim section IA (which delineates the relevant conceptual systems)
and the other sections listed above (which apply these conceptual sys-
tems to particular antitrust topics) and concentrate on the remaining sec-
tions of this article (which should be readily comprehensible since they
do not rely on these concepts to any significant extent).
I. BASIC CONCEPTS, DISTINCTIONS, AND LEGAL TESTS
Part I delineates various concepts, distinctions, and relationships
that are critical to the analysis of antitrust law and antitrust policy. Spe-
cifically, Section IA delineates various sets of technical economic con-
cepts that I have developed for use inter alia in antitrust contexts: (1)
one set of concepts that define the various components of the gap be-
tween a firm's price (P) and conventional marginal cost (MC) that are
worth distinguishing; (2) the concept of quality-or-variety-increasing-in-
vestment (QV-investment) competition and a set of related concepts that
define the various middle-level determinants of the intensity of such com-
petition (barriers to entry, barriers to expansion, monopolistic invest-
ment-disincentives, oligopolistic investment-disincentives, and
monopolistic investment-incentives); and (3) various terms that define
2. Although this article contains a considerable amount of new material, I have written on this
topic before. See Markovits, An IdealAntitrust Law Regime, 64 TEx. L. REv. 251 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Ideal Regime].
3. 38 STAT 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988)).
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the different kinds of resource misallocation that imperfections in compe-
tition can affect.
Section IB then delineates a number of other distinctions and rela-
tionships on which antitrust analysis relies: (1) the distinction between
the effect of any business act or practice on the intensity of competition
and its impact on allocative efficiency; (2) the distinction between the
allocative efficiency of prohibiting a business act or practice and the con-
textual moral permissibility or overall desirability of doing so; (3) the
distinguishing features of the three most likely possible baselines for ana-
lyzing the competitive impact of a business act or practice; and (4) the
relationship between the anti-competitive impact (allocative inefficiency,
overall undesirability) of any business act or practice and the pro-com-
petitive impact (allocative efficiency, overall desirability) of prohibiting
it.
Finally, Section IC delineates and compares the basic tests of legal-
ity I think the Sherman and Clayton Acts promulgate-the tests these
statutes would be held to have established if they were properly inter-
preted by the standards of American legal theory and practice.
A. Three Sets of Technical Economic Concepts
1.The Components of a Seller's P-MC Gap. Although, as Section
IC will argue, the American antitrust laws' tests of legality do not make
the effect of any business act or practice on a seller's P-MC gap auto-
matically decisive, the analysis of both antitrust law and antitrust policy
would be substantially improved if that gap were divided into two major
and a larger number of minor components. Since much of my critique of
American antitrust law and policy will be based on analyses that focus
separately on the individual components of a seller's P-MC gap, I will
begin by delineating the conceptual system I have developed to subdivide
a seller's P-MC gap.
My system uses the concept of a seller's highest non-oligopolistic
price (HNOP) to define and separate the two major components of a
seller's P-MC gap - (1) P-HNOP and (2) HNOP-MC. HNOP is
defined to be the highest price the relevant seller would find profitable to
charge in a perfectly informed world if he knew that his rivals would
always respond to his moves on the assumption that he could not react to
their responses. P-HNOP and HNOP-MC are then subdivided. In
particular, P-HNOP is subdivided into (a) contrived oligopolistic mar-
gins (OM)-oligopolistic margins (components of the seller's P-MC
gap) that reflect anti-competitive threats, offers, and/or agreements that
[Vol. 38
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enable the seller to rely on the fact that his rivals' response to his prices
will be influenced by his ability to react to their responses; (b) natural
OMs-oligopolistic margins that do not reflect such anti-competitive
threats, offers, or agreements; and (c) margins that reflect various parties'
mistakes. HNOP-MC is then similarly subdivided. Superficially, the
subdivision of HNOP-MC varies with whether prices are set on a cus-
tomer-by-customer (so-called individualized) basis or across-the-board
(apply to all potential customers of the seller in question). In individual-
ized-pricing situations in which no relevant errors are made,
HNOP-MC is subdivided into (a) the best-placed seller's basic competi-
tive advantage (BCA) when dealing for the patronage of the relevant
buyer (the sum of his buyer preference advantage [BPA]4 and conven-
tional marginal cost advantage [MCA]' in relation to this buyer) and (b)
the second-best-placed seller's contextual marginal costs. These contex-
tual marginal costs (CMC) are the extra costs a seller has to bear because
the price he is charging the buyer in question would expose the seller to
some risk of arbitrage (to the extent that the price he is charging is dis-
criminatory or is combined with a lump-sum fee), induce his other cus-
tomers to intensify their bargaining (by putting the lie to his statements
about his costs, by leading them to conclude that he has been treating
them unfairly, or by suggesting that he can in fact be bargained down),
expose him to ex ante litigation and legal-liability costs (to the extent that
his price may appear to some to involve illegal price discrimination or
some other price-regulation violation), and/or induce his rivals to retali-
ate (though a seller will not be able to justify the claim that a portion of
his P-MC gap is non-oligopolistic by attributing it to the retaliation
costs he has threatened to inflict on his rivals and may not be able to
justify such a claim by citing the retaliation costs one set of rivals has
4. A seller is said to have a BPA over a given rival for a particular buyer's patronage if that
buyer prefers the former seller's product variant or distributive outlet to that of the latter. The size
of the BPA any given seller enjoys over another equals the amount by which the relevant buyer
prefers the former's variant over the latter's.
5. A seller is said to have an MCA over a particular rival for a given buyer's patronage if the
conventional marginal cost the former seller has to incur to supply that buyer is lower than its
counterpart for the latter seller. The size of the MCA any given seller enjoys over a particular rival
equals the amount by which the former seller's relevant MC (or incremental cost when the sale of
more than one unit is at stake) falls below its counterpart for the latter seller. Obviously, although
the textual formulation is based on an implicit assumption that any seller who has a BCA over a
particular rival for a given buyer's patronage will always have both a BPA and an MCA over that
rival in their relations with the buyer in question, this assumption is unjustified: a seller who enjoys
a BCA over a rival may do so because his BPA exceeds his marginal cost disadvantage (MCD) or
because his MCA exceeds his buyer preference disadvantage (BPD).
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threatened to inflict on another).6 In individualized-pricing situations, a
seller who is second-best-placed to obtain the relevant buyer Y's pa-
tronage is likely to have to incur CMC to quote Y a price that makes his
offer as attractive to Y overall as the offer Y received from his best-placed
supplier because the price-component of the second-best-placed seller's
"matching" offer to Y is likely to be discriminatoryl-i.e., is likely to be
lower than the price the seller who is second-best-placed to supply Y is
quoting other buyers whom he is best-placed to serve.
2. QV-Investment Competition and its Various Determinants. In
our monopolistically competitive world, firms compete not only by low-
ering their prices but also by increasing the quality and variety of the
physical products and product-images they offer, the locational conven-
ience they provide, and their speed of service through time. Normally,
sellers who attempt to increase the variety or attractiveness of their offer-
ings find it most profitable to do so by making quality-or-variety-increas-
ing (QV) investments in product-design, pilot-plant production, basic
promotion, additional or superior distributive outlets or locations, and
capacity or inventory (whose availability increases average speed of ser-
vice when demand fluctuates through time). Since the factors that influ-
ence the intensity of QV-investment competition are different from the
determinants of the intensity of price competition and since both the allo-
cative efficiency and the distributional desirability of any increase or de-
crease in the intensity of QV-investment competition are or may be
different from their counterparts for a comparable increase or decrease in
price competition, it is important to analyze the effect of any business act
or practice on QV-investment competition separately from its impact on
price competition. This Article makes use of a special set of nineteen
terms or expressions that have been specifically designed for this purpose.
Section 12 delineates the various terms in question.
6. Obviously, the presence of CMC raises the possibility that a seller who has a BCA over the
field in his relations with a particular buyer may not have an overall competitive advantage (OCA) in
his relations with this buyer since his BCA may coincide with an absolutely larger contextual cost
disadvantage (CCD). However, such an outcome probably occurs relatively seldom, for in most
cases the firm that has a BCA will also enjoy a contextual cost advantage (CCA). In particular, the
firm that has a BCA over some rival will probably also enjoy a CCA over that rival because (I) the
former firm's HNOP to his own customers will normally be less discriminatory than the price the
latter firm will have to quote to match the former's offer and (2) most of the contextual costs that are
generated by a given price will increase with the extent to which that price is discriminatory.
7. It is sometimes useful to describe a second-best-placed firm's CMC as the sum of the best-
placed firm's CMC and the best-placed firm's contextual marginal cost advantage over the second-
best-placed firm (CCA): in these terms, a best-placed firm's HNOP-MC can be said to equal the sum
of its overall competitive advantage (OCA=BCA+CCA) and its CMC.
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The first two are the concept of an "arbitrarily designated portion of
product space" (ARDEPPS) and the notion of the "intensity of QV-in-
vestment competition." It is convenient to discuss the definition of these
two expressions together. I employ the concept of an ARDEPPS when
others would use the word "market" to emphasize the fact that in our
monopolistically competitive world the economy's various products can-
not be placed into the kinds of non-overlapping subsets that traditional
discussions of markets presuppose. Many such discussions assume that
products can be clustered into groups such that each member of any
group is second-best-placed (by the same average amount) and close-to-
second-best-placed to obtain the patronage of the same percentage of the
customers of any other member of that group (of the customers whom
any other member of that group are best-placed to serve) and that each
member of any group is never second-best-placed to obtain the patronage
of any member of any other group. Moreover, many other somewhat
less restrictive discussions assume that although one or more of the mem-
bers of even optimally defined markets may be unequally competitive (in
the above sense) with various other members of the market to which they
were assigned and although a member of a given optimally defined mar-
ket may occasionally be the closest competitor of a member of another
optimally defined market, no member of one optimally defined market
will ever be more competitive with some member of another optimally
defined market than with a single other member of his own optimally
defined market. As I have argued elsewhere at great length,' neither of
these sets of assumptions is correct: (1) since some products in an ideally
defined market (all shoe-stores in a given suburb or all product-variants
of a given price and quality) will be more competitive with each other
than with other products in that market, each product within such a
market will not be competitive for the same percentage of all other "in-
siders'" customers and (2) since both product A (a shoe-store in one
commuter-suburb or a high price-quality product-variant) and product B
(a shoe-store in another commuter-suburb outside the other side of town
8. The most complete statement of my argument on this point appears in Markovits, Interna-
tional Competition, Market Definition, and the Appropriate Way to Analyze the Legality of Horizontal
Mergers Under the Clayton Act" A Positive Analysis and Critique of Both the Traditional Market-
Oriented Approach and the Justice Department's Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L.
REV. 745 (1988) [hereinafter Market Definition]. For earlier statements of this position, see Marko-
vits, Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a Monopolistically Competitive
World: A Non-Market-Oriented Proposal and Critique of the Market Definition-Market Share-Mar-
ket Concentration Approach, 56 TEX. L. REv. 587 (1978) [hereinafter Horizontal Mergers] and Mar-
kovits, Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and The Antitrust Paradox A Review Article, 77
MICH. L. REv. 567 [hereinafter Review Article] (1979).
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or a low price-quality product-variant) may be highly competitive with
product C (a shoe-store in the central city near the various commuters'
places of work or a medium price-quality product-variant) without being
at all competitive with each other, it may not be possible to put all prod-
ucts that are highly competitive into a given traditional market without
putting into such a market some products that are not at all competitive
with each other or, less restrictively and more importantly, that are less
competitive with each other than they are with various members of other
markets.
Of course, the preceding paragraph's conclusions do not imply the
impossibility of defining markets non-arbitrarily (at least if one ignores
the difficulty of determining the volume of sales a group of products must
have before they can be said to constitute a market-a problem that ac-
counts for my designating as "arbitrary" the areas of product-space on
which my exposition focuses): one can still define markets in a more or
less traditional way-for example, (1) by dividing the economy's various
products into non-overlapping groups whose members' sales exceed some
stipulated minimum size-groups that maximize the difference between
the weighted average frequency with which the members of any group
are each other's closest competitors (weighted by the amount by which
the members of any such group are each other's closest competitors) and
the (weighted) average frequency with which they are any outsider's clos-
est competitor and (2) by denominating each member of the "maximiz-
ing" set of such groups a "market."9 However, since each individual
member of any such group will not be equally competitive with each
other member of that group, will not be symmetrically placed in relation
to individual inside or outside rivals, and will sometimes find that his
closest competitor for the patronage of one or more buyers is an outsider,
the market-share and market-concentration data such market-definitions
can be used to generate will not be nearly so revealing as the traditional-
ists have supposed. Indeed, in part for this reason, I have argued that it
is never useful to define markets. In any event, the ARDEPPS concept is
employed to emphasize the inaccuracy of the assumptions traditionalists
have made about markets and the related uselessness of any market-ori-
ented approach.
Of course, as the term itself suggests, the operational definition of an
ARDEPPS in a given case will also be arbitrary. However, this admis-
sion is far less damaging to the approaches I will propose taking to vari-
9. I ignore the possibility that even after a constraint is placed on the size of any group of sellers
that can be classified as a market, more than one set of such groups may be maximizing.
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ous antitrust issues than the counterpart conclusion is for the traditional
market-oriented approach, for unlike the conclusions of traditional ana-
lysts-which are often critically affected by the way in which they have
defined their "relevant markets," my conclusions are never affected by
the way I have defined any ARDEPPS. It is therefore important to re-
member that my use of the concept of an ARDEPPS will always be heu-
ristic, that no proposal I make will ever require a decision-maker to make
a significant arbitrary designation of a purportedly relevant portion of
product-space.
The second component of my special QV-investment-competition-
related vocabulary is the concept of "the intensity of QV-investment
competition." In the text that follows, this concept will be defined opera-
tionally in terms of (1) the lifetime (supernormal) rate of return the es-
tablished firms can realize in equilibrium on the most profitable projects
they can operate in a given ARDEPPS: more specifically, the intensity
of QV-investment competition will be said to be solely dependent on-in
particular, to be inversely related to-the lifetime rate of return such
projects yield. Admittedly, the intensity of QV-investment competition
could equally well be defined in a number of other ways-e.g., to be in-
versely related to (2) the weighted average (supernormal) rate of return
the established firms realize in equilibrium on all the projects (not just
the most profitable projects) in the ARDEPPS in question, (3) the abso-
lute difference between equilibrium QV investment in the ARDEPPS in
question and the so-called "competitive" QV-investment level (the lowest
level at which no project in the ARDEPPS concerned would generate
supernormal profits over its lifetime), or (4) the ratio of this difference to
either the equilibrium QV-investment level or the "competitive" QV-in-
vestment level in the ARDEPPS in question. However, since as we shall
see (A) neither the legality nor the overall desirability of a business act or
practice will be controlled by its impact on the intensity of QV-invest-
ment competition in any of the above senses, (B) the impact of a business
act or practice on "the intensity of QV-investment competition" will
rarely depend on which of the above definitions is selected, (C) there is
no reason to believe that any of the alternatives to the definition I pro-
posed will make the impact of a business act or practice on "the intensity
of QV-investment competition" more relevant to its legal and policy as-
sessment, and (D) the highest-supernormal-profit-date (HSNir) definition
I proposed is easiest to employ (the impact of a business act or practice
on this equilibrium rate of return is easiest to analyze), the text will al-
1990]
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ways use the concept of the intensity of QV-investment competition in
the first, HSNir sense defined above.
The next five terms I use when analyzing the intensity of QV-invest-
ment competition or the effect of any business act or practice on that
intensity refer to the various barriers that may confront potential en-
trants to a given ARDEPPS. In general, the term "barrier to entry" is
used to refer to any factor that reduces the certainty equivalent rate of
return the relevant potential entrant expects to realize on his optimal
entry over its lifetime below the certainty equivalent lifetime rate of re-
turn the established firms would expect to realize on the set of most prof-
itable projects in the ARDEPPS in question if they will not have to
retaliate against QV investments in the future. My conceptual system
distinguishes four different types of barriers to entry: (a) the profit-differ-
ential barrier to entry--lT-which equals the difference between the rate
of return (gross of risk costs) the established firms would expect to realize
on their most profitable projects if no one ever retaliated or threatened to
retaliate against QV investments and the comparable rate of return the
best-placed potential entrant would expect to realize on his most profita-
ble entry under these conditions; (b) the risk barrier to entry-R-which
equals the difference between the normal rate of return for the estab-
lished firms' most profitable projects and the normal rate of return for
the best-placed entry; (c) the scale barrier to entry-S-which equals the
amount by which the best-placed entry will reduce everyone's lifetime
rate of return by increasing QV investment in the ARDEPPS in question;
and (d) the retaliation barrier to entry-L--which equals the amount by
which the possibility of retaliation against QV investments reduces the
supernormal profit rate the best-placed potential entrant expects to real-
ize on his most profitable entry.
My conceptual scheme also contains five expansion-related ana-
logues to the general concept of an entry-barrier and the specific types of
entry-barriers just defined-viz, the general concept of a barrier to ex-
pansion and four specific terms that refer to the different kinds of barriers
to expansion that may confront firms that are considering expanding the
amount of QV investment they have made in an ARDEPPS in which
they are established. In the text that follows, the subscript N will be used
to indicate that a irD, R, S, or L barrier is a barrier to entry while the
subscript E will be used to indicate that a given barrier is a barrier to
expansion.
The next three terms I use to analyze the intensity of QV-investment
competition all relate to the fact that in some circumstances, the cer-
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tainty equivalent lifetime (supernormal) rate of return an established
firm's QV investment is expected to generate may be affected by the pos-
sibility that it may decrease or increase the profits the expander will real-
ize on its pre-existing projects in the ARDEPPS in question. In
particular, an established firm will be said to face a "monopolistic invest-
ment-disincentive" (M) to make a particular QV investment equal to the
amount by which the certainty equivalent rate of return that investment
is expected to yield is reduced by its possible effect on the (conventionally
measured) operating profits of his pre-existing projects. Put crudely, an
established firm's QV investment will reduce the profits yielded by the
investor's pre-existing projects to the extent that (1) it takes more sales-
profits from these projects directly by taking sales from them itself than
would be taken by any other firm's QV investment the QV investment in
question will deter and (2) it induces the investor's rivals to respond by
making non-retaliatory price reductions (price reductions whose profit-
ability will not depend on their teaching anyone a lesson) that reduce the
investor's pre-existing projects' profit-yields by more than they would be
reduced by the similar responses that would otherwise be made to any
rival QV investments the QV investment in question will deter. Simi-
larly, an established firm will be said to face an "oligopolistic investment-
disincentive" (0) to make a particular QV investment if that investment's
attractiveness is reduced not only by the possibility that it might reduce
his pre-existing projects' certainty equivalent expected return for the rea-
sons just delineated but also by the possibility that it might induce an-
other established firm to make a QV investment that rival would not
otherwise have made-a QV investment that would reduce the conven-
tional book profits the initial investor on whom we are focusing realized
on both his new QV investment and his pre-existing projects. Put
crudely, a QV investment may induce other such investments to be made
(even when it does not reveal new product-or-distribution types, new
production-or-distribution techniques, or previously undetected pockets
of demand) whenever the second QV investor was originally deterred
from investing by the fear that his investment would induce the first in-
vestor to make an additional QV investment. Finally, and in the other
direction, a potential expander may sometimes have a "monopolistic in-
vestment-incentive" to expand. In particular, a potential expander will
have a monopolistic investment-incentive when the QV investment in
question is sufficiently likely to deter someone else from making a QV
investment that is sufficiently likely to be more damaging to the profit-
yield of the relevant investor's pre-existing projects (is sufficiently likely
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to deter an alternative QV investment that would take more sales-profits
from his pre-existing projects directly and would induce his rivals to re-
spond with more damaging non-retaliatory price reductions). Although
monopolistic investment-incentives will also be symbolized by an upper-
case M in the text that follows, one must remember that the value of that
M will be negative for any investor who has a monopolistic investment-
incentive.
The final four expressions in my special QV-investment-competi-
tion-related vocabulary have all been designed inter alia to facilitate the
analysis of the relationship between (A) the barriers to entry, barriers to
expansion, monopolistic or oligopolistic investment-disincentives, and
monopolistic investment-incentives on the one hand and (B) the intensity
of QV-investment competition on the other. The first two such terms are
"the best-placed potential entrant into a given ARDEPPS at a given
point in time" and "the best-placed potential expander in a given
ARDEPPS at a given point in time." The relevant best-placed potential
entrant(s) is the potential competitor who faces the lowest total
(lrD+R+S+L)N barriers at the relevant point in time (a clause that
makes relevant the pre-existing QV-investment level as well as the date in
question). The relevant best-placed potential expander(s) is the estab-
lished firm that faces the lowest sum of (rD+R+S+L)E+(M or 0) ex-
pansion barriers and investment-disincentives at the relevant point in
time. The "temporal" reference is critical primarily because an individ-
ual potential competitor is likely to face progressively higher barriers on
the successively most attractive QV investments he could make but also
because the additional investments that are made in a given ARDEPPS
through time may alter the barriers (or barriers and disincentives) a
given potential competitor or established firm faces by "pre-empting" a
QV investment that firm was relatively more able to make or by changing
the ARDEPPS' structure in a way that altered the retaliatory or non-
retaliatory response he should anticipate inducing. Operationally, this
fact is significant because it implies that the barriers to entry (expansion-
barriers and investment-disincentives) confronting the potential competi-
tor (established firm) that would be best-placed to make the initial post-
inquiry entry into (expansion in) a given ARDEPPS at the time of in-
quiry will generally be different from their counterparts for the potential
competitor who would be best-placed to make a subsequent QV invest-
ment in the ARDEPPS in question-e.g., that the barriers that the best-
placed potential entrant would face in relation to his most attractive en-
try at the time of the inquiry might very well be lower than the barriers
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facing the potential competitor who would be best-placed to make the
subsequent, additional QV investment that would bring the ARDEPPS
into equilibrium (for among other reasons because this latter QV-invest-
ment project and probably this latter QV investor would be different
from the project and investor that were best-placed to be the first post-
inquiry project and investor).
The final two expressions I use in this context are "the entry-
preventing QV-investment level and its corresponding entry-preventing
highest-supernormal-profit-rate (HSNir)." The entry-preventing QV-in-
vestment level is the lowest QV-investment level in an ARDEPPS that
will make any post-inquiry entry ex ante unprofitable, and the entry-
preventing HSNir is the lifetime certainty equivalent rate of return the
established firms would expect to realize on the most profitable project(s)
in the ARDEPPS if ARDEPPS QV investment just attained its post-
inquiry entry-preventing level. Similarly, the entry-barred expansion-
preventing QV-investment level is the level of QV investment that would
prevent expansions if (most likely, counter-factually) entry were barred,
and the corresponding HSNrr is the lifetime supernormal profit-rate the
ARDEPPS' most profitable projects would be expected to yield if its QV-
investment level achieved equilibrium at the level in question. Although
as I will argue in Section IVD when criticizing limit price (wings) theory
entry-decisions (and expansion-decisions) will be determined by the QV-
investment level of the ARDEPPS in question rather than by the rates of
return its established firms realize on their most profitable or average
"inside" QV investments, it will be convenient to focus on the relevant
rates of return when analyzing the relationship between the various bar-
riers and investment-disincentives we have distinguished and the inten-
sity of QV-investment competition.
It should now be possible to analyze the relationship between (1)
these various barriers and investment-(dis)incentives and (2) the intensity
of QV-investment competition defined in the equilibrium-HSNir sense I
have proposed. For simplicity, I will assume not only (A) that only the
set of firms that were established in the relevant ARDEPPS at the time
of the inquiry may face monopolistic investment-disincentives, monopo-
listic investment-incentives, or oligopolistic investment-disincentives but
also (B) that QV investment will always settle at the lowest level that
would produce an equilibrium, (C) that entries and expansions will be
made in the order of their profitability, and (D) that equilibrium QV
investment in the ARDEPPS in question will always be at least as high
as time-of-inquiry QV investment. For the same reason, I will ignore (E)
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the fact that the expression "infinitesimally more than" should precede
all the barrier and investment-(dis)incentive sums that appear in the text
that follows as well as (F) the fact that entries of a given size (measured
in QV-investment terms) may reduce the profitability of any ARDEPPS
(may increase price competition in any ARDEPPS) by more than an ex-
pansion of the same size. In any event, on these assumptions at least
three conclusions that are worth noting would be justified.
The first is precise though somewhat complicated: if (for some sup-
posedly regulatory reason) post-inquiry expansions were barred or if no
expansion were profitable at the time of the inquiry (if the sum of the
expansion-barriers and investment-[dis]incentives facing the best-placed
potential expander at the time-of-inquiry QV-investment level equalled
[just exceeded] the lifetime rate of return the ARDEPPS' most profitable
projects would yield at that QV-investment level), the equilibrium HSNr
would equal (irD+R+S+L)N for the last entry that was just profitable
(assuming that the time-of-inquiry QV-investment level was lower than
the entry-preventing QV-investment level). Before proceeding, it should
be emphasized that the barrier-to-entry sum just delineated will in gen-
eral be higher than its counterpart for the most profitable, possible, post-
inquiry entry. Although, admittedly, the conditions under which this
conclusion applies will not often be found in practice, the conclusion
does still have some significance since the entry-barrier sum to which it
refers does establish a maximum value for the relevant ARDEPPS' equi-
librium HSNr.
The second, analogous conclusion is equally precise and compli-
cated and similarly relevant: if (for some [say, supposedly regulatory]
reason) post-inquiry entries were barred or if the sum of the entry-barri-
ers facing the best-placed potential entrant at the time-of-inquiry QV-
investment level made entry unprofitable for all potential competitors (if
the relevant sum just exceeded the lifetime rate of return the ARDEPPS'
most profitable projects would yield at that QV-investment level), the
equilibrium HSNfr would equal (irD+R+S+L)E+(M" or 0") for the
last expansion that would just be profitable if entry were barred-hence
the asterisks. Once more, it should be emphasized that the expansion-
barrier-plus-investment-disincentive sum just delineated will generally be
higher than its counterpart for the most profitable, possible, post-inquiry
expansion whenever the expansion-preventing QV-investment level is
lower than the time-of-inquiry QV-investment level. And again,
although the conditions with which this paragraph is concerned will not
often be found in practice, its basic conclusion does have some signifi-
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cance since the expansion-barrier-plus-investment-disincentive sum to
which it refers also establishes a maximum value for the relevant
ARDEPPS' equilibrium HSNir.
Unfortunately, although the third conclusion is substantially more
significant, it is far less precise and more complicated. In particular, as
my prospective MIT book on oligopolistic and predatory conduct will
explain and specify in some detail, in the more general case in which
neither all post-inquiry entry nor all post-inquiry expansion is either
barred or prevented by the prevailing barriers and investment-disincen-
tives, the equilibrium (supernormal) HSNir will be somewhere between
zero and the lower of (1) (7rD+R+S+L)N for the last entry that would
be profitable if expansion were barred and (2) (irD+R+S+L)E+(M or
0*) for the last expansion that would be profitable if entry were barred.
The calculation of the actual equilibrium HSNir is complicated by two
"facts" or conclusions. The first is the obvious fact that a combination of
entry and expansion may result in equilibrium QV investment's exceed-
ing (and the equilibrium HSNir's falling below) the level that would re-
sult if either any post-inquiry entry or any post-inquiry expansion were
barred or unprofitable. The second is the somewhat more complicated
fact that even if each established firm that would be best-placed to make
the various successive additional post-inquiry QV investments (expan-
sions) that would have to be made to prevent all post-inquiry entry could
realize nominally normal returns by doing so (normal returns if one ig-
nored any M or 0 disincentives it faced), the established firms might
choose not to expand sufficiently to prevent all entry---Le., the somewhat
more complicated fact that established firms that are in such positions
may not find it profitable to prevent all entry (or any particular entry)
when the amount of QV investment they would have to make to do so
exceeds the amount of entry that would result if they did not do so (since
the monopolistic investment-disincentives associated with such "limit in-
vestments" may be prohibitive). Regrettably, this analysis suggests that
in the more general case on which we are now focusing it will not be
possible to predict the equilibrium HSNIr solely from the sum of the rele-
vant barriers and investment-disincentives that would confront the last
entrant if post-inquiry expansions were barred or the last expander if
post-inquiry entries were barred. Instead, in this more general case, pre-
dictions will have to be based on data about (1) the barrier-plus-invest-
ment-disincentive sum that would confront the best-placed entrants and
the best-placed expanders at the time of the inquiry and (2) the set of all
successively worse-placed entrants and expanders who turn out to be rel-
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evant-a set that will not include the "last" entrants and expanders men-
tioned above when neither all entries nor all expansions are either barred
or prevented by prevailing barriers and investment-disincentives.
3. The Various Types of Resource Misallocation That Imperfections
in Competition May Cause on Their Own or Affect Antitrust policy ana-
lysts are usually not very clear about the kinds of allocative inefficiency
competitive imperfections can cause or affect. Since I have already ana-
lyzed this issue in great detail elsewhere," I will confine myself here to
listing the most significant ways in which pro-competition policies can
affect the extent of resource misallocation---Le., can affect the extent to
which an alternative allocation of society's scarce resources could have
given its beneficiaries more equivalent-dollar gains than it would have
taken away from its "victims."
I will begin with the two major ways in which pro-competition poli-
cies can reduce consumption-optimum misallocation (misallocation that
reflects the way in which given quantities of given products are allocated
among various final consumers). First, to the extent that increases in
competition reduce the amount of price discrimination that is practiced,
pro-competition policies will tend to reduce the amount of misallocation
that results from differences in the relative marginal purchase-cost of two
goods to different-buyers. And, second, to the extent that increases in
competition redistribute income to the poor, pro-competition policies
may tend to reduce the amount of misallocation caused by direct income-
distribution-related externalities-in particular, pro-competition policies
will tend to do so if such redistributions produce net equivalent-dollar
benefits by satisfying the income-distribution "preferences" of the soci-
ety's members.
Let me now turn to the various ways in which pro-competition poli-
cies can reduce production-optimum misallocation (misallocation that
occurs when an alternative allocation of resources to society's various
actual and potential producers could have given us more of some good
without giving us less of any other good). First, to the extent that in-
10. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A Check-
list for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Checklist]. Most of
the substance of this subsection is taken from this article. Roughly speaking, a beneficiary's
equivalent-dollar gain is equal to the number of dollars he would have to have received in some
intrinsically neutral way to have left him as well off as he was left by the event, act, or policy in
question and a victim's equivalent-dollar loss is equal to the number of dollars he would have had to
lose in an intrinsically neutral way to have been left as badly off as the event, act, or policy in
question left him. For an explanation, see Markovits, Duncan's Do Notw" Cost-Benefit Analysis and
the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1169 (1984).
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creases in competition reduce the amount of price discrimination that is
practiced on productive inputs, they will tend to reduce the amount of
production-optimum misallocation that results by reducing differences in
the relative marginal purchase-cost of two inputs to their different poten-
tial (producer-)users. Second, to the extent that pro-competition policies
redistribute income to the poor and to the extent that any such gains
poor families receive induce them to invest more in the development of
their own children's productive capacity, such policies will tend to re-
duce the amount of production-optimum misallocation we generate by
under-investing in the children of the poor. Third, to the extent that
competitive imperfections deflate the private benefits of production-pro-
cess research (PPR)---.e., research into (alocatively) cheaper ways of
producing a given quantity of a given product-by more than they de-
flate the private costs of such research in general,'1 to the extent that
monopoly deters research into less accident-and-pollution-prone produc-
tion techniques when manufacturer-liability is based on negligence and
producers are never held negligent for failing to do PPR,12 and indeed to
the extent that monopoly also artificially deflates the profitability of shift-
ing to less accident-or-pollution-prone production-techniques that are al-
ready known,13 pro-competition policies may reduce production-
optimum misallocation by increasing the allocative efficiency of both
PPR and production-technique (and production-location) choices in gen-
eral. Fourth, to the extent that predatory and contrived oligopolistic be-
havior sometimes leads to sales of standardized products' being made by
unnecessarily high-cost producers (because such behavior involves un-
dercutting and retaliation by worse-than-best-placed firms or because it
results in the exit of some firms that have lower allocative costs than the
survivors), pro-competition policies that reduce such behavior will tend
to reduce high-cost-production production-optimum misallocation on
that account. Fifth, to the extent that pro-competition policies increase
or decrease the sum of (1) the allocative costs that the government and
various private parties generate in the course of dealing with antitrust
disputes and (2) the allocative costs various private parties generate when
engaging in the acts or practices in question that the antitrust laws cover,
they will decrease or increase production-optimum misallocation on that
account. It should be noted that pro-competition policies can either in-
11. See R. Markovits, Antitrust and R&D Misallocation: A General-Equilibrium Distortion
and Policy Analysis (unpublished manuscript available from the author).
12. See L Markovits, Monopoly and the Allocative Inefficiency of First-Best Tort Law (unpub-




crease or decrease such costs. For example, in the one direction, a toe-
hold conglomerate-merger rule or a failing-company rule that respec-
tively required a large outside firm or failing company to make the most
pro-competitive merger that was more profitable than engaging in no
merger at all might increase transaction costs both by increasing legal
disputes and by increasing the expenses firms incur to investigate enough
additional possible merger-partners to avoid prosecution. In the other
direction, to the extent that a rule prohibiting contrived oligopolistic
pricing (or a policy of imposing harsh penalties on contriving oligo-
polists) leads potential contrived oligopolistic pricers to forego such pric-
ing rather than to arrange and enforce such pricing in more clandestine,
difficult-to-prove, and expensive ways, such pro-competition policies will
tend to reduce transaction costs and hence production-optimum misallo-
cation. It should also be noted that some so-called antitrust policies that
are not pro-competitive may also reduce transaction costs and hence pro-
duction-optimum misallocation by reducing the expensiveness of the
pricing techniques sellers employ--e.g., by prohibiting them from using
certain types of transaction-costly tie-ins or reciprocal trading agree-
ments that function by enabling them to convert buyer into seller sur-
plus.14 Sixth and seventh, some pro-competition policies (say, against
mergers or internal growth) may increase production-optimum misallo-
cation by precluding firms from taking advantage of economies of scale
and by preventing them from combining assets that are complementary
for non-scale reasons.
Finally, pro-competition policies can also affect allocative efficiency
by changing the amount of top-level-optimum misallocation-the
amount of misallocation we generate when we choose the set of product-
types to produce (including leisure, work of different degrees of inherent
attractiveness, and future-vs.-present consumption) as well as when we
choose the relative proportions in which to produce the products we do
produce. Discussions of the allocative efficiency of pro-competition poli-
cies almost always focus on such top-level-optimum misallocation. How-
ever, they usually are limited to assertions that pro-competition policies
will always reduce one specific type of such misallocation-what I call
relative-unit-output (RUO) misallocation, the kind that results when
given the set of product-types that are in production too many resources
are allocated to the production of some such product-types and not
14. See Markovits, Tie-ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, and PolicyAnalysis, 58 TEx. L.
REv. 1363 (1980) and Markovits, The Functions, Allocative Efficiency, and Legality of Tie-Ins: A
Comment, 28 J. L. & ECON. 387 (1985).
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enough to the production of others. Unfortunately, such assertions are
inadequate for two different reasons. First, such statements are inade-
quate because the RUO claim they make is incorrect in itself: given the
fact that some competitive imperfections will survive even the most strin-
gent pro-competition policy that could conceivably be allocatively effi-
cient as well as the fact that various other types of relevant Pareto
imperfections will always be present in the economy, individual pro-com-
petitive interventions that do not reduce contrived oligopolistic or preda-
tory pricing (1) will probably not even tend to improve RUO allocation
(a) intra-ARDEPPS (in the ARDEPPS in which they are individually
applied) or (b) between that ARDEPPS and its moderately competitive
counterparts and (2) will tend to improve RUO allocation (a) between
the ARDEPPS of application and its distant substitutes other than lei-
sure only if the former's pre-intervention P/MC* ratio15 is higher than
its weighted average counterpart for the economy as a whole16 and (b)
between the ARDEPPS of application and leisure only if the goods in the
ARDEPPS of application are substitutes rather than complements of lei-
sure (a condition that admittedly will often be fulfilled). 17 Second, and
more importantly, such statements are inadequate because they ignore
the large number of other types of top-level-optimum misallocation that
all pro-competition policies can affect as well as the ways in which cer-
tain kinds of pro-competition policies can improve RUO allocation. The
rest of this subsection will delineate all the various kinds of top-level-
optimum misallocation pro-competition policies can affect as well as the
directions and ways in which they can do so.
The first two possibilities relate to the RUO-misallocation and re-
lated labor-leisure-misallocation possibilities on which traditional ana-
lysts focused. First, as the previous paragraph indicated, selective pro-
price-competition policies that are applied to ARDEPPSes whose
P/MC* ratios"8 are higher than those of their weighted average substi-
15. Where the asterisk indicates that MC has been adjusted to reflect externalities, factor taxes,
the relevant producers' monopsony power when buying the relevant factors, or the monopoly power
of the relevant producers' factor-suppliers.
16. No similar claim is made for the effect of a pro-competitive intervention on the allocative
efficiency of the allocation of resources between unit-output production in the ARDEPPS of inter-
vention and its close substitutes because I suspect that the P/MC* ratios of close substitutes tend to
diverge in the same direction and to the same extent from their weighted average economy-wide
counterparts.
17. For a further explanation, see Checklist, supra note 10, at 17-29.
18. A more complete statement would focus on the weighted average P/MC* ratio of the rele-




tute (outside the ARDEPPS of application) will tend to decrease RUO
misallocation. Second, as the previous paragraph also indicated, pro-
price-competition policies will tend to improve the allocative efficiency of
labor-leisure choices (at least when the ARDEPPS to which they are
applied produces substitutes rather than complements of leisure).
The next two possibilities are analogous to two of the kinds of re-
source misallocation we considered in the consumption-optimum-misal-
location or production-optimum-misallocation categories. Thus, third,
as was already suggested, pro-price competition policies that reduce
predatory and contrived oligopolistic pricing in ARDEPPSes that pro-
duce non-standardized products (where the concept of a product is de-
fined to include its point of distribution) will also tend to improve RUO
misallocation by reducing the amount of sales made by allocatively
worse-placed suppliers. Fourth, pro-competition policies that redistrib-
ute income to the poor will tend to reduce RUO misallocation by deter-
ring the poor from engaging in crime (by increasing the attractiveness of
their non-criminal options and perhaps by reducing the extent to which
they are alienated from our society and relatedly by increasing the degree
to which they find criminal activity inherently distasteful) as well as by
deterring them from consuming externality-generating products (pollut-
ing, breakdown-prone cars or unaesthetic and disease-and-fire-spreading
housing) that they would otherwise purchase because of its low purchase-
cost to them.
The fifth kind of top-level misallocation pro-competition policies
can reduce is a type of misallocation-X-inefficiency-that might appear
to belong in the production-optimum category since it is normally de-
fined in terms of the "unnecessarily high" costs X-inefficient firms are
said to incur. However, this categorization of X-inefficiency is incorrect:
since an X-inefficient company's employees obtain benefits from the
shorter work-week, longer vacations, less intense work-efforts, more at-
tractive managerial offices and production facilities, and more "attrac-
tive" secretaries and "compatible" colleagues1 9 that raise their
employer's costs to "unnecessarily high" levels, the misallocation in-
19. The words "attractive" and "compatible" are enquoted because the preferences to which
they refer may be based on prejudice. To the extent that they are, a pro-competition policy may also
produce an allocative-efficiency gain by satisfying the moral preferences of those who disapprove of
such discrimination (though any related equivalent-dollar gain will be offset by the losses the reduc-
tion in discrimination imposes on bigots). This analysis may account for the apparent tendency of
monopolistic firms to engage in more labor-market discrimination than competitive firms. See Shep-
herd, Market-Power and Racial Discrimination in White-Collar Employment, 14 ANTITRUST BULL.
141, 155 (1969) and Ideal Regime, supra note 2, at 269-72.
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volved in X-inefficiency is really top-level-optimum misallocation. In
any event, X-inefficiency occurs because in a world in which taxes are
levied on marginal monetary income but not on the kinds of non-mone-
tary rewards that make a company X-inefficient, employees will have an
artificial incentive to substitute implicit (X-inefficient) income for
straightforward wages-an artificial incentive that will increase with the
marginal rate at which this monetary income is taxed. Hence, third, to
the extent that worker and managerial salaries increase with the monop-
oly power of the employer in question and to the extent that higher in-
creased incomes are taxed at progressively higher marginal rates, pro-
competition policies may reduce X-inefficiency by reducing the tax-in-
centives workers and managers have to substitute more attractive work-
schedules and working environments for higher taxable pay.
The final two ways in which pro-competition policies may affect top-
level-optimum misallocation relate to two types of top-level-optimum
misallocation we have not yet encountered-unit-output-vs.-QV-invest-
ment (UO-QV) misallocation and inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment mis-
allocation. Both of these types of misallocation relate to the set of
product-types the economy produces. In particular, UO-QV misalloca-
tion will be said to be present to the extent that the economy's scarce
resources are misallocated between QV-investment uses (increasing the
quality and number of the product-types or product-images available to
us, increasing the number and attractiveness of the distributive outlets
through which we can purchase these products, and increasing the aver-
age speed with which these products will be delivered-increasing capac-
ity and inventory) and so-called unit-output-increasing uses (increasing
the amount of resources devoted to producing units of a less diversified,
conveniently or attractively distributed, or quickly delivered set of prod-
ucts). In theory, QV investment can be either excessive or insufficient
relative to "unit output" from the perspective of allocative efficiency-
le., our economy can produce either too few units of an excessively nu-
merous, excessively conveniently distributed, and/or excessively quickly
delivered set of product-types or too many units of an insufficiently nu-
merous (varied), insufficiently conveniently distributed, or insufficiently
quickly delivered set of product types. However, in practice, I am con-
vinced that the existing imperfections in competition lead to too many
resources' being devoted to QV investment and not enough to unit out-
put. To see why, it is illuminating to focus (artificially) on a marginal
QV investment that is "created" and "used" with resources or factors of
production F that would otherwise have increased the unit outputs of
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various pre-existing product-types "G." The relevant argument then
proceeds in the following way: (1) the private cost (PC) of any such
resource to the QV investor is equal to its marginal revenue product for
its alternative employer (MRP), which in turn equals its marginal physi-
cal product in that alternative employer's hands (MPPF/,) times the mar-
ginal revenue (per unit) he obtained by selling that MPPF/G-i.e., MRG;
(2) the allocative cost (LC) of the QV investor's using that resource is
equal to the value of the units of output its alternative employer would
use it to produce not to him but to those units' consumers, which on
conventional assumptions will equal MPPF/G times the average price PG
over the relevant range.20 Therefore, (3) to the extent that the prices of
such products "G" are supra-competitive (that PG exceeds MCOG, which
equals MR0 ), the PC=MPPF/G(MR) of the resources the QV investor
uses both to create his new product (build his new outlets or construct
his new capacity)-Le., to create his QV investment-and to produce
physical units of his new product (distribute goods through his new
outlet)-Le., to use his QV investment-will be less than the LC=
MPPF/G(PG) of his using these resources in these ways-i.e., QV invest-
ment will be excessively profitable and hence allocatively excessive rela-
tive to unit-output production. This conclusion is simply the mirror
image of the fact that the private value (PV) of a last unit of output to its
monopolistic producer G (MR0 ) will be less than its allocative value
(LV = PG, ceteris paribus.)
Admittedly, this bias imperfect competition creates in favor of QV
relative to UO by distorting downward (deflating) the private cost of the
resources marginal QV investors attract away from UO uses will be par-
tially offset by the buyer surplus that is generated by the sale of the prod-
uct or service the relevant QV investment creates as well as by any
monopolistic or oligopolistic investment-disincentives the relevant imper-
fect competitors face on their marginal QV investments. However, I do
not think that these two considerations cancel out the distortion just de-
scribed. In particular, a combination of four "facts" imply that (A) the
amount by which a marginal QV investor's costs will be deflated by the
fact that he is bidding away the resources he uses from imperfect compet-
itors who would otherwise have used them to increase their unit outputs
will exceed (B) the amount by which his revenues will be deflated by the
surplus that buyers of his new product or service realize: (1) the former
20. The relevant assumptions are that the consumption of the units in question generates no
externalities, that the relevant buyers are not monopsonists, and that the buyers in question are
maximizing sovereigns.
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amount is equal to the sum of the P-MR differences for the marginal
units of output that the marginal QV investor's factor-market competi-
tors will not produce if he creates and uses the marginal QV investment
in question--i., (A) is equal to the sum of the differences between the
heights of his factor-market competitors' demand (DD) and marginal
revenue (MR) curves at the output that indicates the units they do not
produce because the marginal QV investor has bid away resources from
them to create and use his marginal QV investment; (2) the latter amount
(B)-the buyer surplus the marginal QV investor himself generates when
selling the good or service his marginal QV investment creates-can be
expressed as the product of his quantity-sales and the difference between
the average height of his demand and marginal revenue curves between
output zero and his actual output (since the average height of his demand
curve over this range indicates the average dollar value of a unit of his
product to its consumers and the average height of his marginal revenue
curve equals the price he charged); (3) the demand and marginal revenue
curves the marginal QV investor faces when selling his new product
should in general be the same as the weighted average demand and mar-
ginal revenue curves has factor-market competitors face; and (4) DD and
MR curves tend to diverge increasingly as output increases-!ie., P-MR
at a seller's marginal unit of output will tend to be larger than average
(P-MR) over his whole output. For example, "marginal P-MR" will
be twice as large as "average P-MR" for all sellers who face linear de-
mand curves and do not engage in price discrimination.21 Moreover,
although part of the net positive distortion in the private profitability of
QV investments that therefore results from the combined effect of the
supra-competitive prices of the marginal QV investor's factor competi-
tors and the buyer surplus the sales of the marginal QV investor's new
product generates may sometimes be offset by a negative distortion
caused by an operative monopolistic or oligopolistic investment-disincen-
tive, I believe that too many of the last expansions that are made in dif-
ferent ARDEPPSes deter new entry for such M or 0 investment-
disincentive distortions to play a significant role. Although, obviously, a
complete analysis of this issue22 would have to consider all the various
Pareto imperfections that may distort UO-QV misallocation, my own
conclusion is that their consideration will not change the basic conclu-
21. This conclusion reflects the fact that for such sellers P-MR is zero for their first unit of
output and increases at a constant rate for all subsequent units of output.
22. For such an analysis, see Markovits, A Basic Structure for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis
in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World- A Proposal and Critique of the Chicago Approach to the
Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 950, 1015-29 (1975).
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sion that the economy currently produces too few units of an excessively
numerous, excessively conveniently distributed, and/or excessively
quickly delivered set of product-types.23
This conclusion has two clear and highly divergent implications for
the allocative efficiency of pro-competition policies. On the one hand,
since supra-competitive pricing leads to increases in QV investment and
decreases in unit output, the conclusion that QV investment is now ex-
cessive relative to unit-output production provides a strong allocative-
efficiency argument for pro-price-competition policies. On the other
hand, since pro-QV-investment-competition policies increase QV invest-
ment and some of the resources that go into any resulting QV investment
will come from unit-output-increasing uses elsewhere, the conclusion
that QV investment is now excessive relative to unit-output production
provides a strong allocative-efficiency argument against pro-QV-invest-
ment-competition policies2 4 -e.g., against conglomerate mergers that re-
duce QV-investment competition by eliminating an effective potential
competitor without lowering the barriers to expansion faced by the
merged company sufficiently to outweigh the consequences of the elimi-
nation of the "outside" merger partner as an independent force.
The seventh and final type of resource misallocation that is worth
distinguishing in this context is inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment misallo-
cation. This type of misallocation is present to the extent that, given the
amount of resources allocated to the creation of QV investment, alloca-
tive efficiency would be increased if fewer resources were devoted to this
purpose in one or more ARDEPPSes and additional resources were di-
rected to this purpose in one or more other ARDEPPSes. Although
once more each of the various kinds of Pareto imperfections could con-
ceivably cause inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment misallocation in an
23. Actually, only two other types of Pareto imperfections seem to have a significant impact in
this context, and they cut in opposite directions. On the one hand, since various tax-subsidy (accel-
erated depreciation) provisions that were designed to encourage PPR and cost-reducing plant-mod-
ernizations have been written in a way that affords similar advantages to QV investors, taxes on the
margin of income probably compound the tendency of monopoly to lead to too many resources
being allocated to QV-investment uses as opposed to unit-output-increasing uses. On the other
hand, since unit-output production is probably more external-cost-prone than QV investments (in-
deed, QV investments in distributive-convenience may actually reduce external costs by reducing the
amount of driving people must do to shop, though the effect of such investments on residential-
location decisions makes this possibility hard to evaluate), the non-internalization of costs that must
therefore be considered to be externalities probably offsets the tendency of monopoly to encourage
excessive QV investment relative to unit-output production.
24. I should note, however, that rather than permitting business acts that decrease QV-invest-
ment competition, I would prefer addressing the UO-QV misallocation problem separately through
tax laws.
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otherwise-Pareto-optimal world, its major two causes almost certainly
are imperfections in competition and taxes on the margin of income. Ad-
mittedly, unlike the imperfections in price competition that were relevant
in the UO-QV-misallocation context, the imperfections in price competi-
tion that are relevant in the current context do offset each other. How-
ever, the offsets in question are not likely to be perfect. Thus, although
there is every reason to expect that the PC to any QV investor of the
resources he uses to create his QV investment will be equally distorted
(since in each case those resources are likely to come from similarly
placed QV-investment alternatives2"), the fact that most of the resources
a QV investor obtains to use his QV investment (to produce actual units
of his new product) will (in effect) be withdrawn from pre-existing prod-
ucts in his own and closely neighboring ARDEPPSes as well as the possi-
bility that the P/MC* ratios of closely competitive ARDEPPSes will
tend to resemble each other suggest that ceteris paribus the amount by
which the PC of using a marginal QV investment in a given ARDEPPS
will be deflated will be directly related to the monopolistic character of
its prices (at least until one is dealing with a "pure" monopolist, who
takes all his sales from distant competitors). Although a complete analy-
sis would also have to take into consideration differences in the sales-to-
investment ratio for marginal QV investments in different ARDEPPSes,
the preceding argument implies that ceteris paribus QV investment will
tend to be excessive in ARDEPPSes in which pricing is more monopolis-
tic relative to its level in ARDEPPSes whose prices are less monopolistic.
Once more, this relationship is no doubt partially offset by the positive
correlation between a seller's P-MC gap on the one hand and the buyer
surplus he generates and M or 0 investment-disincentives he faces on the
other. However, the same arguments that led me to conclude that these
correlations do not totally cancel out the relevant cost-deflation argu-
ment in the UO-QV-misallocation context lead me to the same conclu-
sion in relation to the relative cost-deflation argument that is relevant in
the current inter-ARDEPPS-QV-investment-misallocation context.
As I have already indicated, inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment misal-
location is also caused by inter-ARDEPPS differences in the effective
rate of taxation on business profits. However, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the distortions in the relative private after-tax profitability of
marginal QV investments in various ARDEPPSes that such tax-differ-
ences create will systematically offset the monopoly distortions just ana-
25. Recall that we are currently assuming that the total amount of resources devoted to QV-
investment uses is fixed.
1990]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
lyzed. Indeed, I suspect that since monopolists will often be able to
overcome the public-good obstacles that might prevent the members of
their ARDEPPS from lobbying or making campaign contributions that
would be profitable for them taken as a group if the ARDEPPS were
structured more atomistically, monopoly is likely to enable the monopo-
lists to secure lower effective tax-rates 26 that will compound its tendency
to reduce the cost to them of using their QV investment: in both these
ways, then, the monopoly power of monopolists is likely to lead them to
make marginal QV investments that are less allocatively productive than
the additional QV investments that could be made in other, less monopo-
listic ARDEPPSes
In any event, the presence of inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment mis-
allocation also has substantial implications for the allocative efficiency of
pro-competition policies. Specifically, since (1) pro-price-competition
policies will reduce inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment misallocation when
applied in ARDEPPSes that have relatively too much QV and will in-
crease it when applied in ARDEPPSes that have relatively too little QV
while (2) pro-QV-investment-competition policies will increase this kind
of misallocation when applied in ARDEPPSes that have relatively too
much QV and will reduce it when applied in ARDEPPSes that have rela-
tively too little QV, the presence of inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment mis-
allocation cuts for the adoption of more selective antitrust policies if this
problem is not or for some reason cannot be attacked in some other way.
Let me conclude with two comments on these last two types of (QV-
investment-related) resource misallocation. First, I want to emphasize
that in my opinion they are far more important than the kinds of top-
level misallocation (primarily RUO misallocation) on which antitrust ex-
perts have always focused. This conclusion itself reflects two facts or
factual assumptions: (1) the empirical "fact" that a very substantial per-
centage of our economy's resources are devoted to QV-investment uses
26. Pro-competition policies can also improve resource allocation by improving the functioning
of the political system in general-by preventing the adoption of allocatively inefficient and distribu-
tionally undesirable legislation, administrative regulations, or prosecutorial enforcement-orders and
by preventing the growth of concentrated economic structures that reduce the ability of our "demo-
cratic" procedures to allow individuals to express themselves meaningfully through effective political
participation. Admittedly, however, pro-competition policies are not ideal means of achieving these
goals. For a more complete analysis, see Ideal Regime, supra note 2, at 272-73.
27. The text has not discussed a third type of QV-investment misallocation, namely, intra-
ARDEPPS QV-investment misallocation, which is primarily caused by differences in the amount of
buyer surplus and externalities that would be generated by the operation of alternative projects in a
given ARDEPPS. This omission reflects the fact that antitrust policies are unlikely to be able to
reduce such misallocation.
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and (2) the mixed empirical and analytic "fact" that although the imper-
fections in price competition that are relevant for RUO misallocation
produce distortions that not only offset each other but seem likely to do
so fairly exactly, the imperfections in price competition that are relevant
for inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment misallocation produce distortions
that offset each other far less perfectly while the imperfections in price
competition that are relevant for UO-QV misallocation produce distor-
tions that actually compound each other.
Second, I want to note that despite the importance of these types of
QV-investment misallocation my ideal antitrust regime would not (or
would rarely) alter its pro-competitive stance on their account. Ideally, I
would prefer to prevent misallocation from being caused by the tendency
of monopoly to result in too many resources' being diverted to QV-crea-
tion relative to UO-production and too much QV's being created in some
ARDEPPSes relative to others by consciously manipulating tax-rates-
viz., by applying a higher effective tax-rate to the profits generated by the
creation and use of new QV investments than to the profits generated by
the use of pre-existing QV investments and by taxing the profits gener-
ated in some ARDEPPSes at a higher effective rate than those generated
in others. If the accounting difficulties that militate against this proposal
could be overcome, antitrust policyper se would not have to be altered to
take account of the misallocative QV-investment consequences some pro-
competition policies would sometimes have in the absence of the kind of
tax-policies just proposed.
B. Four Distinctions that Play an Important Role in Antitrust Legal
and Policy Analysis
1. The Relationship Between the Competitive Impact and Allocative
Efficiency of a Business Act or Practice. Although industrial-organization
economists and academic antitrust lawyers tend to assume (1) that all
business acts or practices that increase competition will increase alloca-
tive efficiency on that account and (2) that all business acts or practices
that do not decrease competition are not misallocative, neither of these
assumptions is justified. The first is unjustified because in our highly im-
perfect economy the (additional) monopoly distortion a given anti-com-
petitive act or practice would create in an otherwise-Pareto-optimal
world may actually lead to a decrease in the overall distortion in the
relevant party's or parties' incentives and hence may increase rather than
decrease allocative efficiency. The second is unjustified because business
practices that do not reduce competition (in what I will argue is the
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Clayton-Act sense of injuring buyers by reducing the absolute attractive-
ness of the offers they receive from their inferior [worse-than-best-placed]
suppliers) may still misallocate resources by generating unnecessary
transaction costs in order to transfer surplus from buyers to sellers in
circumstances in which the income-transfer in question cannot be alloca-
tively justified by any tendency it may have to increase the amount of QV
investment its beneficiary and his counterparts make.
I should emphasize at the outset that both of these possibilities are
empirically significant. Thus, as the preceding subsection argued, the
fact that monopoly tends to misallocate resources to QV-investment uses
and away from unit-output-increasing uses by deflating the PC of the
resources the relevant ARDEPPS' marginal QV investor bids away from
unit-output production probably implies that any business act or practice
that reduces QV-investment competition by raising the M or 0 invest-
ment-disincentive a marginal QV-investor faces (such as a conglomerate
merger that eliminates an effective potential competitor without increas-
ing the merged company's ability to grow sufficiently to offset this effect)
will tend to decrease the overall distortion in his incentives and reduce
UO-QV misallocation on this account. Similarly, as I also have shown
elsewhere,2" many vertical practices (e.g., many functional types of tie-ins
and reciprocity agreements) that are not anti-competitive do misallocate
resources by raising contract-creation costs, contract-enforcement costs,
risk costs, and/or relative-marginal-purchase-cost differences.
Hence, even if one ignores the fact that a business act or practice
that is anti-competitive may still be allocatively efficient because it in-
creases the organizational allocative efficiency of the relevant actors by
enabling them to take advantage of economies of scale, allowing them to
combine assets that are complementary for non-scale reasons, or permit-
ting them to price their products and control their customers in less ex-
pensive ways, the connection between the competitive impact and
allocative efficiency of a business act or practice is far weaker than many
antitrust lawyers and economists seem to suppose.
Two related observations are relevant at this point. First, the imper-
fect connection between the allocative efficiency and competitive impact
of a business act or practice makes more significant the dubious tendency
of most antitrust experts to assume that the American antitrust laws au-
thorize the courts to condemn all business acts or practices that are allo-
catively inefficient. Second, the fact that this connection is so imperfect
really should not be so surprising since in our highly Pareto-imperfect
28. See sources cited supra note 14.
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world the business acts and practices under scrutiny will have several
effects that are irrelevant to the competitive impact of the business con-
duct in question (in any sense of that phrase) but are clearly relevant to
its allocative efficiency-viz., (1) will increase the profits of those who
commit or engage in them, (2) will influence the welfare of buyers who
are not customers of either the relevant actors or their product-rivals
(hereinafter product-Rs), and (3) will affect the profits of sellers other
than the actors themselves.
2. The Distinction Between The Allocative Efficiency of a Business
Act or Practice on the One Hand and Its Contextual Moral Permissibility
or Overall Desirability on the Other. Many antitrust economists and law-
yers have explicitly or implicitly assumed (1) that it is always desirable to
increase allocative efficiency and (2) that no decision that increases allo-
cative efficiency can ever violate anyone's rights. These assumptions are
manifest in discussions of (A) the kinds of business conduct that ought to
be prohibited, (B) the kinds of business conduct that the current Ameri-
can antitrust laws ought to be interpreted to prohibit, and (C) the kinds
of short-cuts the courts ought to adopt when deciding whether to hold a
given defendant liable for violating some applicable antitrust law. Unfor-
tunately, neither of these assumptions is justified.
First, even if a particular decision would not violate anyone's rights,
the fact that it would increase allocative efficiency would not guarantee
its overall desirability. Indeed, in itself the fact that a decision would
give its beneficiaries a larger total equivalent-dollar gain than the total
equivalent-dollar loss it imposed on its victims would have no signifi-
cance whatsoever: we are interested in the net equivalent-dollar effect of
a decision not because we value greenback-equivalents in themselves but
only if and to the extent that such information is relevant for predicting
its impact on other things we do value-e.g., total utility (if we are utili-
tarians). In general, when rights are not involved, policies can probably
best be evaluated in a four-step process: first, predict the equivalent-dol-
lar gains that the policy will generate for its beneficiaries and the
equivalent-dollar losses it will impose on its victims; second, stipulate the
values according to which the policy is to be evaluated (utilitarian, some
variant of egalitarian, some variant of libertarian, etc.) and analyze the
characteristics of the beneficiaries and victims that these values make sa-
lient (average incomes, relationship between pre-policy income and pre-
policy allocative product); third, determine the actual relevant character-
istics of the beneficiaries, victims, and acts and calculate the weights the
relevant values indicate ought to be attached to the average equivalent-
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dollar gains and losses the beneficiaries and victims obtained or suffered;
and fourth, compare the weighted equivalent-dollar gains of the benefi-
ciaries with the weighted equivalent-dollar losses of the victims to deter-
mine whether the policy was desirable overall. Since conclusions about
the allocative efficiency of a given policy do not reflect any such weight-
ing procedure, the fact that a policy would be allocatively efficient is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for its overall desirability
(even if rights are not involved).
Second, the assumption that it is always morally permissible in our
culture to pursue a policy that is allocatively efficient ignores the fact that
such a policy might violate someone's rights. In the antitrust context,
proposals have been made or acted upon that violate the rights of both
antitrust litigants and citizens in general. Thus, since in our moral and
hence legal system (1) defendants in criminal cases have a right not to be
convicted unless the evidence establishes their guilt "beyond a reasonable
doubt" where "reasonable" cannot be interpreted to refer to the quantum
of doubt that it would be conventionally allocatively efficient to require,
(2) defendants in civil cases have a right not to be held liable unless the
evidence creates more than a 50% probability that they did in fact violate
a statutory or common-law norm (that is constitutional), and (3) private
plaintiffs have a right to be given a fair opportunity to establish the requi-
site more-than-50% probability that a defendant did violate a relevant
norm where "fair" cannot be equated with "conventionally allocatively
efficient," judicial attempts to increase conventional allocative efficiency
(or at least to do so by only modest amounts) by holding per se illegal
defendant-acts that might not be anti-competitive, by holding per se legal
defendant-acts that might be anti-competitive, by adopting various rebut-
table presumptions that give more weight to certain facts than is statisti-
cally warranted, by using such supposed short-cuts as predicting the
competitive impact of mergers by focusing on market-oriented data, and
by using certain filters to dismiss antitrust cases against defendants who
might in fact be guilty29 will all violate the aforementioned rights of
either affected defendants or affected plaintiffs. Moreover, whenever
courts adopt any such policy without giving prior notice, they will violate
at least the first affected party's right to fair notice in addition to violat-
ing the rights previously described. In fact, such judicial decisions will
also violate the rights of citizens in general to the extent that they entail
29. As Professor, now Judge, Easterbrook proposed in his article The Limits to Antitrust, 63
TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984). For my response to these proposals, see Markovits, The Limits to Simpljfylng
Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEx. L. REV. 41 (1984).
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self-derogations of power since the usurpation of power violates every
citizen's right to express himself through political participation (in addi-
tion to creating a dangerous precedent that might lead to government
decisions that have consequences that are directly undesirable).
In short, at neither the legislative stage nor the adjudicative stage of
the antitrust process can policies be evaluated solely in terms of their
allocative efficiency. One must always make sure that any policy that is
proposed would not violate anyone's rights and even when no rights are
endangered one must weight the equivalent-dollar gains and losses with
which allocative-efficiency analysis is exclusively concerned to reflect the
ultimate values that are supposed to be implemented. Indeed, as we have
seen, information about the allocative efficiency of a policy has no rele-
vance in itself-L e., is relevant only to the extent that it helps us predict
other consequences we actually do value.
3. The Distinguishing Features of the Three Most Likely Baselines
for Measuring Competitive Impact. When economists discuss the effect of
some private act or government decision on allocative efficiency, they
always implicitly compare (unless they otherwise specify) the relevant act
or decision to the most allocatively efficient act or decision that could
have been made. This commonplace practice may account for the failure
of industrial-organization economists or (more surprisingly) antitrust
lawyers to confront the analogous baseline (compared with what) ques-
tion when analyzing the competitive impact (as opposed to the allocative
efficiency) of a business act or practice in the course of examining its
legality.
In fact, although many such baselines could be employed, three pos-
sibilities are by far the most likely. The first is the counterpart to the
normal practice of economists in allocative-efficiency-analysis contexts:
one could evaluate the competitive impact of a business act or practice by
comparing it with the most pro-competitive choice the business could
have made that would have been more profitable than doing nothing.
The second may in fact be a more sophisticated version of the first that
takes into account both the existence of imperfections of information
about the alternatives available to the actor in question and the related
costs he would have to incur to discover his most pro-competitive (or at
least some more pro-competitive) course of action that would be more
profitable than doing nothing. This baseline would be the most pro-com-
petitive, profitable course of action the relevant business would have dis-
covered had it incurred "reasonable" expenses to uncover additional pro-
competitive alternatives (where "reasonable" could be defined in terms of
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the allocative efficiency of the expenses in question but basically has been
left undefined when this type of baseline has actually been employed in
practice). The third member of the set of most likely baselines is the one
I think the Clayton Act has adopted. This baseline is the degree of com-
petition that would prevail in the ARDEPPS in question if the defendant
forewent the act in question without changing his operations in any other
way. In merger cases, this baseline would be the intensity of competition
that would prevail in the ARDEPPS in question if the defendants fore-
went their merger without engaging in one or more alternative mergers
or making additional QV investments (expansions or entries) in the
ARDEPPS in question on their own.
The difference between this third baseline and its predecessors
should be clear. In the merger case, a court that adopted the first base-
line would measure the competitive impact of the merger in question by
comparing the intensity of competition post-merger with the intensity
that would have prevailed had the merger partners engaged in the most
pro-competitive mergers that were possible and more profitable than do-
ing nothing or the most pro-competitive expansions or entries that were
possible and more profitable than doing nothing (whichever of these al-
ternatives was more pro-competitive). On the other hand, a court that
adopted the second baseline described above would measure the impact
of the merger in question by comparing the intensity of competition post-
merger with the intensity that would have prevailed had the merger part-
ners executed the most pro-competitive mergers, expansions, or entries
they would have discovered to be more profitable than doing nothing had
they spent a "reasonable" amount of resources searching out such alter-
natives. Obviously, both these baselines will lead to the conclusion that a
given merger has reduced competition far more often than will the "do-
nothing" baseline I think the Clayton Act has adopted.
In brief, I believe that both the text of the Clayton Act and the
overwhelming majority of judicial doctrine and precedents support my
"do-nothing"-baseline interpretation. Thus, the text's use of the phrases
"lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly" both seem to me to
be equivalent to "reducing competition in comparison with the status
quo." This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that (outside the fail-
ing-company area) no horizontal merger case or academic commentary
has ever even addressed the possibility that a horizontal merger that in-
creased competition in comparison with the status quo might still be ille-
gal because one of the merger partners could have engaged in alternative
mergers or expansions that would have been even more pro-competitive
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relative to the status quo. Admittedly, as Section 1116 will indicate, some
courts have adopted the second baseline described above when evaluating
the competitive impact of conglomerate mergers involving large, well-
placed outside firms and non-small established firms as well as when de-
ciding whether to accept various merger-partners' failing-company de-
fenses. However, I regard these decisions (as well as others involving
joint ventures and conglomerate mergers involving potential competi-
tors) as being not only deviant but also legally incorrect.
4. The Distinction Between the Relevant Effect of the Business Act
or Practice in Question and the Effect of Prohibiting It. Although I sus-
pect that the relevant commentators are aware of this distinction, discus-
sions of the case for prohibiting business acts or practices that are anti-
competitive or allocatively inefficient or undesirable overall sometimes
assume that the fact that a business act or practice is anti-competitive or
allocatively inefficient or undesirable overall implies that any policy that
prohibits it will increase competition or increase allocation efficiency or
be desirable overall. Unfortunately, for at least four different kinds of
reasons, this assumption is incorrect.
First and most obviously, the fact that government prohibitions may
increase the sum of allocative transaction and legal-control costs implies
that it may be allocatively inefficient or undesirable overall to prohibit a
business act or practice that is itself allocatively inefficient or undesirable
overall. This kind of argument has been made (unconvincingly, to my
mind) in relation to prosecutions of contrived oligopolistic pricing in
cases in which there is no direct testimony of anti-competitive offers, con-
tracts, or threats.
Second, the possible anti-competitiveness, allocative inefficiency,
and/or overall undesirability of prohibiting a business act or practice
that is itself anti-competitive, allocatively inefficient, or undesirable over-
all is also suggested by the fact that a business actor may respond to a
prohibition of an act or practice that is anti-competitive, allocatively inef-
ficient, and/or undesirable overall by substituting an alternative act or
course of conduct that is even more anti-competitive, allocatively ineffi-
cient, and/or undesirable overall. I have myself made this kind of argu-
ment in relation to various kinds of tie-ins and reciprocity agreements.30
Third, the same possibility may arise when the only way or the only
arguably cost-effective way to prohibit a business act or practice that is
anti-competitive, allocatively inefficient, or undesirable overall is to pro-
30. See sources cited supra note 14.
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hibit a larger set of acts or practices some of whose members are pro-
competitive, allocatively efficient, and/or desirable overall. Both Rea-
gan-Administration officials and many commentators of varied political
inclinations have made this kind of argument against prohibiting hori-
zontal mergers that are not blatantly anti-competitive.
Fourth and finally, this possibility may also arise if the prohibition
in question would produce anti-competitive, allocatively inefficient, and/
or undesirable side-effects not because it would apply to a wider category
of acts than would be ideal if good and bad acts could be costlessly segre-
gated but rather because the act it prohibits would increase the rewards
to private actors who have engaged in conduct whose profitability is de-
flated for other reasons. This situation might arise, for example, if a rule
requiring failing companies to incur reasonable costs to find and execute
more pro-competitive mergers was applied to a failing concern that was
started by a middle-aged entrepreneur who formerly worked as a man-
ager of a well-established firm: to the extent that the ex ante certainty
equivalent private profitability of his decision to start his own company
was lower than its allocative efficiency,31 the rule in question might actu-
ally decrease competition, allocative efficiency, and overall welfare by
eliminating the far-from-ideal ex ante "subsidy"32 a more generous fail-
ing-company defense would offer such entrepreneurs if their companies
turned out to be on the verge of failing.
In any event, even if the distinction with which this subsection is
concerned does not always seem persuasive when it is used to support a
particular policy-position, there can be no doubt that in many cases it
really will point to a difference that critically affects the case for a partic-
ular prohibition or policy.
C. The Basic Sherman and Clayton Act Tests of Legality
1. The Basic Sherman Act Test of Legality. The Sherman Anti-
trust Act has two basic provisions. Section 1 prohibits "every contract,
combination..., or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations," and Section 2 makes it illegal
for anyone to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire.., to monopolize" any part of interstate or foreign commerce.
31. Because the entrepreneur in question obtained no direct gains from the tendenc of his
decision to reduce prices in the market in question, the entrepreneur would not, for example, profit
when his presence led an established rival to lower a price in order to retain a sale.
32. I use the word loosely to refer to the difference between the private profits he would make by
selling out to the highest bidder and the allocative efficiency of his doing so in circumstances in
which the higher sale-price reflected the less pro-competitive impact of the merger in question.
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to define the Sherman-Act test of legality
in a justifiable, simple way. In my opinion, correctly interpreted accord-
ing to the practices of American jurisprudence, the Sherman Act would
be read to prohibit any business act or practice whose profitability was
(or was perceived by its perpetrators to be) ceteris paribus critically in-
flated by its tendency to increase the demand curve the relevant actor or
actors faced or would face by reducing the absolute attractiveness of the
offers against which he or they must compete when the additional profits
that are expected to result in this way cannot be said to arise from any
related increase in one or more relevant actors' ability to exploit a given
demand-marginal-cost (DD-MC) combination.
Three points should be made about this interpretation of the Sher-
man Act. First, and most basically, this interpretation amounts to the
claim that (roughly speaking) the Sherman Act prohibits firms from in-
creasing their profits by making choices they would not otherwise have
made (A) to reduce the attractiveness of the offers their existing rivals
make (by entering into a price-fixing agreement with them or by deter-
ring them from undercutting a contrived oligopolistic price by threaten-
ing retaliation), (B) to eliminate their existing rivals (by merging with
them or driving them out of business), or (C) (with a qualification that
will be delineated below) to deter an established rival from expanding his
QV investments in the ARDEPPS in question or a potential competitor
from entering into it. Correlatively, this interpretation implies that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit a firm from increasing its profits by re-
ducing its costs and/or increasing the attractiveness of its products or by
taking better advantage of a given DD-MC combination. Second, and
here comes the qualification to (C) above, the "ceteris paribus critically
inflated" phrase in my definition of the Sherman-Act test of legality is
included to insure that investments that would not have been made but
for their tendency to deter the entry or expansion of a rival ("limit invest-
ments" in my vocabulary) will violate the Sherman Act only if ceteris
paribus (i.e., absent any other distortion in their profitability) their deter-
rent effect would make privately profitable a QV investment that was
allocatively inefficient. And third, the "ability-to-exploit-a-given-DD-
MC-combination" qualification in my definition of the Sherman Act test
of legality is included to insure that so-called "systems rivalry" is not
held to violate the Sherman Act (a conclusion that is warranted by the
fact that the practice-of altering differentiated goods to preclude their
buyers from using complements supplied by other suppliers-functions




Although the phrase "restraint of trade" has a somewhat checkered
past34 and the legislative history of the Sherman Act is not really clarify-
ing,35 the interpretation I have just proposed can be supported by a
mixed textual-functional-structural argument as well as by the substance
of subsequent pieces of antitrust legislation and various doctrinal and
precedential arguments derived from Sherman-Act cases. The textual-
functional-structural argument is based on the following four facts: (A)
the fact that the word "monopolize" has a sinister connotation; (B) the
fact that everyone has always supposed that §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act condemn the same functional kinds of business behavior; (C) the fact
that one of the functional distinctions my interpretation makes is funda-
mentally sound (that [by definition] ceterisparibus allocatively inefficient
acts whose profitability is critically inflated by their reducing the absolute
attractiveness of the offers against which the actor has to compete will be
ceterisparibus allocative inefficient while acts that increase profits by low-
ering costs and/or improving quality will be ceteris paribus allocatively
efficient); and (D) the fact that the other functional distinction my inter-
pretation makes is consistent with (1) other pieces of legislation that were
contemporaneous to the Sherman Act (such as our patent, copyright,
and trademark laws), (2) the assumptions of the times, and (3) the as-
sumptions that most economists continue to make (that acts that increase
a seller's profits by increasing the extent of the gains he can obtain from a
given DD-MC curve will increase allocative efficiency by reducing the
33. Although this type of behavior might also be profitable if full requirement tie-ins were lawful
(since it might be more expensive to police such tie-ins than to alter the basic product to make other
sellers' purported complements incompatible), its profitability is clearly higher in a legal regime that
prohibits such tie-ins (i.e., on the false assumption that they are anti-competitive). See R. Markovits,
Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct: A Legal and Policy Analysis (forthcoming, MIT Press).
34. The phrase was used in a number of common-law cases. Although, for the most part, its
usage was compatible with the interpretation I believe it should be given in the Sherman-Act con-
text, it was sometimes employed in a way that is incompatible with that interpretation.
35. Inferring "legislative intent" from the statements of a small percentage of legislators is al-
ways a dicey business. Admittedly, both the statements various legislators made when the statute
was being considered and the historical events that gave rise to the Sherman Act suggest that many
of those who voted for this legislation hoped it would promote various distributional and other
("non-economic") social goals. However, since the legislative history also suggests that the relevant
legislators (0) did not recognize the relationship between preventing decreases in competition on the
one hand and preventing decreases in allocative efficiency or achieving various other social goals on
the other and (2) never considered the possibility that a business act or practice that would increase
allocative efficiency in the first instance might reduce competition or derogate other social goals, it is
impossible to say how they would have wanted the dilemma this possibility creates to be resolved,
much less how they thought the statute they wrote in ignorance of this possibility ought to be
interpreted.
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buyer surplus that ceteris paribus deflates the private profitability of QV
investments-a claim I reject both (i) because in reality the negative dis-
tortion buyer surplus generates in the private profitability of QV invest-
ments almost certainly reduces the overall distortion in their profitability
by offsetting the positive distortion generated by the supra-competitive
pricing of the sellers who would otherwise produce additional units of
output with the resources the QV investor employs to create and use his
QV investment and (ii) because the pricing techniques in question almost
all increase transaction costs by a considerable amount.
Moreover, although the interpretation given to a piece of legislation
by a subsequent legislature or by a court is obviously not decisive, my
definition of the legal test the Sherman Act promulgates is also supported
by the fact that the Clayton Act (which has always been assumed to be
directed at similar behavior) uses such expressions as "to lessen competi-
tion" and "to tend to create a monopoly" as well as by the fact that my
proposal is more consistent with the courts' interpretation of the Act-
i.e., with antitrust decisions and doctrines (such as the doctrine of "ancil-
lary restraints"36 and the defense of "superior skill, foresight, and indus-
try," which has been recognized in § 2 monopoly cases) 7-than any
other that has ever been proposed.
2. The Basic Clayton Act Test of Legality. The Clayton Act differs
from the Sherman Act in two basic respects. First, unlike the Sherman
Act, the Clayton Act contains a series of separate provisions that deal
individually with relatively specific categories of conduct. Second, unlike
the Sherman Act, which, as we have just seen, focuses on the specific
intent of the accused actors, the Clayton Act focuses on the effect of any
business act or practice it covers on the intensity of competition for the
patronage of United States buyers-i.e., on whether it tends to "lessen
competition" or "create a monopoly" within the United States. I will
first discuss the meaning of the Clayton Act's "lessen competition" lan-
guage and then explain why this provision should probably be inter-
preted to focus exclusively on the position of American buyers.
In my opinion, with two qualifications I will delineate below, the
Clayton Act's "lessen competition" language should be interpreted to
prohibit any business act or practice it covers that on balance injures
American customers by changing the attractiveness of the offers they re-
36. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74
YALE L.J. 715, 789 (1985).
37. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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ceive from their "inferior suppliers" (from those firms that are not pri-
vately best-placed to supply them). Textual, functional, structural, and
doctrinal arguments can all be made for this interpretation of the stat-
ute's "lessen competition" language. If one ignores the two qualifications
to which I referred but failed to specify above (and for which functional
and structural justifications can and will be offered), this interpretation is
consistent with the "lessen competition" language of the Clayton Act.
Unlike its price-minus-marginal-cost (P-MC), unit-output, simple-
seller-profit, and straightforward-buyer-welfare alternatives (which are
incompletely specified, inconsistent with each other, and in three of the
four instances functionally incoherent 38 -at least in terms of the func-
tions that seem to underlie the Sherman Act), my interpretation opera-
tionalizes the statute's language in a clear, functional way that is
consistent with both the Sherman Act and the general structure of Amer-
ican economic policy.
The two qualifications I would make to the test just described will
not affect the outcome of many cases. However, I should admit that both
are difficult to reconcile with the Clayton Act's "lessen competition" lan-
guage. The first qualification would render lawful any covered business
act or practice that benefitted the customers of the business actors in
question and their product-rivals even if it did on balance injure these
buyers by reducing the attractiveness of the offers they received from
their inferior suppliers-e.g., would render lawful any horizontal merger
that reduced the merger partners' (MPs') costs sufficiently to make it
profitable for them to reduce their (across-the-board) prices despite the
fact that absent this cost-reduction it would have induced them to raise
their prices by reducing the attractiveness of the offers each MP's cus-
tomers received from other, inferior suppliers. Although this qualifica-
tion is inconsistent with all operational definitions of the concept of the
intensity of competition other than the welfare-of-the-relevant-buyers
definition (which the Clayton Act clearly did not adopt 39), it is consistent
with one apparent proximate goal of the antitrust laws-to prevent buy-
38. See Markovits, Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrust Laws' Tests of Legality,
27 STAN. L. REv. 841 (1975) [hereinafter Tests of Legality].
39. To my mind, this conclusion is implied by the combination of the following observations: (1)
the Sherman Act does not prohibit a firm from taking advantage of a given DD-MC combination in
a way that injures its customers, (2) although significantly different in some respects, the Clayton
Act does manifest similar attitudes toward the various functions that business acts or practices can
perform, and (3) no court or respected critic has ever argued that the mere fact that a business
practice covered by the Clayton Act (e.g., price discrimination or the use of tie-ins or reciprocity)
reduced the welfare of the buyer it directly involved demonstrates its illegality. (Of course, it would
be unpersuasive to try to bolster a doubtful interpretation of the Clayton Act by arguing that that
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ers from being injured by sellers' engaging in acts that reduce the abso-
lute attractiveness of the best offer these buyers receive from any of their
inferior suppliers.
The second, "natural monopoly" qualification would apply in cases
in which two conditions were fulfilled: (1) the profitability of the covered
business act or practice in question would be assured by its enabling the
relevant actor or actors to reduce their costs and/or improve their prod-
ucts even if any related immediate improvement in the MPs' competitive
positions did not benefit them as well by leading a rival to exit (or deter-
ring an existing rival or potential competitor from making a relevant QV
investment) and (2) the business act or practice in question did injure
buyers by generating efficiencies that induced such exits (or deterred such
investments) by improving the actor or actors' competitive positions and
thereby reducing the frequency and amount by which one or more of
their rivals are (or would be) best-placed. The "natural-monopoly" qual-
ification would give covered actors a natural-monopoly or organiza-
tional-allocative-efficiency defense-Le., would enable covered parties
whose acts or practices produced effects (2) to exonerate themselves by
demonstrating fact (1). Operationally, in the case of a horizontal merger,
for example, this "natural-monopoly" qualification would provide
merger partners with a defense if their merger's profitability was assured
by its direct contribution to their organizational allocative efficiency de-
spite the fact that their merger would leave or did leave the relevant buy-
ers worse off by inducing the MPs' product-rivals (Rs) to exit (or
deterring the MPs' actual or potential competitors from making new QV
investments). Admittedly, it is difficult to reconcile this defense with the
language of the Clayton Act taken by itself. However, structural as well
as policy arguments cut against the straightforward-textual interpreta-
tion. The "structural" argument for a natural-monopoly or organiza-
tional-allocative-efficiency defense is based on the fact that it would bring
the Clayton Act into line both with the general American pro-natural-
monopoly policy (which is manifest, for example, in the patent laws) and
with the Sherman Act as it was written and has been interpreted. The
policy argument emphasizes the allocative efficiency and overall desira-
bility of allowing firms to achieve efficiencies by engaging in any business
act or practice when that act or practice is the most allocatively efficient
way for them to increase their organizational allocative efficiency.
One further issue needs to be examined at this juncture. I have al-
interpretation made it consistent with a doubtful interpretation of the Sherman Act that was estab-
lished by citing the doubtful interpretation of the Clayton Act under scrutiny.).
1990]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ready asserted that the Clayton-Act test of legality appears to focus ex-
clusively on the position of American buyers-i.e., appears to make
irrelevant the impact of any covered business act or practice on foreign
buyers. The basic argument for the conclusion that the Clayton Act
makes irrelevant the impact of the business acts it covers on foreign buy-
ers is a straightforward-textual argument: the text of the Clayton Act
has always referred to lessening competition "in any section of the coun-
try" (emphasis added) and although no one with whom I have raised this
issue had ever considered it before all concluded that the reference to
"the country" does strongly favor the interpretation I have reluctantly
proposed. Moreover, in this case the textual argument is bolstered by
both an argument from precedent-the fact that no case has ever focused
on the competitive impact of a covered business act or practice on foreign
buyers-and a policy argument-the fact that Americans may benefit
from a deterioration in the offers foreign buyers receive from their infer-
ior suppliers when these buyers' best-placed suppliers are domestic cor-
porations or foreign corporations in which American firms (or investors)
have an interest. Admittedly, counter-arguments can be made to each of
these last two contentions. The argument from precedent is weakened by
the fact that no opinion has ever addressed the issue in question explicitly
or clearly ignored an anti-competitive impact on foreign buyers when
that impact would or might have critically affected the overall competi-
tive impact of the covered business act or practice in question-a nega-
tive fact whose significance is reduced by the courts' positive belief that
the Clayton Act forbids any covered act that injures any relevant signifi-
cant group of buyers even if it benefits all relevant buyers taken together.
The policy argument (which is egoistic in any case since the foreign-
bayer losses in question will usually be undesirable from any defensible
world-oriented value perspective) is contingent on other countries' not
responding to this feature of the Clayton Act by choosing to ignore the
negative effects of their companies' behavior on American consumers.
However, although as we have just seen arguments for straightforward
textual interpretations do not always carry the day in American jurispru-
dence, I think that in this instance it is most appropriate to adopt the
interpretation that a straightforward reading would generate-to con-
clude that the Clayton Act does deem effects on foreign buyers
irrelevant.
3. The Difference Between the Basic Sherman-Act and Clayton-Act
Tests of Legality. The preceding discussions of the basic Sherman-Act
and Clayton-Act tests of legality imply that the legality of business acts
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or practices under the Sherman and Clayton Acts may differ for at least
three basic reasons. The first such reason is that the Sherman-Act test of
legality may be subjective while the Clayton-Act test is clearly objective.
Admittedly, even if the Sherman Act is read to contain a subjective test,
in practice subjective intent will virtually always be inferred from objec-
tive evidence about the relevant effects. However, the possible relevance
of subjective intent under the Sherman Act implies that even if any act or
practice that violated the Clayton-Act test would violate the objective
version of the Sherman-Act test and vice versa one or more actors who
did not violate the Sherman Act because they mistakenly believed that
the profitability of their act did not depend on its reducing the absolute
attractiveness of their rivals' offers in some dubious way might have com-
mitted an act that would violate the Clayton Act and one or more actors
who did violate the Sherman Act because they mistakenly believed that
the profitability of their act did depend on its reducing the competition
they faced in a dubious way might have committed an act that did not
violate the Clayton Act.
Second, and more importantly, the preceding discussion also sug-
gests that the legality of a business act or practice that is covered by both
the Sherman and Clayton Acts may differ under the statutes in question
because some effects that clearly are relevant under the Clayton Act will
normally be irrelevant under the Sherman Act. This conclusion can be
best explained by focusing on the case of a horizontal merger. Thus, the
fact that a horizontal merger enables the MPs' product-Rs to charge
higher prices (a) by increasing the MPs' prices to their own customers
and hence the contextual marginal costs they would have to incur to steal
their Rs' customers and/or (b) by deterring the MPs from undercutting
an R's oligopolistic margin (by increasing the MPs' vulnerability to retal-
iation, by spreading the merged firm's defenses, and facilitating the R's
oligopolistic communications)4' would always count against its Clayton-
Act legality but would usually be irrelevant to its Sherman-Act legality:
since the related effects of the merger on the MPs' Rs' customers do not
increase-indeed, will actually tend to decrease-the profitability of the
merger to the MPs, they will be relevant under the Sherman-Act test
only when their presence-or more precisely only when any related ten-
dency of the merger to decrease the MPs' profits-makes critical any
tendency the merger has to increase the MPs' profits by reducing the
40. For an explanation of these two and several other related effects of horizontal mergers on
the behavior of the MPs' product-Rs, see Horizontal Mergers, supra note 8, at 611-58.
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attractiveness of the offers each MP and perhaps some independent rivals
make to the other MP's customers.
Third and finally a given business act or practice might violate the
Sherman Act without violating the Clayton Act because, unlike the for-
mer Act, the latter deems irrelevant the effects that covered practices
have on transactions involving foreign buyers.41
This Part delineated three technical, economic, conceptual systems
that the rest of this article will employ to analyze the various legal and
policy issues with which it will be concerned, four important additional
distinctions or relationships that often play an important role in antitrust
discussions, and the basic legal tests that the Sherman and Clayton Acts
promulgate. Parts II, III, and IV will rely on these concepts and distinc-
tions to criticize the statutes themselves, the interpretations they have
been given by the courts, as well as the ways in which they have been
operationalized in practice.
II. A CRITQUE OF THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS
THEMSELVES
Part II uses the various concepts and distinctions developed in Part
I to criticize the Sherman and Clayton Acts themselves. Section IIA
focuses on some basic deficiencies of the Sherman Act that the Clayton
Act either shares or fails to remedy. Section IIB addresses a number of
less basic shortcomings of the acts as they are drafted.
A. The Basic Functional Deficiencies of the American Antitrust Laws
1. General Formulation: The Possible Desirability of Shifting From
Competitive-Impact and Monopolization Standards of Antitrust Legality
to an Overall-Desirability Standard of Antitrust Legality. Although I am
opposed to using the antitrust laws to pursue some of the non-economic
41. I should point out that the Sherman and Clayton Acts cover different sets of business acts or
practices. For example, unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act has been held (incorrectly, I
believe) not to cover price discrimination on services on the ground that its relevant provision-
§ 2-refers exclusively to "commodities." Similarly, unlike the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act does
not cover the kind of price discrimination that takes place when different buyers are charged the
same price for goods of different quality-an anomaly that reflects the fact that the Clayton Act's
prohibition of anti-competitive price discrimination was drafted in accordance with the lawyer's
practice of defining price discrimination to refer solely to differences in price for goods of like grade
and quality. I will ignore these errors of interpretation and drafting in the text that follows.
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goals others believe should influence not just legislative and prosecutorial
policy in the antitrust area but also the courts' interpretation of our cur-
rent antitrust laws,42 I do think that the current laws were designed and
that antitrust laws should be designed to achieve certain distributional
and political-structure goals and that an optimal antitrust law would also
sometimes focus on the allocative efficiency rather than the competitive
impact of prohibiting the business acts or practices they cover. I will
now address each of these three possibilities in turn.
Admittedly, both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act do serve
and were designed inter alia to serve various distributional goals, at least
if they are compared with a legal regime that allowed all kinds of busi-
ness conduct. Thus, by prohibiting business acts that distribute income
from buyers to sellers in certain ways, the Clayton Act implements utili-
tarian and egalitarian distributional values as well as liberal values that
are opposed to labor-market discrimination.43 And by preventing acts
executed with the intent to monopolize, the Sherman Act serves not only
these values but also more "historic"-4 e., history-including-behavior-
related-values that condemn individuals' profiting from or being injured
by acts that are motivated in this way (utility and equality concerns
aside). However, the fact that the two traditional tests happen to satisfy
these values more than would a legal regime which contained no anti-
trust prohibitions does not mean that the current antitrust laws are ideal
42. In particular, I do not think that the antitrust laws should be used to foster small businesses
or to protect the so-called "liberty" interests of independent distributors. This footnote will explain
each of these conclusions. First, even if (contrary to my beliefs) it would be desirable to subsidize
small businesses as a class, it would be preferable to do it directly and openly rather than, for exam-
ple, by allowing small businesses to use privately profitable, allocatively efficient pricing or contract-
enforcing techniques while prohibiting their larger, well-established rivals from doing so. See, eg.,
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
Second, I am opposed to using the antitrust laws to secure for independent businessmen "the
freedom to dispose of the goods they own as they see fit" by preventing them from being limited by
vertical price, territorial, or customer restrictions. See Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTh Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (White, J., concurring). I have four reasons for this opposition: (A) I doubt
that these interests deserve to be classified as the kind of liberty-interests that merit special protec-
tion in our (liberal) culture, (B) even assuming arguendo that government restrictions of these kinds
would infringe on "liberty" properly so-called, I suspect that the allocative efficiency of many of the
restrictions in question would make them permissible, (C) even if the restrictions in question would
be impermissible if imposed by the government, the actual restrictions with which the antitrust laws
are concerned were voluntarily accepted by the businessmen in question in the course of negotiating
their distributive contracts with their private suppliers, and (D) at least in a substantial percentage of
the relevant cases, the prohibition of the vertical contractual restriction in question would lead to
changes in other terms of the relevant contract or to vertical integration by the suppliers that would
either eliminate the independent businessman or leave him less well off by his own standards. See
Ideal Regime, supra note 2, at 272-78.
43. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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in these respects. In actuality, at least two of the main substantive defi-
ciencies of these acts-(l) their failure to prohibit firms from taking bet-
ter advantage of a given DD-MC combination by employing a more
transaction-costly pricing technique than single pricing' and (2) their
failure to prohibit any firm from taking advantage of its ability to prac-
tice oligopolistic pricing naturally or the contextual costs its rivals would
have to incur to undercut it (or the across-the-board equivalent of such
costs, the gap between the P and across-the-board MR of each such indi-
vidual rival) may reflect their authors' failure to keep their distributional
concerns in mind. Of course, since as we shall see these statutory omis-
sions are usually allocatively inefficient as well as distributionally unde-
sirable from utilitarian and egalitarian perspectives, it is difficult to blame
them on the statutes' authors' distributional lapses (particularly since in
a first-best world a Calvinist or libertarian argument could be made that,
distributionally, legitimate monopolists ought to be allowed fully to ex-
ploit the DD-MC combinations they have legitimately secured-i.e.,
have secured through their skill, foresight, and industry or, indeed, per-
haps even through their luck). Still, it is worth noting that from a variety
of distributional perspectives the omissions just described are distribu-
tionally undesirable. Indeed, in reality even the Calvinist-libertarian be-
lief that every person is entitled to his "allocative product" probably does
not favor the distributional consequences of transaction-costly pricing
techniques or prices that reflect the contextual marginal costs of rivals-
given (1) that even a Pareto optimal economy will distribute income ac-
cording to the marginal allocative products of the last equally able and
industrious laborer in a given line of work while the values in question
probably make salient the average allocative product of all equally able
and industrious people in that line of work and (2) that the economy is
far from Pareto optimal.
The existing antitrust laws also do not reflect the possible political-
structure gains of deconcentrating the economy in general and the com-
munications sector in particular. Once again, to the extent that the anti-
trust laws do increase economic competition among sellers compared
with a no-prohibition regime, they will tend simultaneously to improve
other governmental outcomes by preventing concentrations of interests
that facilitate lobbying and related activities that lead to bad legislation
and enforcement-decisions and by reducing concentrations of wealth that
44. "Single pricing" is the term I use to describe the pricing practice in which a seller charges a
single per-unit price and "allows" all buyers to purchase as much of his product as they like at that
price.
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reduce the extent to which our citizens can express themselves in a mean-
ingful way through political participation. But clearly, a statute that was
directed at internal growth or that required a firm that wanted to merge
to engage in the most pro-competitive, profitable-when-compared-to-do-
ing-nothing horizontal or conglomerate merger it would discover by in-
curring "reasonable" search costs might very well provide benefits of
both these political kinds. Of course, I realize, (1) that both these types
of policies would have substantial disadvantages and might not be worth
their cost, (2) that economists should be wary4' of playing with blocs,
and (3) that there are many other on-balance superior ways to attack
some of the relevant democratic-process problems (limitations on cam-
paign contributions, requirements that candidates disclose the support
they have received as well as their financial positions, limitations on the
size of someone's newspaper-magazine-TV-radio holdings, etc.). Still, in
marginal cases, it might be desirable to condemn mergers (or internal
growth) that seem to be neither anti-competitive nor pro-competitive
(nor indeed allocatively inefficient-politics aside) on political-structure
grounds (particularly in the communications industry but in general as
well).
46
The third (and probably to economists the most persuasive) objec-
tion to the American antitrust laws' tests of legality reflects the fact that
they focus on seller motives or effects on buyers rather than on allocative
efficiency. Because of the various Pareto imperfections that are present
in the economy, one cannot predict the allocative efficiency of a business
act or practice by determining whether its profitability was not ceteris
paribus critically inflated by its tendency to reduce the attraction of the
offers against which the relevant actors had to compete; an act or prac-
tice that reduced competition by injuring the relevant buyers by reducing
the attractiveness of the offers they received from their inferior suppliers
might be allocatively efficient; and one that did not injure buyers in this
way might be allocatively inefficient. The differences are probably easiest
to comprehend in the latter two Clayton-Act cases: since (1) the effects
of a business act or practice on the actors in question, their product-Rs,
the factor-market competitors of the actors in question and their prod-
45. See J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER
(1956).
46. This conclusion reflects my belief that contrary to Galbraith's claim (see id) countervailing
power does not really protect us in the monopoly area: although one concentrated industry's or
manufacturing interest-group's lobbying activities might offset another's, in most cases the various




uct-Rs, and the customers of these factor-market competitors are rele-
vant to allocative-efficiency analysis but not to Clayton-Act competitive-
impact analysis (which focuses solely on some of the effects on the cus-
tomers of the actor[s] in question and those of their product-Rs) and (2)
the competitive imperfections (inter alia) that are present in the economy
result in the covered acts' or practices' having a net equivalent-dollar
effect on these actors, product-Rs, factor-market-Rs, and factor-market-
R customers, allocative-efficiency and Clayton-Act competitive-impact
conclusions would often differ even if the Clayton Act did cover all the
ways in which business acts or practices could injure the buyers whose
welfare it sometimes makes relevant.
In practice, these distinctions are likely to be critical in at least three
important types of cases. The first general category of such cases arises
whenever the allocative-efficiency gains that are created by the efficien-
cies and potential efficiencies an act or practice generates are different
from the increase in competition it generates. Such a difference would
arise, for example, if a horizontal merger that reduced the marginal costs
the merger partners (MPs) had to incur to produce their pre-merger
products was executed by MPs who were often best-placed but rarely
either second-best-placed or worse-than-second-best-placed by less than
the efficiencies in question. Since in such a case the efficiencies the
merger generated would rarely be passed on by the MPs when they were
best-placed and would rarely affect the OCA of any remaining rival when
the MPs were not best-placed, they would have little effect on the com-
petitive impact of the horizontal merger in question though they would
have a substantial effect on its allocative efficiency-viz., would increase
production-optimum efficiency by approximately (1) the (allocative) cost-
reduction per unit times (2) the number of units the MPs produced (the
frequency with which they were best-placed). Hence, in this kind situa-
tion a merger that was anti-competitive might very well be allocatively
efficient on balance even if the reduction in competition it generated did
misallocate resources.
The second category of cases in which a business act or practice
might be likely to increase competition while reducing allocative effi-
ciency or to decrease competition while increasing allocative efficiency
will tend to occur when decreases (increases) in competition are alloca-
tively (in)efficient in themselves. As I have already argued, this possibil-
ity is likely to be most significant in relation to policies that would
increase the intensity of QV-investment competition (particularly in
ARDEPPSes in which-put crudely-price competition and the effective
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rate of taxation on business profits are lower-than-average)--for exam-
ple, in relation to a conglomerate-merger policy that would prohibit a
merger that eliminated a uniquely best-placed, effective potential compet-
itor at least when the merger in question would not generate sufficient
dynamic economies or static economies that would carry over to the
merged firm's expansions to outweigh the consequences of the "out-
sider"-MP's being eliminated as an independent force.4 7
The third major category of cases in which the conclusion that
would be reached under a competitive-impact or monopolization stan-
dard of legality would differ from its counterpart under an allocative-
efficiency standard of legality consists of cases that deal with buyer-into-
seller-surplus-converting acts or practices that do not decrease competi-
tion in the Clayton-Act sense and were not intended to monopolize in the
Sherman-Act sense (since they did not reduce the absolute attractiveness
of the offers against which the actor or the actor and his product-Rs had
to compete) but still created allocative inefficiency by generating tradi-
tional allocative mechanical transaction costs and perhaps certain une-
qual-relative-product-cost misallocation without producing any or
enough offsetting allocative gains. Many types of tying agreements, reci-
procity agreements, or independent types of price-discrimination ar-
rangements belong in this category.48
I have a mixed reaction to shifting from a competitive-impact or
monopolization standard to an allocative-efficiency standard or an over-
all-desirability standard in which allocative efficiency is a major concern.
On the one hand, I do think that actual and potential efficiencies should
be measured in allocative-efficiency terms, that increases in competition
should in general be valued not for themselves but for their allocative-
efficiency (as well as distributional and political-process significance), and
that buyer-into-seller surplus-converting practices that would decrease
allocative efficiency should be prohibited even when they cannot be said
to be monopolizing and will not reduce competition. On the other hand,
I would prefer employing tax and/or subsidy policies to eliminate the
various incentive-distortions that can arise over adjusting antitrust stan-
dards to take account of their existence--L , I would prefer to offset the
relevant distortions (A) by imposing a higher effective-tax-rate (1) on the
profits generated by a new QV investment than on those that are gener-
ated by the production of already-established product-variants or the op-
eration of already-established distributive outlets, (2) on the profits
47. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
48. See, eg., sources cited supra note 14.
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generated in some sectors of the economy than on those generated in
other sectors, or (3) on the profits generated by the creation and use of
new QV investments and the use of old QV investments than on the prof-
its generated by investments in production-process research (especially
when the discovery being sought would be likely to reduce pollution or
work-or-consumption-related accidents) or (b) by offering direct subsi-
dies to those types of resource-uses (production-process research and
unit-output production) that are less privately profitable than allocatively
efficient.
2. Two Specific Consequences of the Deficiencies in the Existing
Laws' Basic Tests of Legality
a. The Failure to Prohibit Non-Single-Pricing, Allocatively Ineffi-
cient, Buyer-into-Seller-Surplus-Converting Pricing Techniques. As I
have explained in great detail,4 9 many functional types of tying agree-
ments and reciprocity agreements as well as many forms of price discrim-
ination are allocatively inefficient even though they do not violate the
Sherman Act or Clayton Act-even though (among other reasons) they
reduce neither the absolute attractiveness of the offers against which their
employers have to compete nor the absolute attractiveness of the offers
the customers of their employers and their employers' product-Rs receive
from their worse-than-best-placed (henceforth, "inferior") suppliers. In
fact, I am confident that even after transaction-cost considerations are
taken into account, it would be allocatively efficient (and desirable over-
all) to prohibit sellers from employing the relevant functional types of the
practices in question especially if sellers were simultaneously prohibited
from employing other, equally or more misallocative techniques in their
stead. The fact that the existing American antitrust laws fail to prohibit
such misallocative practices is therefore regrettable-more particularly,
is a regrettable specific consequence of their failure to make the legality
of a practice depend on its allocative efficiency rather than their employ-
ers' monopolizing motives or their own anti-competitive consequences. 0
49. See, most recently, sources cited supra note 14.
50. The fact that the Sherman Act does not refer to these practices specifically is not the prob-
lem: the Sherman Act does not refer specifically to any of the various kinds of behavior it should be
interpreted to prohibit. Similarly, the fact that the Clayton Act does specifically cover these prac-
tices in that § 2 refers to price discrimination (but see supra note 41) and that § 3 explicitly and
specifically covers the relevant types of tie-ins and reciprocity (though not by name) is not the solu-
tion. The problem is that the legal tests these Acts promulgate do not render illegal many types of
these practices that it would be allocatively efficient and desirable overall to prohibit.
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b. The Failure to Prohibit Natural Oligopolistic Pricing and Tak-
ing Advantage of Rivals' Contextual Marginal Costs. Neither the Clay-
ton Act nor the Sherman Act prohibits firms from practicing natural
oligopolistic pricing or from taking advantage of their rivals' contextual
marginal costs. The Clayton Act does not do so because none of its (spe-
cific) provisions covers the behaviors in question. The Sherman Act does
not do so because none of these behaviors involves an actors' making a
choice that would otherwise not be profitable in order to increase his
returns by reducing the attractiveness of the offers against which he has
to compete-Le., none involves monopolizing offers, agreements, and/or
threats (that would be unprofitable but for their tendency to achieve such
ends). It should be obvious that no such acts are involved in "taking
advantage of a rival's contextual marginal costs." The same conclusion
also applies to "practicing natural oligopolistic pricing" because the nat-
ural oligopolistic pricer is simply taking advantage of the fact that his
rivals will not undercut him because they realize that it would be in his
interest to respond to their undercutting in a way that would make that
undercutting unprofitable for them even if no one's future acts would be
influenced by the response in question because they realize that the prof-
its the natural oligopolistic pricer would have originally realized at a
price that would beat their underbid exceed the strategic and mechanical
costs"1 he must incur to change his initial price. Nor is there any reason
to change this conclusion in those cases in which sellers make "prema-
ture price announcements" in order to reduce the strategic and mechani-
cal cost of changing their initially-announced price" sufficiently to
enable them to practice oligopolistic pricing naturally. In particular,
51. The strategic costs a seller must incur to reduce an already announced price include any
losses he suffers (1) because the price-cut in question induces his possible customers to assume that
the prices he announces in the future will also be reduced, (2) because the price-cut alienates buyers
who paid the higher, initially-announced price, or (3) because the price-cut induces other buyers to
try to negotiate similar concessions. The mechanical costs a seller must incur to reduce an already-
announced price are the cost of changing any related advertising layouts or commercials, the cost of
informing distributors of the change in question, and the costs they will have to incur to retag
products, issue new price-lists, etc.
52. Premature price announcements reduce the relevant strategic and mechanical costs because
they enable sellers to induce their rivals to lock themselves into non-undermining prices without
locking themselves into vulnerable prices first. Such announcements can succeed in this respect
because they inform the announcer's rivals of the prices he will charge if they make it profitable for
him to do so by locking themselves into non-undercutting prices as he locks himself into the prices in
question without actually locking himself into the announced prices (since the relevant announce-
ment is made prior to the time at which he would have to act on his intentions by making sales to
consumers or even by placing advertisements in the media final consumers read, sending his distribu-
tors price lists, or tagging his products).
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such announcements do not change the basic conclusion because they
also do not involve any anti-competitive offers, agreements, or threats.
The allocative inefficiency of allowing firms to practice natural
oligopolistic pricing and take advantage of their rivals' contextual margi-
nal costs is a corollary of the following four observations: (1) as section
IlC showed, supra-competitive pricing increases a large number of types
of allocative inefficiency ranging from income-distribution-related misal-
location to X-inefficiency to production-process-research misallocation to
labor-leisure misallocation and UO-QV misallocation; (2) supra-competi-
tive pricing tends to cause these types of misallocation regardless of
whether it reflects the pricer's contrived OMs, the pricer's natural OMs,
the pricer's rivals' contextual marginal costs, or the pricer's BCAs
(which may or may not reflect his skill, foresight and industry); (3)
although despite these results I admit that it might be allocatively effi-
cient to allow firms to charge supra-competitive prices when their ability
to do so reflects their skill at making cost-reducing innovations and
others would reach the same conclusion when the relevant actors owed
their ability to charge such prices to their skill at making QV invest-
ments53 (since such a policy might increase allocative efficiency on bal-
ance by critically raising the incentives of various potential allocatively
efficient production-process researchers or QV investors), no similar ar-
gument can be made for allowing firms to obtain contrived or natural
OMs or to take advantage of their individualized-pricing rivals' P-MR
gap;5 4 and (4) a prohibition of natural oligopolistic pricing would proba-
bly increase allocative efficiency as well by reducing transaction costs
since it would obviate the courts' determining whether any oligopolistic
margin it identified was natural or contrived and would eliminate the
incentives the current law gives sellers to put themselves in a position to
obtain oligopolistic margins naturally by making transaction-costly price
announcements that would otherwise be premature. Admittedly, some
may argue that our experience with public-utility rate-of-return regula-
tion demonstrates that the allocative-efficiency case for prohibiting firms
from taking advantage of their rivals' contextual marginal costs would be
53. Obviously, since I believe that from the perspective of allocative efficiency too many of our
society's resources are directed to QV investment relative to either the production of units of output
of pre-existing product-service types or the execution of production-process research, I would not
agree with the QV-investment portion of the text's conclusions.
54. Admittedly, although I cannot imagine any set of even reasonably plausible circumstances
in which this would turn out to be the case, the ceterisparibus inflation of the incentives of actors to
make (more or less remotely related) choices that would enable them to obtain supra-competitive
prices for oligopolistic or rival-contextual-marginal-cost reasons could offset the effect of other im-
perfections that would tend to deflate their incentives to make these choices, ceteris paribus.
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prohibitive. However, I would reject this argument on the ground that
this experience is irrelevant in the present context, given that unlike pub-
lic-utility rate-of-return regulation the "price supervision" I am recom-
mending does not require the government decision-maker to calculate
either the size of the relevant seller's investment or the height of his nor-
mal rate of return. Thus, since such a decision-maker will be able to
determine whether a given, individualized-pricing seller has taken advan-
tage of his rivals' contextual marginal costs "simply" by ascertaining
whether that seller's individualized price to the particular buyer in ques-
tion exceeds his MC by more than his BCA in his relations with that
buyer and will be able to determine whether an across-the-board-pricing
seller has done so "simply" by ascertaining whether his across-the-board
price is higher than the price he would charge if all his rivals set their
prices to his customers at their conventional marginal costs,5 the fact
that public-utility regulators have found it extraordinarily difficult to es-
timate the regulatees' investments or the normal rate of return in their
ARDEPPSes is not at all damaging to my proposal. Hence, in my judg-
ment, allocative efficiency56 and overall welfare would be increased not
only if the American antitrust laws were revised to prohibit natural
oligopolistic pricing but also if they were revised to prohibit firms from
taking advantage of their rivals' contextual marginal costs.57
B. Six Arguably Independent, Less Fundamental Deficiencies of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts
Even if one were committed to the Sherman Act's critical "mono-
55. Presumably, one would also have to conclude that the relevant seller's price was insuffi-
ciently likely to have reflected an error on his part for him to be able to escape guilt or liability on
that account.
56. The allocative-efficiency argument is strengthened by what I suspect is the tendency of the
practices in question to be more important in ARDEPPSes in which P/MC* would probably be
higher-than-average in any case, given that pro-competition policies with a greater-than-average in-
cidence in such ARDEPPSes will also tend to reduce inter-ARDEPPS QV-investment misallocation
and, less significantly, inter-ARDEPPS RUO misallocation among distant competitors.
57. For precisely the same reasons that they do not prohibit a firm from obtaining natural OMs,
the Sherman and Clayton Acts also do not prohibit a firm from taking advantage of the natural
oligopolistic investment-disincentives its rivals face by restricting its own QV investments. However,
although one could require firms to make any QV investment that would be profitable were it not for
the oligopolistic investment-disincentives it and its rivals faced, I have not discussed the failure of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts to do so (1) because in practice it would be very difficult to identify cases
in which such investment-disincentives were operative and (2) because at least until the distortions in
the private profitability of QV investments that imperfections in price competition generate are offset
by appropriate tax and/or subsidy policies, any additional QV investments such a policy would
induce are likely to be misallocative and probably undesirable overall.
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polizing intent" test of legality and the Clayton Act's competitive-impact
test of legality, these statutes could be improved in a variety of different
ways. For example, as the preceding section implies, the statutes would
have been far more satisfactory had they defined their critical terms ("re-
straint of trade," "monopolizes," "to lessen competition or to tend to
create a monopoly") more clearly. This section (1) examines two specific
problems caused by the Clayton Act's formulation of its "competitive-
impact" test that could be considered to be independent of the selection
of this test in preference to an allocative-efficiency or overall-desirability
test, (2) describes a substantive error that several Clayton-Act provisions
manifest, and (3) considers (a) one other Sherman-Act drafting-def-
ciency and (b) two specific Clayton-Act drafting-deficiencies that have
produced undesirable results.
1. The Legal Significance Under the Clayton Act of a Covered Busi-
ness Act's Effect on (1) the Relevant Buyers' Welfare or (2) the Accused
Actor's Organizational Allocative Efficiency. An interpretation of the
Clayton Act that focused solely on its text might very well lead to the
conclusion that it condemns the following two types of covered business
acts or practices: (1) acts or practices that ceteris paribus tend to injure
the customers of the accused actor(s) and their product-rivals by reduc-
ing the absolute attractiveness of the offers these buyers received from
their inferior suppliers even though the acts or practices in question bene-
fit these buyers overall because by generating marginal static efficiencies
they induce the relevant actors-who are across-the-board pricers-to
lower their prices, and (2) acts and practices that function in the first
instance by raising the organizational allocative efficiency of the actors in
question but injure the relevant buyers on balance by reducing the actual
OCAs of the actors' existing rivals sufficiently to cause them to exit or
the prospective OCAs of potential expanders or entrants sufficiently to
deter them from expanding or entering. Although, admittedly, one
might argue that my objection to these conclusions is based on my pref-
erence for allocative-efficiency or overall-desirability tests of legality, I do
think one could support the kind of competitive-impact test I have de-
scribed and still advocate the kind of buyer-welfare or organizational-
allocative-efficiency exceptions that would result from the rejection of the
two conclusions just delineated. My own judgment is that the supporters
of the Clayton Act would have approved of these exceptions or qualifica-
tions to the simpler Clayton-Act test of legality. This conclusion is con-
sistent with their desire to increase the welfare of the relevant buyers and
with their willingness to allow legitimate monopolists to profit from their
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monopolies even when their efforts to do so injured their customers after
their discovery or innovation was made-a willingness that is manifest in
various Clayton-Act supporters' support for patent, copyright, and
trademark laws as well as in their support for the Sherman Act, whose
language ("monopolizes") suggests that it was intended to punish only
behavior that was neither productive in itself nor ancillary to other con-
duct that was socially productive. For this reason, to the extent that the
text of the Clayton Act militates against the recognition of these "excep-
tions" or qualifications to the simpler Clayton-Act test, it seems fair to
describe it as deficient.
Of course, I do not want to imply that, in my opinion, the interpre-
tation of the Clayton Act that is judicially appropriate would reject these
qualifications or exceptions. In American jurisprudence, it would be en-
tirely appropriate for an interpreter to take into account (1) the distribu-
tional concerns of its drafters, (2) the presence of other non-antitrust
legislation (say, patent, copyright, and trademark law) that recognized
the legitimacy of firms' profiting from their innovations, (3) the fact that
the Sherman Act's language (the negative connotation of "monopoliz-
ing") also suggested the lawfulness of obtaining advantages through skill,
foresight, and industry, and (4) the use of other methods (public-utility
regulation) to control natural monopolies. Indeed, as I have argued
before, I believe that a sophisticated reading of the Clayton Act would
lead to these "exceptions'" being recognized.58
2. The Clayton Act's Apparent Assumptions About the Competitive
Impact of Price Discrimination and Various Other Vertical Contractual
Arrangements. Although § 2 and § 3 of the Clayton Act condemn re-
spectively price discrimination on commodities of like grade and quality
and various sorts of vertical contractual arrangements only if they may
"substantially... limit competition or tend to create-a monopoly"-Le.,
although these sections do not state that such practices and contractual
arrangements always or even usually do reduce competition, they cer-
tainly do imply that such practices and contractual provisions reduce
competition in ways that would not otherwise be covered by the antitrust
laws sufficiently often and demonstrably to justify their existence. I
doubt that this implication is correct. The fear that the supposed ability
of big buyers to obtain cost-justified price-concessions would lead to re-
ductions in competition by putting small firms in a position in which they
58. See Tests of Legality, supra note 38, at 853 and the text of this article in the paragraph
following note 39 supra.
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had to exit has proved unjustified-at least in part because small firms
have been able to join together into buyers' cooperatives.59 And, as I
have argued in great detail elsewhere,"° except in extraordinarily rare
and probably undemonstrable instances,61 the only types of other vertical
contracts that would violate the Clayton Act's test of legality would be
illegal in any case-for example, because they were predatory or func-
tioned by concealing predatory behavior or contrived oligopolistic pric-
ing. Hence, in my opinion, §§ 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act give a
misleading impression of the possible consequences of the practices with
which they deal.
I admit that this argument may seem suspect for two reasons-one
of which does have some force. First, and somewhat forcefully, it might
be contended that the likely consequences of the relevant vertical prac-
tices cut in the opposite direction to the one I have indicated: rather than
arguing that §§ 2 and 3 should be removed because they are "inconsis-
tent" with my interpretation of the Clayton Act's test of legality, could
one not argue that my interpretation of that test should be rejected be-
cause it is inconsistent with the implicit premises of §§ 2 and 3? No
doubt one could, but I would argue for my position by pointing to in-
dependent evidence that the authors of §§ 2 and 3 did not understand the
actual functions and competitive consequences of the practices with
which these provisions dealt. Indeed, even the courts are just now begin-
ning to grasp the relevant functional and competitive-impact analyses.
59. Indeed, a rule allowing price discrimination by sellers in favor of customers they are worse-
than-best-placed to serve would actually be pro-competitive since it would reduce such inferiors'
contextual marginal costs and hence the best-placed supplier's HNOP (and perhaps his OMs as
well). It is unclear whether the clause of the Clayton Act that allows discrimination "in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor"
(15 USC § 13(b)) (1988)) permits all price discrimination from a position of inferiority since many
such discriminatory offers beat rather than "meet" the best-placed supplier's offer.
60. For my analysis of tie-ins and reciprocity, see sources cited supra note 14. For my analysis
of resale price maintenance and vertical territorial and customer restrictions, see Ideal Regime, supra
note 2, at 323-29. For my analysis of exclusive dealerships and long-term requirements contracts,
see R. Markovits, Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct-A Legal and Policy Analysis (forthcoming,
MIT Press).
61. The general use of tie-ins, reciprocity, RPM, or vertical territorial restraints could conceiva-
bly reduce competition by raising the barriers to expansion or entry facing an effective best-placed
potential expander or entrant. However, this outcome will occur only if these practices are more
profitable for well-established firms that are not such potential expanders than for such potential
expanders and potential entrants and will, to my mind, be legally relevant (even in theory) only if the
relevant practice's profitability does not reflect the contribution it makes to its employer's organiza-
tional allocative efficiency. The textual assertion reflects my beliefs that the relevant practices tend
to be more profitable for potential entrants than for established firms and that any such differences in
profitability will be very difficult to demonstrate.
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The second argument that some might make against this section fo-
cuses on my conclusion that price discrimination from best-placed posi-
tions and many functional types of tie-ins, reciprocity agreements, and
other vertical contractual provisions are often misallocative and undesir-
able overall. Some might argue that this fact completely undermines my
objection to the statute's implication that these practices will at least
sometimes be illegal. This argument has no force. Although I do think
that many functional types of the relevant practices should be made ie-
gal, my conclusion does not reflect my judgment that they are anti-com-
petitive but rather my judgment that their illegality should not be made
to depend on their being anti-competitive. Sections 2 and 3 establish the
wrong standard of illegality. Their incorrect implication that the rele-
vant practices will often violate that wrong standard cannot be justified
by any supposed tendency it has to lead the practice to be condemned in
individual cases. It is not morally permissible to convict parties who
have not violated the law as written even if an optimal law would render
their behavior illegal, and §§ 2 and 3 militate against the passage of ap-
propriate legislation not only by preempting the field but also by misdi-
recting the attention of legislators and policy-analysts.
3. The Specific Drafting-Deficiencies of the Sherman Act or Clayton
Act
a. The Failure of the Sherman Act to Prohibit Attempts to Enter
into Contracts, Agreements, or Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade. The
Sherman Act does not contain any general "attempt" provisions, and-
unlike § 2 of the Sherman Act-§ 1 does not specifically prohibit at-
tempts to form contracts, agreements, or conspiracies in restraint of
trade. This omission is important because there is no general federal at-
tempt statute and federal courts have always refused to read attempt-
provisions into criminal statutes that lack them or their equivalent.
More specifically, the fact that § 1 does not contain an attempt-provision
means that it does not forbid the following kinds of conduct that may
injure the buyers it directly affects: (1) making an anti-competitive offer
that is not accepted (that is misunderstood or rejected) and (2) "ac-
cepting" an anti-competitive offer that was never made (by choosing not
to beat a rival offer that the "acceptor" could have profited from beat-
ing). Although both of these types of behaviors are illicitly motivated (by
Sherman-Act standards) and although both are maldistributive and mis-
allocative 2 as well, neither will be condemned by the Sherman Act as it
62. To see why both categories of attempts may raise the price that the relevant buyer has to pay
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is currently drafted. Since this kind of contrived oligopolistic conduct is
not covered by the Clayton Act at all, this drafting-deficiency leaves a
significant hole in the American Antitrust laws.63
b. Two Specific Deficiencies of the Clayton Act
(1) The Drafting of its Anti-Price-Discrimination Provision. As I
have already noted,64 the Clayton Act's anti-price-discrimination provi-
sion has two major deficiencies: (A) it adopts the lawyer's definition of
price discrimination-the charging of unequal prices for goods of like
grade and quality-a definition that excludes from that category the
charging of similar prices for goods of different grades or quality and (B)
it limits its coverage to "commodities," a concept that has been inter-
preted (inappropriately, I believe) to refer solely to goods and not to serv-
ices. Both these deficiencies could obviously be remedied by superior
drafting. I have also indicated that its "meeting competition in good
faith" provision is also problematic in that it seems not to cover a seller
who has engaged in pro-competitive and allocatively efficient price dis-
crimination by offering a concession to a buyer he was not best-placed to
serve when that concession beat the offer that buyer's best-placed sup-
and cause various kinds of resource misallocation, assume that Xl's HNOP is $1.10 in his relations
with Y1 because X2-who is Xl's closest rival for Y1's patronage-must incur $1.10 in marginal
costs to produce the same product that XI can supply to Y1 at a marginal cost of $1. The first type
of situation described in the text can be illustrated by a case in which X1 makes an anti-competitive
offer and then charges Yl a price of $1.14 and X2 rejects that offer and secures Yl's patronage with
a price of $1.13. Obviously, in this case, Y1 will be three cents worse off than he would have been
had Xl not made his anti-competitive offer, and allocative inefficiency will be 10 cents higher (the
difference between X2's and Xl's marginal costs, ceterisparibus) than it would have been had XI not
tre-l to contrive an oligopolistic price in this way.
The second situation described in the text is illustrated by a case in which (1) Xl quotes a price of
$1.14 to Y1 in the mistaken belief that X2 will have to incur marginal costs of $1.14 to supply Y1,
(2) X2 mistakenly concludes that XI's price was intended to communicate an anti-competitive offer,
basing his conclusion on Xl's past behavior, his belief that Xl would not misestimate Xl's HNOP,
and the fact that X1 has given him the opportunity to make a profit by stealing one of XI's own
customers, (3) X2 responds to that conclusion (A) by setting a price of $1.15 to Yl and (B) by
charging his own customer Y2 a price of $1.13-four cents above his HNOP of $1.09 in relation to
that buyer (where X2's costs in relation to Y2 are $1 and Xl's, $1.09) and (C) XI then proceeds to
secure Y2's patronage by offering him a price of $1.12. In this case, X2's attempted acceptance will
have cost YI the one cent (or infinitesimal) gain he would otherwise have obtained from Y2's under-
bid and X2's related contrived oligopolistic price to Y2 will have cost Y2 three cents ($1.12 minus
$1.09) and society nine cents (the difference between X2's and Xl's marginal costs of supplying Y2,
ceteris paribus).
63. Here, as elsewhere, I am ignoring the Federal Trade Commerce Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58
(1980)) on the assumption that its substantive tests of legality do not add anything relevant to those
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
64. See supra note 41.
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plier made or was likely to make. Although this is not the place to en-
gage in detailed criticism of the Robinson-Patman Act, it did seem to me
that these two "drafting-deficiencies" were worth noting since they mili-
tate against the accomplishment of the statute's purported proximate
goal of increasing competition (or at least preventing decreases in
competition).
(2) Its Reference to Competition "in any line of commerce in any
section of the country." The Clayton Act prohibits the practices it cov-
ers if they substantially "lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly" "in any line of commerce in any section of the country" (emphasis
added). To my mind, the Act's use of this italicized expression has had
three very unfortunate consequences. First, although this interpretation
was never inevitable and is even less persuasive now that a 1980 amend-
ment added the words "or in any activity affecting commerce in any sec-
tion of the country," the italicized expression has been read to imply that
the courts should adopt a market-oriented approach to predicting the
competitive impact of the business acts in question-that the Clayton
Act condemns an act only if it reduces competition (substantially) in
some market.65 Since, as Part IV will argue, such market-oriented ap-
proaches are neither acceptably accurate nor cost-effective, this conse-
quence of the language in question is undesirable.
Second, although I think that this interpretation is too dysfunctional
to be correct, the italicized language has also led the courts to conclude
66
that the Clayton Act condemns any covered business act or practice that
reduces competition substantially in any product market (Le., "in any
line of commerce") or in any geographic market (Le., "in any section of
the country") even if it increases competition sufficiently elsewhere to be
pro-competitive in the relevant sense overall (or at least not to be "sub-
stantially " anti-competitive in that sense overall).
And, third, at least everyone with whom I have discussed this is-
sue 67 has agreed that the Clayton Act's reference to "any section of the
country" (emphasis added) favors the conclusion that the Act deems ir-
relevant the effects and practices it covers on foreign buyers. Since my
distributional values lead me to oppose such an outcome and since I fear
that foreign governments may respond to such American provincialism
in ways that make this outcome inimical to narrowly-defined American
65. See, eg., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
66. See, eg., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
67. This issue had not been raised before I articulated it in Section VI of Market Definition,
supra note 8, at 858-60.
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interests, I regard the italicized statutory language to be undesirable on
this account as well.
III. A CRITIQuE OF THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS
This Part will be concerned with the courts' abstract reading or in-
terpretation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 68 It will argue that some
of the deficiencies of our living law cannot be attributed either to the
basic tests of legality those statutes promulgated or to various other ar-
guably independent deficiencies in their drafting: that some of our living
anti-trust laws' inadequacies reflect the fact that the courts have inter-
preted the relevant statutes incorrectly (taking into consideration not
only the tests the statutes establish but also their legislative histories,
their functions, and the substance of various relevant other pieces of
American law). Part III will itself be divided into two sections. Section
IIIA will review the various respects in which I have already suggested
the courts have misinterpreted the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Section
IIIB then addresses a number of additional interpretive issues the courts
have not handled correctly.
A. Four Misinterpretations That Have Already Been Delineated
1. The "Competitive-Impact" Baseline (Compared-to- What?) Inter-
pretation. The Clayton Act condemns certain kinds of business acts and
practices where their effect may be "substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a "monopoly." However, it does not explicitly indicate
the baseline that should be used when making the relevant competitive-
impact calculation. As Section IB3 pointed out, in general, a number of
different benchmarks could be used for this purpose-i.e., in general, one
could compute the "competitive impact" of any business act or practice
by comparing the intensity of competition with which it was (or would
be) associated with the intensity of competition that would have resulted
had the actor in question made any number of different choices. How-
ever, in the Clayton-Act context, it is clear that the appropriate bench-
mark is the intensity of competition that would have resulted from the
accused actor's doing nothing relevant at all. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the text of the statute since the critical words "lessen" and
"create" both imply that the relevant actors are forbidden solely from
68. Part IV will be concerned with the courts' operationalization of the interpretations they
placed on the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Although I admit that the distinction between "interpre-
tation" and "operationalization" will not always be clear in given cases, it is useful expositionally.
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making positive moves that reduce the intensity of competition below the
level that would have prevailed had they done nothing and (2) by the
related fact that the courts and their company have usually not inter-
preted the antitrust laws to require a seller to compete actively-ie., to
take any positive action to increase competition (for example, to resist an
anti-competitive threat).69
This subsection is concerned with three substantial, unjustified ex-
ceptions that have been made or proposed to this usual interpretive prac-
tice. I will first discuss these exceptions and then evaluate them. The
first exception relates to the failing-company cases. In particular, in a
number of important decisions the Supreme Court and various lower
courts have required defendants who wished to take advantage of the
failing-company "defense" to demonstrate both (1) that no more pro-
competitive mergers were available to them70 (or at least that they had
made "unsuccessful good faith efforts"7 1 to discover more pro-competi-
tive mergers that would have been more profitable than not merging) and
(2) that there was no reasonable prospect of a reorganization's making
competition more intense than it was made (or would be made) by the
merger in question.72
The second exception relates to conglomerate-merger cases in which
a large, outside seller operating in the same business in a different geo-
graphic market has proposed a merger with a non-small, inside firm-a
merger that would not reduce competition in comparison with the status
quo. The exception in question would require the outsider in such cases
to demonstrate that it could not have profited from entering into a so-
called toe-hold merger with a smaller established firm (a toe-hold merger
which is assumed [dubiously, to my mind] to be more pro-competitive
than not merging at all). This requirement was first imposed by the
69. I do not want to imply that the antitrust cases never condemn "doing nothing." To the
contrary, I believe that the Sherman Act does prohibit a firm from engaging in predation (or retalia-
tion) by refusing to deal when that refusal is not part of a group boycott or concerted refusal to deal.
Obviously, the Sherman Act also prohibits refusing to undercut a rival when that decision is made
pursuant to an anti-competitive agreement-though I do not think that it prohibits a seller from
succumbing to a threat by failing to undercut a rival's contrived oligopolistic prices or choosing not
to enter or expand when the profitability of this choice was critically affected by a retaliation barrier
to entry or expansion.
70. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
71. The quoted phrase comes from the Justice Department's 1984 Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. 4490, 4500, 4510 (1986) and not from any judicial opinion.
72. Once more, although I think that this proviso is implied by the relevant judicial doctrine, it
was clearly specified only by the Guidelines. Id.
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Fr173 and was subsequently cited sympathetically by at least two Courts
of Appeals.7 4 (The Supreme Court took notice of the doctrine in Falstaff
Brewing" but neither adopted nor rejected it-in particular "left [it] for
another day.")
The third exception relates to conglomerate-merger cases (including
those that would be covered by the toe-hold merger doctrine) and joint-
venture cases in general. The competitive impact of all conglomerate
mergers and joint ventures are analyzed by comparing the intensity that
competition would have if the relevant mergers or joint ventures were
executed with the intensity it would have if the relevant mergers or joint
ventures were forbidden, taking into consideration the likelihood that
one or both of the MPs or joint venturers in question would enter the
market if the merger or joint venture were forbidden-i e., are analyzed
by comparing their consequences with those of other pro-competitive
acts in which, I believe, the accused had no obligation to engage.76
I admit that these "exceptions'" adoption of this alternative base-
line might very well make good policy sense (that the courts might very
well be able to predict the choices the relevant actors would substitute for
the conduct in question sufficiently accurately at sufficiently low cost to
make the effort worthwhile).77 I also admit that I have myself adopted a
non-do-nothing baseline when analyzing the competitive impact and le-
gality78  of horizontal mergers, 79 joint ventures,8 0 and conglomerate
mergers.8" However, I find this interpretation impossible to reconcile
73. See the FTC decision in Bendix Corp., 77 F.T.C. 731, 815, 817 (1970), vacated on proce.
dural grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971), consent order, 84 F.T.C. 1291 (1974).
74. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. F.T.C., 467 F.2d 67, 77 n.8 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 909 (1974) and BOC Int'l Ltd. v. F.T.C., 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
75. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973). Moreover, although the courts
have never addressed this possibility (because they have failed to analyze QV-investment competition
separately and because, relatedly, they have ignored the possibility that the merger partners involved
in horizontal mergers might make more QV investments in the relevant ARDEPPS or ARDEPPSes
in question as separate entities), I suspect that if the courts' attention were directed to these possibili-
ties, they would also calculate the competitive impact of a horizontal merger by analyzing the effect
on competition of substituting any such expansions that would result if the merger were forbidden
for the behavior that actually resulted from the merger in question.
76. See, eg., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
77. Obviously, this statement implies the existence of another deficiency in the Clayton Act's
drafting or another basic error in the legal test it promulgated.
78. To the extent that any of my legal conclusions depended on my implicit rejection of the do-
nothing baseline, the conclusion of the current section suggests that they were incorrect.
79. See Horizontal Mergers, supra note 8.
80. See Ideal Regime, supra note 2, at 335-37.
81. See Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal
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with either the language of the antitrust laws' prohibitions or the general
assumption that the laws do not create a positive duty to increase compe-
tition. Of course, in our legal system, doctrinal errors or incorrect prece-
dents do eventually become prospectively self-justifying. However, even
though I would personally prefer a more activist statute, I do not think
that the existing, erroneous non-do-nothing-baseline decisions have justi-
fied adopting this interpretation of the Clayton Act in future cases.
2. The Lessening-Competition-in-Any-Market Interpretation. As
Section IIB3b(2) argued, the Supreme Court erred in concluding that the
Clayton Act's use of the word "any" before the expressions "line of com-
merce" or "section of the country" establishes that the Act forbids any
business act or practice it covers if it lessens competition "substantially"
in any product or geographic market even if it does not reduce competi-
tion "substantially" on balance. In my opinion, although the wording in
question does favor such a conclusion, it does not require it, given the
dysfunctional character of such an interpretation and the apparent fail-
ure of the drafters to consider the possibility that a business act or prac-
tice that was not anti-competitive or indeed that was pro-competitive on
balance might still reduce competition in one or more of the product or
geographic markets it affected.
3. The Adoption of Various Market-Oriented Interpretations. Sec-
tion IVA will analyze the various ways in which the Supreme Court oper-
ationalized the various interpretations it placed on the antitrust laws. At
this juncture, I want simply to indicate that although it may not be sur-
prising that the courts equated lines of commerce and sections of the
country with product and geographic markets, it was neither inevitable,
nor correct, nor desirable for them to conclude that the Clayton Act re-
quired them to determine the effect of a covered business act or practice
on the intensity of competition throughout a defined market--.e., to de-
fine separate markets by focusing on sellers and predict the consequences
of the relevant behavior for competition throughout one or more such
seller-oriented markets rather than to predict its consequences for com-
petition for the patronage of various individuals or groups of similar buy-
ers. Section IVA should clarify both the content and the significance of
this point.
and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 658 (1975) [here-
inafter Limit Price Theory].
1990]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
4. The Failure of the Courts to Interpret the Clayton Act to Allow
Business Acts or Practices That Do Not Injure the Relevant Buyers or That
Function in the First Instance By Increasing the Organizational Allocative
Efficiency (OLE) of the Accused. As Section IIB argued, although the
Clayton Act really should have prevented the above failures by explicitly
addressing the issues in question, functional and structural (the relation
between the Clayton Act on the one hand and the Sherman Act, Sher-
man-Act doctrine, and various other related laws-the patent laws, the
copyright and trademark laws, public-utility-regulation laws, etc.-on
the other hand) arguments probably do justify reading such buyer-wel-
fare and organization-allocative-efficiency conditions into the law. Once
more, this conclusion is favored by the undisputed fact that the Clayton
Act's drafters and supporters did not envisage (1) the possibility that a
business act that reduced the absolute attractiveness of the offers against
which the actors and their product-Rs had to compete might benefit the
relevant buyers despite this fact or (2) the possibility that an act that
functioned initially by increasing the actor's OLE might injure the rele-
vant customers on balance by leading his rivals to exit or deterring them
from expanding or entering.
B. Three Additional Misinterpretations or Failures to Clarify
Although I do believe that the overwhelming majority of American
antitrust decisions are consistent with the tests I have argued the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts promulgate, the courts have never offered a clear
articulation of the statutes' tests of legality. However, this section will
not focus on the courts' failure to clarify the antitrust laws' general tests
of legality (or on their failure to adopt my interpretation of the relevant
statutes). Instead, it will be concerned with three specific issues the
courts have failed to resolve or have resolved incorrectly in the antitrust
area.
1. The Concept of a "Contract, Agreement, or Conspiracy" Under
1 of the Sherman Act. Although the courts did eventually reject the
(incorrect) argument that a contract, agreement, or conspiracy could be
demonstrated under § 1 simply by establishing that its supposed partici-
pants had engaged in conscious parallel behavior, 2 they seem never to
82. See Theatre Enter. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954), rejecting
the possible implication of Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). As I have shown
elsewhere, conscious parallel behavior may not violate the Sherman Act because it may be non-
oligopolistic or natural oligopolistic. See Markovits, Injurious Oligopolistic Pricing Sequences: Their
Description, Interpretation, and Legality Under the Sherman Act, 26 STAN. L. REv. 717 (1974).
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have realized in the antitrust context that agreements can be formed (of-
fers can be made and accepted) without any words ever having been spo-
ken or written. For example, a seller who has a reputation for rarely or
never misestimating his HNOP may be able to communicate a contrived
oligopolistic offer (and/or threat) simply by charging an oligopolistic
price (above his HNOP), particularly if he also "enjoys" a reputation for
contriving oligopolistic prices: since his possible undercutters will realie
that he has given them an opportunity to make an immediate profit by
undercutting him and will believe that he has not been led to do so by
any mistakes in calculating his HNOP, they will conclude that he must
have intended his pricing-act to communicate an anti-competitive prom-
ise and/or threat that would make his pricing-act sovereign and maxi-
mizing. Similarly, a seller who has received such a non-verbal offer (or
threat) can accept that offer (succumb to the threat) simply by failing to
take advantage of the immediately profitable opportunity to undercut
which the initiating (or primary) oligopolistic pricer gave him. Thus, an
anti-competitive contract can be formed without any words being used. I
believe that neither the courts nor those members of their company who
have been concerned with such legal issues 3 have ever grasped this
point. Had they done so, more attention would have been given to the
possibility of bringing "price-fixing" cases when no such "verbal" evi-
dence was available-in particular, on basing such cases solely on evi-
dence that established that the price charged exceeded the pricer's
HNOP 4 and that this fact seemed sufficiently unlikely to manifest seller
mistakes or natural oligopolistic pricing 5 for the accused to be found
guilty or liable.
2. The Concept of "Monopolizing" Under § 2 of the Sherman Act.
On my interpretation, a firm "monopolizes" by retaliating (threatening
to retaliate) or engaging in predatory behavior. Retaliating (or threaten-
83. See Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962); Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 919, 933-35 (1974).
84. This fact could be established (1) by calculating the relevant HNOP and comparing it with
the actual price and (2) by making relevant inter-regional or inter-temporal price-comparisons. See
Markovits, Proving (Illegal) Oligopolistic Pricing: A Description of the Necessary Evidence and a
Critique of the Received Wisdom About Its Character and Cost, 27 STAN. L. REv. 307,310-12(1975).
85. This fact could be established negatively by showing that (1) the relevant sellers were well-
informed about these OCAs and (2) that conditions were not conducive to natural oligopolistic
pricing. It could be established positively (3) by demonstrating the presence of behaviors (such as
failures to undercut when undercutting would have been immediately profitable or undercutting
followed by retaliation) that would be part of successful or unsuccessful contrived-oligopolistic-pric-
ing sequences. See id at 312-13.
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ing retaliation) is "monopolizing" because it involves responding (threat-
ening to respond) to undercutting or QV investments by rivals with
moves that would not be profitable but for their tendency to deter similar
undercutting and QV investments in the future by inflicting harm on the
undercutter (QV investor) who is the retaliator's target. Predatory con-
duct is "monopolizing" because it involves making ceterisparibus alloca-
tively inefficient moves that would be unprofitable but for their tendency
to reduce the attractiveness of the offers against which the predator will
have to compete by driving a rival out of business or deterring him from
making a QV investment. It should be noted that, defined in this way,
monopolizing does not presuppose the monopolizer's possessing any mo-
nopoly power-any OCAs or any ability to earn supernormal profits on
his QV investments in equilibrium for reasons that are unrelated to the
presence of any retaliation barriers to expansion or entry or oligopolistic
investment-disincentives: firms that originally have no monopoly power
may "monopolize" in the sense that I think is relevant in the Sherman
Act context. In fact, I suspect that there is very little correlation between
the presence of monopoly power and the profitability of monopolizing:
for example, the profitability of driving out a given competition may be
very high when he was almost as well-placed as the predator-monopo-
lizer to obtain the patronage of the buyers the latter was best-placed to
serve (despite the predator's absence of monopoly power) if the target in
question was far better-placed than anyone else to obtain the patronage
of the buyers in question (and no other firm was well-positioned to enter
the relevant "sub-portion" of product space).
Despite this fact, all three interpretations the courts have given to
the Sherman Act's command "no person shall monopolize" 6 have made
the possession of monopoly power an element of this offense. Regardless
of whether the courts have concluded that § 2 proscribes (1) the mere
possession of monopoly power, (2) the possession of monopoly power
that was not obtained by "skill, foresight, and industry"-e.g., that was
obtained by luck or by actions that were independently illegal, or (3) the
possession of monopoly power that was obtained by conduct that would
itself constitute a Sherman-Act violation, they assumed that a defendant
could not be guilty of monopolizing unless he had monopoly power.
As the preceding paragraph indicated, I think that all these interpre-
86. I ignore a fourth interpretation that has gained more support in Europe than in the United
States. According to that interpretation, a firm is guilty of monopolizing if it possesses and "abuses"
monopoly power. (rhe term "abuses" refers not only to the use of monopoly profits to finance
(illegal) predation or its supposed use to generate leverage in other markets (in non-predatory ways I
cannot understand) but also to its "use" by charging "unreasonably" high or discriminatory prices.).
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tations are wrong-that the best interpretation of "monopolizing" makes
the possession of monopoly power irrelevant to the offense of "mono-
polizing." Three different types of arguments can be made for this con-
clusion. The first is an intra-statute structural argument that focuses on
the fact that my reading brings § 2 into line with § 1 and makes it inde-
pendently important (as the third judicial interpretation argument de-
scribed above would not). The second is an inter-statute structural
argument that focuses on the fact that (in contrast to the first judicial
interpretation described above) my reading brings § 2 into line with such
related pieces of legislation as the patent laws, the copyright and trade-
mark laws, and (in a different way) the general system of public-utility
regulation. The third is a historical argument or at least a legislative-
history argument that focuses on the fact that the drafters and supporters
of the legislation always focused on behavior-never intimated that they
were proposing what in modem terms would be called a general decon-
centration statute. The fourth is an institutional-functional or policy ar-
gument: at least to my mind, the deconcentration-statute interpretation
of § 2 is made less persuasive by the relative unsuitability of using courts
as first-instance administrators of such a scheme. In any event, for all of
these reasons, I prefer my own interpretation of § 2 to any that makes
the possession of monopoly power an element of a § 2 offense.
3. The Parimutuel Approach to Analyzing the Competitive Impact
of Vertical Practices Under the Clayton Act. Before one can analyze the
competitive impact of such vertical practices as tie-ins, reciprocal-trading
agreements, resale price maintenance, and vertical territorial and/or cus-
tomer restraints, a preliminary issue must be resolved: should the analy-
sis focus on the consequences of a given seller's engaging in these
practices or rather on the consequences of a general rule that allowed all
suppliers of any of the relevant buyers to employ such contractual terms?
I have no doubt that the correct unit for analysis is the effect of the gen-
eral rule just described. To focus, instead, on an individual seller's use of
such devices would be to adopt a parimutuel approach which might re-
sult in marginal established firms' and potential competitors' being al-
lowed to employ such contractual terms when their well-established
competitors were not on the ground that both the former grant of per-
mission and the latter prohibition would increase competition by helping
marginal and potential competitors to survive. As my discussion of both
the Sherman-Act test of legality and the organizational-allocative-effi-
ciency qualification to the Clayton-Act test of legality imply, I do not
think that the antitrust laws authorize the courts to act as handicap-
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pers-even in pursuit of the goal of increasing competition. In fact, I
think that the opposite conclusion would be bad policy as well as bad
law: if one wanted to pursue pro-competitive or other goals by subsi-
dizing (small) marginal firms and new entrants, it would be far better to
do so directly than to do so by preventing the better-established rivals of
small firms from organizing their affairs more profitably. In many cases,
the behavior that is forbidden would have been allocatively efficient.
And even if it would not have been more efficient, I would not want to
conceal the size of the defacto subsidy being provided--i.e., I would not
want to substitute QV investments by marginal and potential competitors
for QV investments by well-established firms when the former would be
less profitable than the latter (absent some form of handicapping or sub-
sidy) without making the size of the required subsidy obvious. My pref-
erence for making the relevant subsidies visible reflects (1) the fact that
parimutuel approaches that substitute small-firm QV investments for bet-
ter-established firm QV investments by prohibiting the better-established
firms from using pricing techniques the small firms are allowed to em-
ploy will tend to substitute less efficient for more efficient investments
and (2) my general belief that it is normally desirable for governments to
be required to inform their citizens of the costs they are incurring to
achieve various goals.
In any event, although I find the preceding legal and policy argu-
ments persuasive, the courts have not always adopted the interpretation
they favor. In several cases involving vertical practices, 7 the Supreme
Court has indicated that a small, marginal firm may be allowed to use a
contractual device that its larger, better-established rival might be forbid-
den to employ. I find this parimutuel interpretation of the Clayton Act
both incorrect and undesirable in direct, consequentialist terms.
IV. A CRITIQUE OF THE COURTS' IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SHERMAN AND CLAYTON AcTS
In my opinion, not only the courts' interpretation of the Sherman
and Clayton Acts but also their implementation of those interpretations
has often been erroneous. Part IV will offer brief critiques of (A) the
rules the courts have devised to implement their conclusion that con-
trived oligopolistic and predatory behaviors are illegal, (B) the ccurts'
market-oriented approach to measuring the monopoly power of a seller
and predicting the competitive impact of a horizontal merger, (C) the
87. See, eg., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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courts' approach to predicting the competitive impact of conglomerate
mergers-both those that involve potential competitors and those that do
not, and (D) the courts' various rules about vertical mergers and various
contractual surrogates to vertical integration. Part IV will assume argu-
endo that the courts' assumption that monopoly power is a prerequisite
for monopolizing in the § 1 Sherman Act sense as well as their assump-
tion the Clayton Act requires them to compute the competitive impact of
a horizontal or conglomerate merger by comparing the consequences of
the merger in question with those that would result from the weighted
average expected expansions and/or entries the MPs would make if they
were prohibited from merging. On the other hand, Part IV will not ac-
cept the courts' apparent assumption that contrived oligopolistic pricing
cannot be practiced without verbal communications. Nor will it follow
the parimutuel approach the courts have sometimes taken to analyzing
the competitive impact of various contractual surrogates for vertical
integration.
A. Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct
Since I am about to publish a book on oligopolistic and predatory
conduct,88 I will limit myself to a few comments here. First, as I have
already pointed out,89 the courts have totally failed to develop tests for
determining the oligopolistic character of any price that has been
charged or for assessing whether any oligopolistic price that has been
charged reflects contrived oligopolistic pricing on the one hand or some-
body's mistake or natural oligopolistic pricing on the other. Unfortu-
nately, the other academic commentators who have addressed these
issues have done no better.90
Historically, the courts have been equally unsuccessful at establish-
ing criteria for determining the predatory character of a given price.
More recently, they have relied on some academic proposals that are also
unsatisfactory-proposals91 that have been criticized in subsequent liter-
ature92 that has failed to replace them with superior alternatives.93
88. R. Markovits, Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct: A Legal and Policy Analysis (forth-
coming, MIT Press).
89. See supra notes 84 and 85 and accompanying text.
90. See Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REv.
1562 (1969) and Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits The Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare" A
Reply to Professor Markovits, 28 STAN. L. RFV. 903 (1976).
91. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, 88 HARV. L. Rv. 697 (1975).
92. See, most prominently, Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
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The courts have also failed to work out the conditions under which
non-pricing behavior will be predatory-for instance, have failed to note
that individual refusals to deal may be predatory, have misanalyzed the
circumstances in which QV investments will be predatory,94 and have
incorrectly concluded95 that the practice sometimes called "systems ri-
valry" is essentially predatory.96 Although considerations of space pre-
clude me from demonstrating these claims in this article, it is important
to note that the courts have almost totally failed to operationalize their
various oligopolistic and predatory conduct rules satisfactorily.
B. The Market-Oriented Approach to Measuring the Monopoly Power
of a Seller or Predicting the Competitive Impact of a Horizontal
Merger
As Section LA2 suggested, both the courts and most economists
have implicitly assumed that if products are placed into appropriate
groups (called "markets"), certain important relationships will obtain or
be approximated. In particular, traditional analysts have assumed that if
markets are properly defined, (1) the closest rival any seller has for the
patronage of a buyer he is best-placed to serve will always be another
firm that has been placed within his market (another "insider"); (2) any
insider in a given market will be equally competitive with every other
insider in that market (will be second-best-placed by the same margin to
obtain the same percentage of every other insider's customers); (3) all
products (both within and across markets) will have the same ratio of
best-placed to close-to-second-best-placed positions; (4) the number of
sellers who are second-best-placed or close-to-second-best-placed to serve
a particular buyer will be strongly and positively related to the number of
firms in the market in question; and (5) the size of a seller's overall com-
petitive advantage (OCA) in his relations with a particular buyer he is
best-placed to serve will be strongly and inversely related to the number
of rivals who are second-best-placed or close-to-second-best-placed to
Policy, 89 YALE LJ. 213 (1979). See also Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy
for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979).
93. For an explanation, see R. Markovits, Oligopolistic and Predatory Conduct: A Legal and
Policy Analysis (forthcoming, MIT Press).
94. See Telex Corp. Inc. v. International Business Machines, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
For an incorrect analysis of this issue by two excellent economists, see Ordover & Willig, An Eco-
nomic Definition of Predation, 91 YALE LJ. 8 (1981).
95. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
96. For an explanation of all these claims, see K. Markovits, Oligopolistic and Predatory Con-
duct: A Legal and Policy Analysis (forthcoming, MIT Press).
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serve that buyer. In fact, none of these assumptions is accurate. Thus,
(1) it almost certainly is not possible in practice to divide the economy's
various firms into non-overlapping groups that always contain the sec-
ond-best-placed supplier of any buyer whom an insider is best-placed to
serve; (2) insiders are not equally competitive with each other member of
the market into which they have been placed; (3) some products are best-
placed far more often than they are second-best-placed or close-to-sec-
ond-best-placed while other products (often members of the competitive
fringe and producers who sell primarily in other geographic areas) are
second-best-placed or close-to-second-best-placed in a given market far
more often than they are best-placed; (4) the relationship between the
number of sellers in a given market and the number who are second-best-
placed or close-to-second-best-placed varies tremendously from market
to market (in part because of inter-market differences in the extent to
which the firms in a given market are equally competitive with each
other); and (5) the relationship between the size of a firm's OCA in its
relations with a given buyer and the number of rivals who are close to
being that buyer's second-best-placed supplier is also far weaker than
traditional analysts suppose. This section will briefly suggest the conse-
quences of these and other facts for the traditional market-oriented mea-
sure of monopoly power and the traditional market-oriented approach to
predicting the competitive impact of horizontal mergers.
1. The Market-Oriented Approach to Measuring Monopoly Power.
In my terminology, a firm's market power over price is a function of its
OCAs, and its market power in relation to QV investment is reflected in
the supernormal rate of return it would realize on its most profitable (or
average)97 QV investment in equilibrium absent such oligopolistic factors
as the operative retaliation barriers to expansion or entry and the oligo-
polistic investment-disincentives rival potential expanders faced. In fact,
the general structure of this definition is not that different from that of
the Supreme Court's definition: "Monopoly power is the power to con-
trol prices or exclude competition."98
In practice, however, the courts have equated a firm's monopoly
power with its share of the market(s) in which it is placed. This equation
97. Since I do not think that the possession of monopoly power is legally relevant, I see no
reason to choose between the highest-profit and average-profit definitions in question.
98. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). My defini-
tion distinguishes monopolistic from oligopolistic control and equates the ability to "exclude compe-
tition" non-oligopolistically with the various non-oligopolistic barriers and disincentives confronting
the alleged monopolist's relevant rivals.
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would be neither accurate nor cost-effective if the traditional approach's
various implicit assumptions were realistic, and in the actual world it is
even less acceptable.
Thus, although a seller's market share will reflect the relative fre-
quency with which he is best-placed, it will have little bearing on his total
OCAs since it will be only weakly correlated with his average OCA when
he is best-placed in a world in which (1) the number of firms placed
inside his market is not strongly correlated with his market share, (2) the
percentage of inside firms that are second-best-placed or close-to-second-
best-placed to serve any insider's customers varies tremendously from
market to market and from insider to insider within a given market, and
(3) there is not much of a relationship between the number of firms that
are second-best-placed and close-to-second-best-placed to serve a given
seller's customers and his average OCA. Moreover, there is even less
reason to believe that a seller's market share will be strongly and posi-
tively correlated with the non-retaliation barriers and natural oligopolis-
tic investment-disincentives his actual and potential competitors will face
on various relevant QV investments. As I have argued previously:
"Although firms which maintain high shares of growing markets proba-
bly do face lower QV investment barriers than their established and po-
tential competitors, this correlation has little bearing on the absolute
height of the barriers facing their rivals."9 9
Hence, even if the courts were correct in assuming that the posses-
sion of monopoly power was an essential element of a Sherman-Act § 2
offense, the court's market-oriented approach to measuring a firm's mo-
nopoly power would have to be rejected. In every case, it would be both
more accurate and more cost-effective to use my operationalization of the
concept, which has the special advantage of avoiding critical market
definitions.
2. The Market-Oriented Approach to Predicting the Competitive
Impact of Horizontal Mergers. Courts (and economists) have tradition-
ally based their predictions of the competitive impact of horizontal merg-
ers on market-aggregated data that presuppose market definitions whose
specific designation often critically affects their legal conclusions. In par-
ticular, courts have generally proceeded in Clayton-Act horizontal-
merger cases by (1) defining the relevant markets objectively, (2) deter-
mining the markets in which both MPs are operating, (3) calculatingthe
MPs' pre-merger shares in and the concentration of the markets in which
99. See Review Article, supra note 8, at 614.
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both MPs are said to be operating, and (4) determining whether these
data imply the illegality of the merger under the legal rules it had estab-
lished or would promulgate. Although at different times other factors
(such as trends in concentration or height of the barriers to entry) were
also taken into consideration, the basic rule established a set of combina-
tions of weighted pre-merger MP-market-shares and pre-merger market-
concentration figures that would render a horizontal merger illegal where
the weighted MP-market-share figure was calculated by assigning a
greater weight to the lower MP-market-share-in particular, by weight-
ing that share three to four times more heavily-and the market-share
figure in any given combination was inversely related to the concentra-
tion figure. This Part criticizes this market-oriented approach to predict-
ing the competitive impact of horizontal mergers."
In order to explain my conclusion that the traditional approach is
unacceptably inaccurate as well as cost-ineffective, I must first delineate
the determinants of the competitive impact of a horizontal merger. The
list that follows is relevant to horizontal mergers that take place in mar-
kets in which pricing is individualized. Unfortunately, it is very long. It
begins with the various determinants of such a merger's anti-competitive
tendencies and proceeds to the determinants of its pro-competitive ten-
dencies, all of which relate to the various kinds of efficiencies a horizontal
merger can generate.
In my judgment, a horizontal merger will tend to be more anti-com-
petitive: (1) the greater the amount by which the merger will increase
the MPs' OCAs for reasons that are unrelated to any efficiencies it gener-
ates---Le., the greater the frequency with which the MPs are respectively
best-placed and second-best-placed and the larger the amount by which
100. It might be thought that the basic criticisms this section will make of the traditional ap-
proach will not apply to the Justice Department's 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines since three of
the four rules they promulgated focus on pre-merger and post-merger HHI figures rather than on
traditional market-concentration and market-share data and since the Guidelines specify various
additional (qualifying) factors for the Department to take into account when implementing the basic
rules. In fact, however, I do think that the critique I offer of the traditional approach (or, more
precisely, an analogous critique) applies to the Guidelines' approach as well. No one has ever devel-
oped a persuasive theoretical or empirical case for substituting HHI data for traditional market-
share and concentration figures. The Guidelines' qualifying-factors discussion omits several impor-
tant determinants of the competitive impact of horizontal mergers that are not captured by HHI
data, includes several factors that are irrelevant, poorly specifies several factors whose relevance it
properly analyzes, misanalyzes the reasons for the relevance of some factors whose direction of im-
pact it correctly predicts, and misstates the direction in which one relevant factor actually cuts. For
a detailed critique of both the Guidelines' rules and the traditional approach, see Market Definition,




in such cases the second-best-placed MP is better-placed than the third-
best-placed supplier of the buyers in question; (2) more complicatedly,
the greater the extent to which the merger will increase the MPs' natural
OMs-e., the greater the frequency with which the strategic and
mechanical costs the MPs would have to incur to change their initially
announced prices to those buyers they were best-placed to serve were
larger than their pre-merger OCAs but smaller than their post-merger
OCAs because the merger increased the MPs' OCAs, produced a firm
with a reputation that reduced the strategic cost of changing an initially
announced price, and/or generated efficiencies that reduced the mechani-
cal cost of such a price change; (3) the greater the frequency with which,
pre-merger, contrived oligopolistic pricing was either profitable for the
MPs or unprofitable by a smaller amount than the amount by which the
merger would increase its profitability-(a) the smaller the number of
rivals who were either second-best-placed or close-to-second-best placed
to obtain the patronage of the MPs' customers, (b) the stronger the MPs'
reputations for estimating their costs and OCAs accurately (a strong rep-
utation for accuracy will increase their ability to communicate their con-
trived oligopolistic intentions cheaply simply by charging an oligopolistic
price), (c) the stronger the MPs' reputations for carrying out their threats
and promises, (d) the more stable through time the MPs' repeat-sales,
sales-to-other-suppliers'-customers, and sales-to-new-buyers records and
the smaller the likely differences between relevant future and past condi-
tions (the greater the MPs' ability to detect undercutting from such cir-
cumstantial, sales-record evidence), (e) the greater the MPs' knowledge
about the identity of their closest rivals for particular individual custom-
ers and the greater their ability to identify the new suppliers of their old
customers or of any new buyers in the market, (f) the greater the amount
of benefits the MPs can provide their potential undercutters (relative to
the profits the relevant undercutters [Us] could realize by undercutting,
absent the MPs' oligopolistic responses)-the greater the frequency with
which and the amount by which the MPs were their potential Us' closest
competitors (or closest competitors among those rivals whose coopera-
tion the Us had not secured), and (g) the higher the ratio of the harm
each MP can inflict on an undercutting R to the cost the MP must incur
to do so for the amount of harm he has to inflict on that R to make the R
regret his undercutting sufficiently to deter him and his counterparts
from undercutting the MPs in the future-roughly speaking, the greater
the frequency with which the MPs were second-best-placed or close-to-
second-best-placed to obtain each potential U's customers relative to the
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frequency with which that potential U was able to steal the relevant MP's
customers and the greater the size of each relevant U's OCAs in relations
with the buyers the MPs will find most cost-effective to steal relative to
the size of the relevant MP's contrived OMs in his relations with the
buyers he was best-placed to serve and the relevant potential U was well-
placed to steal; (4) the greater the amount by which the merger will in-
crease the profitability of the MPs' contriving oligopolistic prices-e.,
(a) the greater the frequency with which the elimination of MP2 as a
potential undercutter of MPl (and vice versa) reduces the number of po-
tential Us because pre-merger MP2 belonged to a group of second-best-
placed or close-to-second-best-placed suppliers, (b) the greater the contri-
bution the merger makes to the MPs' ability to estimate their costs and
OCAs (by enabling the MPs to share information about their
product-Rs' costs or the attractiveness of their own products as well as
the products of their product-Rs to particular groups of buyers), (c) the
greater the extent to which the merged firm has a stronger reputation for
carrying out its threats and promises than its antecedents (because it in-
herits the reputation of the tougher MP or because it creates a merged
firm with a greater stake in deterring undercutting by enabling the whole
company to profit from the reputational effects of any act of retaliation or
reciprocation undertaken by a division formerly belonging to any of its
antecedents), (d) the greater the extent to which the merged company's
ability to infer undercutting from circumstantial evidence exceeds its
antecedents' because the merger enables the company to pool its anteced-
ents' repeat-sales, sales-to-other-suppliers'-customers, and new-buyers-
sales records (the larger the sales of the MPs and the greater the extent to
which they have common product-Rs), (e) the greater the extent to
which the merged company's ability to identify its undercutter from
sales-record circumstantial evidence exceeds its antecedents' because it
has access to the relevant sales-records and rival-competitive-position in-
formation of both MPs (the larger the sales of the MPs, the greater the
extent to which they have common product-Rs, and the greater the com-
plementarity of the rival-competitive-position information in their pos-
session), (f) the greater the amount by which the merger increases each
MP's ability to reciprocate-the greater the extent to which one MP had
excess reciprocatory power pre-merger and the greater the frequency
with which the MPs were a rival's closest two rivals not to be coopted
pre-merger and in those instances the greater the amount by which the
worse-placed MP was better-placed than the next-best-placed R not to be
coopted, and (g) the greater the extent to which the merger reduced the
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harm-inflicted-to-cost-incurred ratio for MP-retaliation by enabling the
MPs to pool their power (by combining NPs with different marginal ra-
tios for the last act of retaliation that would have been necessary for each
had they remained separate in relation to a given potential U); (5) the
greater the extent to which the merger would increase the MPs' product-
Rs' OCAs and natural OMs by increasing the MPs' contextual marginal
costs-(a) the greater the factors listed under (1) above, (b) the greater
the attention antitrust authorities pay to the MPs' price discrimination,
and (c) the higher the penalties for illegal price discrimination; (6) the
greater the extent to which the merger enables the MPs' product-Rs to
contrive additional OMs--(a) the greater the frequency with which both
MPs were potential Us of a given product-R pre-merger (the greater the
frequency with which pre-merger such an R would have had to commu-
nicate with both MPs separately and would have had to consider the
possibility that either MP might be their actual U and the greater the
associated communication and identification costs), (b) the greater the
amount by which the merger deters the MPs from undercutting by in-
creasing their OCAs-the greater the factors listed under (1) above, (c)
the greater the frequency with which the merger enables a given R to
take advantage of any excess reciprocatory power he enjoyed vis-a-vis
one MP and the greater the amount of excess reciprocatory power in
question, and (d) the greater the extent to which the merger deters the
MPs from undercutting by spreading their defenses (allowing an R to
retaliate against MPI's undercutting by stealing MP2's customers as well
as MPl's); and (7) the greater the extent to which the merger reduces
QV-investment competition-(a) the greater the extent to which it
increases the MPs' irD+R barriers by leading them to
consolidate the merged company with resources they would otherwise
have used to make a QV investment, (b) the greater the extent to which it
increases the L barriers the merged company faces by raising its OCAs
and spreading its defenses, (c) when the merger does cause rD-+R+L for
the merged company to exceed its counterpart for the MP who was bet-
ter-placed to make an additional QV investment, the greater the fre-
quency with which that MP was uniquely well-placed to make such an
investment in the area of product-space in question, (d) when one of the
MPs was the only firm not deterred by expansion or entry barriers and
investment-disincentives from adding a QV investment to the ARDEPPS
concerned, the greater the extent to which the investment it would have
made would have reduced his merger partner's profits, the smaller the
extent to which he could reduce the sum of this damage and any related
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damage he would sustain on his own pre-existing projects by introducing
a different new QV investment, and the smaller the pre-merger profitabil-
ity of the QV investment he would have introduced pre-merger, and (e)
when one of the MPs' product-Rs was the only firm willing to add a
relevant QV investment pre-merger, the greater the extent to which the
merger would increase the L barrier to expansion or entry it faced-see
the factors listed in 4(a) above, the smaller the likelihood that the MPs'
merger would increase the monopolistic investment-disincentives that R
faced by making it clear that unlike one of its antecedents the merged
firm would not expand if the R did not, and the smaller amount of profits
that would have been yielded by the QV investment that R would have
made had the merger not taken place. On the other hand, a horizontal
merger will tend to be more pro-competitive inter alia (8) the greater the
amount by which the purely static efficiencies (efficiencies that relate to
the costs it must incur to produce members of its antecedents' original
product-sets) the merger generates reduce the MPs' product-Rs' OCAs
by improving the competitive position of the MPs-(a) the larger the
static efficiencies in question (up to the point at which each exceeds the
relevant R's pre-merger OCA over the relevant MP), (b) the greater the
frequency with which a relevant merger partner was second-best-placed
to some remaining product-R or worse-than-second-best-placed by less
than the size of the efficiencies in question, and (c) the smaller the
amount by which the relevant MP was worse-than-second-best-placed
pre-merger, and (9) the greater the amount by which the dynamic effi-
ciencies (which relate to the irD+R+S barriers to expansion the merged
firm will face relative to those faced by its antecedents) the merger gener-
ates (or the static efficiencies it generates that will carry over to any new
QV investments the merged firm makes) will induce the MPs and/or per-
haps one of their remaining rivals to make a QV investment that raises
the relevant ARDEPPS' equilibrium QV-investment level-(a) the larger
the size of the efficiencies in question and (b) the closer one of the MPs
was pre-merger to being the best-placed firm to add to the ARDEPPS'
QV-investment level (both when the merger increases QV investment by
making the merges firm the only firm that could profit by making a QV
investment and when the merger increases QV investment by putting the
merged firm in a position to profit by investing in a case in which pre-
merger the best-placed investor was an established rival of the MPs who
was deterred from investing by the monopolistic investment-disincentive
he then faced but no longer faces after the merger since the efficiencies it
generated put the MIPs in a position to expand).
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I should now be able to explain my conclusion that the traditional
approach to predicting the competitive impact of horizontal mergers is
both unacceptably inaccurate an cost-effective. In part, the inaccuracy of
the crude traditional approach reflects the fact that market-share and
market-concentration figures do not een purport to reveal a large number
of important determinants of a horizontal merger's competitive impact
including (1) the amount by which the merger will reduce the marginal
costs or increase the average attractiveness of the MPs' products, (2) the
frequency with which the MPs were second-best-placed or worse-than
second-best-placed by less than the "efficiencies" it generated of the kind
just described, (3) the size of the purely dynamic efficiencies the merger
would generate and of the static efficiencies the merger would generate
that would carry over to any additional QV investments the merged firm
should make, (4) the extent to which the profitability of the optimal QV
investment available to the merged firm would be reduced by the fact
that the merged firm had to consider the consequences of such an expan-
sion for the profits yielded by both rather than just one merger partner-
e.g., the amount of new-QV-investment sales that would be made to the
second MP's former customers and the extent to which any remaining
rivals' non-retaliatory responses to a new QV investment would reduce
the second MP's profits, (5) the rate at which the demand for the relevant
ARDEPPS' products was increasing through time (which affects the
probability that one of the MPs would have been best-placed to add to
his ARDEPPS' QV investment-in particular, the higher this rate the
lower the likelihood that in the MPs' absence their potential competitors
or established rivals would find it profitable to raise the relevant
ARDEPPS' QV investment to the level that would make any expansion
by the merged firm unprofitable, the lower the likelihood that the barri-
ers the relevant merged-firm rival would confront when contemplating
making the last QV investment necessary to deter the merged firm from
expanding would be lower than the barriers the merged firm faced), (6)
the extent to which the established firms can estimate their OCAs and
MCs accurately (which affects their ability to communicate their con-
trived oligopolistic intentions cheaply, simply by charging an oligopolis-
tic price), (7) the extent to which one or both MPs has a reputation for
carrying out his oligopolistic threats and promises (which affects the like-
lihood that the merger will increase the MPs' contrived OMs), (8) the
extent of the MPs' knowledge of the identity of their former customers'
new suppliers and of the identity of their closest rivals for particular cus-
tomers' patronage, (9) the past and future stability of the function that
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determines repeat-sales, sales-to-other-suppliers'-customers, and new-
buyer-sales percentages in the ARDEPPS in question over time (the
more stable such functions, the more able will the Mps be to infer under-
cutting and identify their undercutter from such sales-records), (10) the
larger the number of buyers each MP supplies (which also affects the
impact of the merger on the MNIs' ability to use the kind of circumstan-
tial evidence just described), and (11) the strategic and mechanical cost
of changing an initial price as well as the probability that a customer who
has received an underbid from an inferior supplier will give his best-
placed supplier the opportunity to rebid (the public character of bids in
the market in question, the extent to which the buyer is a repeat-buyer,
and the extent of seller-knowledge about such buyer-behavior, all of
which are relevant to the pre-merger profitability of natural oligopolistic
pricing). Of course, if the traditional approach's only failing were the
inability of market-share and concentration data to reflect the factors
listed in the previous paragraph, one could simply amend the legal rules
with which it is associated to make them take these additional factors
into account.
In fact, however, a far more radical departure from the traditional
approach is required. In a world in which the various assumptions tradi-
tionalists made about the competitive positions of firms within ideally
defined markets do not hold, the traditional approach must be com-
pletely rejected because the market-share and market-concentration
figures on which it focuses do not even provide much information about
the various competitive-impact determinants they are supposed to pre-
dict, such as (1) the frequency and amount by which the MPs were each
other's closest competitors pre-merger (and hence the effect of the
merger on the MPs' OCAs and derivatively both on the MPs' natural
and contrived OMs and on their product-Rs' OCAs and natural and con-
trived OMs), (2) the frequency with which each was in a position to un-
dercut the contrived OMs the other would otherwise have charged (and
hence the effect of the merger on the MPs' contrived OMs, etc.), (3) the
frequency with which the two MPs were both in a position to undercut a
contrived OM a given rival would otherwise have charged (and hence the
effect of the merger on the product-Rs' contrived OMs), (4) the pre-
merger profitability of natural and contrived oligopolistic pricing both
for the MPs and for their product Rs (and hence the effect of the merger
on all these parties' OMs), (5) the size of the OCAs enjoyed by the MPs
and their product-Rs pre-merger, (6) the number of firms in a position to
undercut various contrived OMs the MPs and their product-Rs might try
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to obtain, (7) the probability that the merger would increase the retalia-
tion barrier to expansion or entry faced by the MPs or one of their actual
or potential product-Rs, and (8) the probability that an MP was or was
close to being uniquely well-placed to add to or maintain the relevant
ARDEPPS' QV-investment level.
The preceding paragraphs tried to explain why I think the tradi-
tional approach (or any approach that relies on such market-aggregated
data as market-share and market-concentration figures) will be highly
inaccurate. They should also enable me to explain my conclusion that
any such approach would be cost-ineffective even if it were acceptably
accurate. In my opinion, market-oriented approaches are inevitably cost-
ineffective. Markets should never be defined because the process of defin-
ing markets consumes a substantial amount of resources and because
market-definitions do nothing more than put the analyst in a position to
calculate market-share and market-concentration (or HHI) figures that
have less predictive power than the non-aggregated competitive-position
data on which the market-definitions were based. Because the traditional
approach achieves the remarkable double of increasing costs while de-
creasing accuracy, I am confident that some more or less refined version
of an approach that focuses on my list of competitive-impact determi-
nants should be substituted for the courts' traditional market-oriented
operationalization of the Clayton-Act's test of legality in horizontal-
merger cases.
C. The Traditional Approach to Predicting the Competitive Impact of
Conglomerate Mergers
1. Conglomerate Mergers in which the MPs Are Not Potential Com-
petitors. Conglomerate mergers in which the MPs are not potential com-
petitors can still decrease or increase competition. In particular, they can
decrease competition by facilitating the MPs' and their various product-
market rivals' contrived oligopolistic pricing and/or retaliation to QV
investments, and they can increase competition by generating marginal
static efficiencies, static efficiencies that will carry over to any new QV
investments the MPs make, or dynamic efficiencies that induce the MPs
and/or such rivals to offer price cuts or make QV investments that would
otherwise not have been made.
Since conglomerates may face each other in more than one market,
conglomerate mergers can facilitate contrived oligopolistic behavior in
most of the same ways that horizontal mergers can do so: e.g., (1) by
creating a new company with a stronger reputation for contriving than
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one or both of its antecedents, (2) by reducing by one the number of anti-
competitive communications the MPs or their product-rivals must make
to engage in contrived behavior in more than one market, (3) by enabling
the MPs to pool information about their own competitive positions, their
rivals competitive positions, or their own sales-records, (4) by permitting
the merged company to use any excess reciprocatory power one MP pos-
sessed in relation to a rival who was in a position to undercut both MPs,
(5) by permitting a product-rival to take advantage of any excess recipro-
catory powers it possessed in relation to one MP when both MPs were in
a position to undercut it, (6) by permitting the merged company to re-
duce the costs it would have to incur to inflict some relevant amount of
harm on a given rival by enabling it to retaliate more through one MP
than that MP would have found profitable to do on its own, and (7) by
permitting a product-R of the merged company to reduce the costs it
would have to incur to inflict some relevant amount of harm on the
merged company by enabling it to retaliate more against one MP's prod-
ucts than would have been necessary had that MP remained independ-
ent. And, in the other direction, conglomerate mergers can generate
efficiencies that will increase competition in just the same ways that hori-
zontal mergers can produce such results.
Unfortunately, the courts have noticed neither of these possibilities.
They have completely ignored both the possible pro-competitive conse-
quences of the various kinds of efficiencies conglomerate mergers can
generate and the possible anti-competitive consequences of a conglomer-
ate merger's possible impact on contrived oligopolistic behavior. Indeed,
on at least one occasion, a district court appears to have misunderstood a
government argument that seemed to be directed at the effect of such a
merger on contrived oligopolistic conduct. In particular, in that case, the
court interpreted a government contention that "the most important
anti-competitive effect of the trend toward conglomeration by merger is
'conglomerate interdependence and forbearance'" to be a social and
political argument for preventing the concentration of society's resources
across the economy as a whole rather than an argument for preventing
decreases in competition.101
Moreover, not only have the courts failed to identify the various
ways in which conglomerate mergers may affect the intensity of competi-
tion when the MPs are not potential competitors, they have also sug-
gested that such conglomerate mergers will decrease competition in one
particular way in which it is not likely to do so (or to violate the Clayton
101. United States v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 53 (D. Conn. 1970).
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Act by doing so)-viz., by increasing the practice of reciprocity. More
specifically, the Supreme Court appears to have approved an FTC finding
that a conglomerate merger that created a merged company that was in a
position to sell an input to a producer whose output it bought would give
the input-supplying portion of the merged company an unfair advantage
whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competition."'10 2 Section
IVD will state and criticize the leverage theory on which this FTC posi-
tion is based. At present, I will confine myself to two comments: (1)
competition in the Clayton-Act sense will rarely be reduced by either an
individual seller's use of reciprocity or a general rule allowing all mem-
bers of some relevant group of competitors to employ this practice and
(2) even if the individual use of or general availability of reciprocity
should have anti-competitive consequences, it would often not violate the
Clayton Act since its profitability will often reflect its allocative effi-
ciency. 1 3 Hence, the courts' operationalization of their interpretation of
the section of the Clayton Act that covers conglomerate mergers suffers
from sins of commission as well as sins of omission where mergers in-
volving MPs who are not potential competitors are concerned.
2. Conglomerate Mergers,"°  Potential Competition, and Limit
Price (Waiting-in-the- Wings or Perceived-Potential-Entry) Theory.
Although the Supreme Court (1) has never articulated the variant of
limit price theory to which it is committed, (2) has failed to recognize
that limit pricing would really be predatory and hence illegal if it were
ever practiced, and (3) has ignored the implications of limit price theory
for the legality of horizontal mergers in "markets" in which potential
competition is effective,' 05 various cases have assumed that the presence
of potential competitors who are perceived to be likely to enter if no
established firm does anything to deter them from doing so will either (1)
induce the established firms to charge lower prices than they would
otherwise have charged with the intent and effect of deterring entry or (2)
result in entry's taking place. In the present context, these assumptions
are significant because they imply that, ceteris paribus, a conglomerate
102. See F.T.C. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 593 (1965).
103. See Markovits, The Functions, Allocative Efficiency, and Legality of Tie-ins: A Comment,
28 J. L. & ECON. 387 (1985). For more detail, see Markovits, Tie-ins and Reciprocity: A Functional,
Legal, and Policy Analysis, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1980).
104. The same issue arises in many joint-venture cases. See, eg., United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). I have analyzed the determinants of the competitive impact ofjoint
ventures elsewhere. See Markovits, The Burger Court, Antitrust, and Economic Analysis in THlE
BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 180, 190-96 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
105. See Limit Price Theory, supra note 81 for an explanation of all three of these points.
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merger that eliminates an outsider who was or would become a perceived
potential entrant (who was "waiting in the wings") will reduce competi-
tion on that account by eliminating a firm that would either have become
a new entrant or have induced the established firms to limit price.
Unfortunately, the assumptions I have just attributed to the courts
are unsatisfactory in several different respects. First, they are insuffi-
ciently precise for the purpose for which they are being used in that the
courts have never defined the concept of "a perceived potential en-
trant"-have never delineated the factors that will determine whether a
given potential competitor or indeed any firm outside a market will be a
perceived potential competitor. 6 Second, the assumptions are insuffi-
ciently justified in that neither the courts nor any of the many economists
who have developed or purported to test any such limit price theory has
ever satisfactorily explained how such pricing would deter entry, why it
would be more profitable than doing nothing, or why it would be more
profitable than the other methods established firms could use to deter
entry such as expanding their own QV investments in the ARDEPPS in
question (making what I call "limit" QV investments).
10 7
106. The relevant determinants can be derived from Section IA2's analysis of the determinants
of the intensity of QV-investment competition. In particular, if we assume for simplicity that the
passage of time will not affect the relevant firms' abilities to enter (controlling for the amount of post-
inquiry entry they have made), the best-placed potential competitor at the time of the inquiry will be
an effective competitor if the sum of the barriers to entry he faced was lower than the sum of the
barriers to expansion and oligopolistic or monopolistic investment-disincentives that would face the
first "best-placed-expander" established firms to be deterred from expanding if entry were barred
post-inquiry. The articulation of the conditions for the effectiveness of a potential competitor who
was worse-than-best-placed to enter at the time of the inquiry is equally straightforward, though far
more complicated, since these conditions reflect not only the barriers such firms faced but also the
amount of QV investment that would be made by their better-placed potential-competitor comrades.
107. Limit price theorists have offered three reasons for such pricing's supposed ability to deter
entry: (1) it would communicate a threat of post-entry retaliation, (2) it would deceive potential
competitors into underestimating the heights of the established sellers' conventional profit-maximiz-
ing prices, and (3) it would make entry less profitable by building up the'goodwill of the established-
firm limit-pricer. I can imagine two further reasons why such pricing might deter entry: (4) it might
increase the retaliation barrier to entry by making post-entry retaliation more likely by reducing the
likelihood that the retaliator would be or could successfully be sued or prosecuted by making it
possible for him to retaliate simply by maintaining his pre-entry price, and (5) it might increase the
risk barrier to entry by making the potential competitor uncertain of the established firms' individual
conventional profit-maximizing prices even if it did not deceive them into systematically underesti-
mating these prices. In response, I pointed out (A) that some of these arguments-() and (2), for
example-were inconsistent with each other; (B) that others were doubtful-(3) is unlikely to work
when the limit pricer is General Motors and not the village butcher and (2) is unlikely to work when
potential competitors are already-established firms in adjacent fields who practice industrial espio-
nage and hire defecting managers who come with secrets about their previous firms' positions; (C)
that limit pricing is unlikely to be the cheapest way of achieving these deterrent effects-for example,
that phone calls or (better yet) conversations at trade-association meetings can convey threats more
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I have examined this topic in great detail elsewhere.1" 8 At this junc-
ture, I will limit myself to the following comments: (1) limit pricing is
virtually a theory in search of a phenomenon-that except in an ex-
tremely narrow set of circumstances, nothing that even remotely deserves
that name is ever practiced1°9; (2) established firms that wish to deter
entry normally do so in ways other than by limit pricing-e.g., by mak-
ing limit investments (which are usually not predatory or illegal) and/or
retaliatory threats (which are illegal); (3) the theory of QV-investment
competition I have developed predicts both (A) when a potential compet-
itor will be effective and (B) when the established firms will respond to
the presence of an effective potential competitor (i) by allowing him to
enter or (ii) by making a limit investment; (4) the fact that a conglomer-
ate merger eliminates an effective potential competitor (whose absence
matters) makes it anti-competitive, ceteris paribus, regardless of whether
the established firms would otherwise have responded to his presence by
making a limit investment or by behaving in a way that made it profitable
for him to enter; and (5) a conglomerate merger that tends to reduce
competition by eliminating an effective potential competitor as an in-
dependent force in the relevant ARDEPPS may still increase competi-
tion on balance if it generates a sufficient amount of marginal static
efficiencies, static efficiencies that carry over to the merged firm's expan-
sion, and dynamic efficiencies (sufficient given the frequency with which
the MPs were second-best-placed and close-to-second-best-placed to ob-
tain the patronage of individual buyers and the extent to which the barri-
ers to entry they faced would have to be reduced for the relevant
efficiencies to increase the merged firm's contribution to QV-investment
competition). These assertions should make clear why I find unsatisfac-
tory the courts' response to the fact that the MPs engaged in a conglom-
erate merger were potential competitors.
cheaply; (D) that limit pricing that works in the ways just described will rarely be more profitable
than allowing entry to occur, and (E) that limit pricing will almost certainly not be as profitable as
deterring entry by making a QV (limit) investment in any case.
108. See Limit Price Theory, supra note 81.
109. I can think of only two types of situations in which limit pricing might be profitable. First,
such pricing might be profitable for an inefficient producer in a little-explored oligopolistic niche
when that niche's profit-potential is far greater than others perceive. Such a producer might find it
profitable to limit price to deter the entry of more efficient firms whose entry would force him to exit
(non-predatorily) by preventing them from discovering the attractiveness of operating in the area in
question. Second, something that might be called limit pricing might be profitable for a seller facing
a strong buyer who was threatening to integrate backward to deter the buyer from doing so. It is
significant in this respect that none of the many published studies of limit pricing has ever described
a real-world example of the practice.
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D. Vertical Mergers and Various Contractual Surrogates for Vertical
Integration
1. Vertical Mergers. I have always shied away from writing about
the competitive impact and legality of vertical mergers, in part because I
felt I had little new to say on these issues and in part because I was
unsure of my own reaction to the positions others have taken on them.
At the risk of confirming my self-suspicions, I will now (1) delineate the
various ways in which vertical mergers might affect competition in the
Clayton-Act sense and (2) compare my conclusions with those implicit in
the courts' approach to analyzing the legality of vertical mergers.
To begin with a familiar possibility, to the extent that a vertical
merger generates efficiencies and to the extent that the MPs' static com-
petitive positions and relative ability to make additional QV investments
make the efficiencies their merger generates pro-competitive, a vertical
merger that generates efficiencies will increase competition on that ac-
count in just the same way that competition may be increased by an effi-
ciency-generating horizontal or conglomerate merger. Although this
lengthy proposition appears to be trivial, it would be worth setting down
if, as I believe, many vertical mergers generate real efficiencies (even
when they do not involve continuous-flow processes) and many vertical-
merger partners are sufficiently well-placed for the efficiencies their
merger generates to be pro-competitive.
On the other hand, a vertical merger between a manufacturer and a
retailer could reduce competition by facilitating price-fixing on the up-
stream product by making it easier for the manufacturing-MP's rivals to
determine whether he has adhered to their scheme by enabling them to
check his behavior by observing the prices his retail-divisions charged (by
making it unnecessary for them to identify his distributors and determine
whether any decisions these distributors made to charge low prices were
made off their own bat rather than in response to a price-concession they
received from him). I should add, however, that although I do think that
there is something to this argument, I doubt that it is sufficiently impor-
tant to be given much weight, particularly in light of my doubts about
counting against a merger any tendency it has to encourage anti-competi-
tive behavior that is independently illegal and that could be indepen-
dently prohibited and/or penalized.
Finally, vertical mergers may reduce competition not only by lead-
ing to subsequent illegal behavior but also by changing the ARDEPPS'
structure. For vertical mergers to reduce competition in this way, three
conditions would have to be fulfilled: (1) vertical integration would have
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to give an advantage to integrated firms; (2) vertical integration would
have to be more profitable for well-established firms than for their margi-
nal and potential competitors; and (3) this difference in profitability
would have to result in a marginal firm's exiting or a potential competi-
tor's being worse-placed to enter in circumstances in which the exit or
heightened barriers to entry mattered. Moreover, since the Sherman and
Clayton Acts do not condemn acts or practices whose initial profitability
reflect their allocative efficiency, the structural consequences of vertical
mergers will not make them illegal unless a further condition is fulfilled:
(4) the private advantage that integration gives the vertically integrated
firm must not be critically affected by its allocative efficiency. Personally,
given the ability of non-integrated sellers and buyers to form joint-sales
and joint-purchase agencies, I doubt very much that these conditions will
often be fulfilled.
How does this analysis compare with the courts' approach to verti-
cal mergers? First, the courts have totally ignored the possible pro-com-
petitive impact of the efficiencies vertical mergers can generate. Second,
the courts have also totally ignored the possibility that vertical mergers
between manufacturers and retailers may increase the extent to which
the manufacturer-MP and his rivals contrive oligopolistic prices by in-
creasing the ability of the rivals of any manufacturer-MP who have inte-
grated forward into distribution to determine whether the manufacturer-
MP has cut his prices.110 Third, the courts never have explained when
they think vertical mergers will tend to reduce competition or reduce
competition illegally by raising barriers to entry (or expansion) or leading
marginal established firms to exit. And fourth, the courts have articu-
lated two other behavioral bases for concluding that vertical mergers
should be considered to be anti-competitive and illegal that I do not
think bear analysis. In particular, the courts have sometimes argued that
vertical mergers should be held illegal because of the possibility that they
may lead the merged company to execute allegedly predatory "price
squeezes" or to engage in two kinds of allegedly predatory individual
refusals to deal (to "foreclose" competition). Broadly speaking, a verti-
cally integrated firm that produces both an input and a final product in
whose production it is used is said to have executed a "price squeeze"
when the price it charged a final-product-manufacturing rival for the in-
put precludes that rival from beating the price the vertically integrated
110. The Justice Department's Vertical Merger Guidelines are explicitly concerned with the
possibility. See 2 TRADE REG. REP. % 4490, 4500, 4510 (1986).
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firm charged for the final product in question.11 Even if one assumes
arguendo that vertical mergers will sometimes produce this type of be-
havior (inter alia will sometimes make it profitable for integrated con-
cerns to behave in this way), I do not think that this fact would have any
legal significance: since we are assuming that the manufacturer's monop-
oly power over the input is legitimate, he is perfectly entitled to exploit it
himself by using it only in his own operations. Obviously, this conclu-
sion that the manufacturer has no obligation to sell the input to any out-
sider at all implies a fortiori that he may offer it to others only on terms
they will not find profitable to accept. Accordingly, one cannot justify
holding a vertical merger illegal on the ground that it will lead to price
squeezes: even if this prediction is correct, it is irrelevant because the
price squeezes themselves cannot be classified as predatory.
The preceding argument also disposes of the second additional be-
havioral ground the courts have sometimes cited for holding a vertical
merger illegal: the possibility that a merged input-and-related-final-prod-
uct manufacturer would refuse to sell the input in question to a rival
final-product producer or the possibility that a merged manufacturer-dis-
tributor would refuse to sell the good it produced to a rival distributor.
Once more, since the integrated firm would be perfectly entitled to re-
strict the use of the input to its own operations or to distribute its own
product exclusively by itself, the prospect of a vertical merger's leading
to such refusals to deal would not be legally relevant even if it were real.
The courts' final additional behavioral ground for holding vertical
mergers illegal is "foreclosure"-the possibility that an integrated manu-
facturer-retailer will not buy or distribute any rival-manufacturer's prod-
ucts for predatory reasons. I should admit at the outset that the purely
private contextual marginal costs that non-integrated sellers will often
have to incur to charge their customers' marginal-cost prices will often
place them at a private disadvantage when competing for the patronage
of an integrated concern against the integrated concern's own manufac-
turing division (because the integrated concern will not have to incur any
contextual marginal costs to charge its own retail division marginal-cost
prices). However, although this unfortunate fact does tend to support
the structural argument against vertical mergers, it cuts against the pred-
atory-behavior argument by providing a non-predatory explanation for
the tendency of the merged downstream firm to purchase less from out-
111. Analogous definitions can be offered for the case in which the vertically integrated concern
produces and distributes a final product: in this case, the victim of the so-called squeeze will be a
rival distributor of the good in question.
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siders than did its downstream antecedent. I should also admit at the
outset that an integrated firm may sometimes engage in an individual
predatory refusal to deal in which its relevant antecedent would not have
engaged. Contrary to many, I do think that predation is profitable often
enough to be a significant phenomenon, and I also think that individual
refusals to deal will sometimes be a profitable method of practicing pre-
dation-that the harm-inflicted-to-cost-incurred ratio for individual re-
fusals to deal will sometimes be higher than its relevant marginal
counterpart for such other types of predatory conduct as predatory price-
cutting or predatory advertizing-campaigns. Although I am therefore
more sympathetic than many to the courts' predatory-foreclosure argu-
ment, I think that such behavior is insufficiently likely to be caused by a
vertical merger and insufficiently predictable even when it does result to
support its playing a significant role in the adjudication of the legality of
vertical mergers-particularly since such behavior is itself illegal and
hence in principle independently deterrable and sanctionable.
On balance, then, my hesitant analysis of the factors that will affect
the competitive impact and legality of vertical mergers suggests that the
courts' approach to these subjects is unsatisfactory. In particular, my
analysis suggests that the courts have ignored one major related issue
(the pro-competitive impact of any efficiencies vertical mergers can gen-
erate), have overlooked a minor issue (the tendency of manufacturer-re-
tailer mergers to facilitate contrived oligopolistic pricing in the
manufacturing ARDEPPS), have misstated and tremendously exagger-
ated the importance of the predatory-foreclosure issue, have failed to be
acceptably specific about the circumstances in which a vertical merger's
effect on the barriers to entry will reduce competition in a way that
makes it illegal, and have failed to grasp the non-predatory character and
hence legal non-significance of two kinds of behavior they believe vertical
mergers will encourage (price-squeezes and refusals to sell to down-
stream rivals).
2. Contractual Surrogates for Vertical Integration. Since I have an-
alyzed the competitive impact and legality of such practices as tie-ins,
reciprocal trading agreements, resale price maintenance, and vertical ter-
ritorial or customer restraints in great detail elsewhere,112 this section
will do no more than briefly summarize my own conclusions and use
them to criticize the courts' approach to these practices. My own con-
clusions are as follows: (1) under the Sherman Act, the appropriate fo-
112. See Ideal Regime, supra note 2, at 303-29 and sources cited supra note 103.
[Vol. 38
THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS
cus for the legal analysis of the kinds of conduct with which we are
currently concerned is the individual firm's employment of a given prac-
tice; (2) except in the rare case in which a firm employs one of these
practices as part of a more complicated pattern of behavior that would
violate the Sherman Act in any case (e.g., employs a tie-in or reciprocal
trading agreement that functions by concealing or changing the apparent
locus of his contrived oligopolistic pricing or predation or engages in re-
sale price maintenance that helps him and his rivals implement contrived
oligopolistic pricing), its employment of any such practices will never
violate the Sherman Act because the private profitability of such prac-
tices does not depend on their reducing the attractiveness of the offers
against which its employer competes; (3) the appropriate focus for the
legal analysis of the practices in question under the Clayton Act is the
relevant effects of a rule allowing all suppliers of some relevant set of
buyers to employ the practice; (4) with the same exceptions that had to
be made under the Sherman Act, the general availability of these prac-
tices will rarely if ever reduce competition in the Clayton-Act sense be-
cause (a) they will usually not be more profitable for well-established
firms than for marginal and potential competitors (indeed, may seem
more likely to be profitable for marginal and potential competitors than
for well-established firms), (b) the reduction in the actual and prospective
returns of marginal and potential competitors that will result when the
practice is more profitable for well-established firms than for them will
often not induce the exit of a marginal firm that mattered (that would not
be replaced by an equally competitive concern) or raise a barrier to entry
(or barrier to expansion) that mattered (ag., because potential competi-
tion will not always be effective or because the disadvantaged potential
competitor may not be an effective potential competitor), and (c) even if
the availability of the practice in question to all possible suppliers of the
relevant set of buyers does cause an exit or increase a QV-investment
barrier that matters, it may not injure the relevant buyers in relevant
ways overall because the efficiencies it generates may end up benefiting
them more than they will be harmed by the exit-and-barrier-induced re-
duction in the attractiveness of the offers they receive from inferior sup-
pliers1 13; (5) even when the availability of such practices to all possible
suppliers of the relevant set of buyers will reduce competition in the
Clayton-Act sense-will cause exits or increases in QV-investment barri-
113. Note that the relevant comparison (which, fortunately, will never have to be made-I am
engaging in overkill) rules out any loss the buyers sustained because the practice induces a seller to
convert buyer into seller surplus by making it more profitable for him to do so.
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ers that will injure the relevant buyers by more than any efficiencies it
generates benefits them, it may not violate the Clayton Act because many
of these practices (say, tie-ins that reduce the costs a seller must incur to
control the quality of the complements his immediate customer combines
with his product) function in the first instance by increasing their em-
ployer's organizational allocative efficiency; and therefore (6) although I
do think that it would be desirable for a legislature to prohibit certain
types of these practices (because they generate considerable allocative
transaction costs to transfer surplus from buyers to sellers, because they
sometimes misallocate resources in other ways as well, and because my
conclusion that we already have too much QV investment in any case
implies that these allocative losses are not justified by the consequences
of the incentives such practices give their employers to make QV invest-
ments that put them in a position to use them), I believe that with the
exceptions described in (1) above they should virtually always be held
lawful under the current antitrust laws.
Unfortunately, although the courts have become more sophisticated
in this area in recent years,1" 4 both the approach the courts took to these
issues historically and the current doctrine are indefensible. Historically,
the courts argued that the only or at least the inevitable function of tie-
ins was to enable their employers to use their (legitimate) monopoly
power in one (so-called tying-product) market to lever themselves into a
similar position in a second (so-called tied-product) market-i.e., histori-
cally, the courts subscribed to exclusive and inevitable leverage theories
that appear to have been based on the remarkable premise that tying
sellers could both have their cake (exploit their positions in the market in
which they had "monopoly" power) and eat it too (use it to obtain mo-
nopoly power in the second, tied-product market). This approach led the
courts to take varying unjustified stands on the market-share or other
evidence (about patents-for example) one could use to establish the
existence of the requisite power in the tying-product market. Although
the courts have backed further and further away from this approach over
the past 15 years, they have still not rejected it or replaced it with a
sensible alternative.
The courts' performance in relation to resale price maintenance and
vertical territorial and customer restraints has been only slightly better.
114. Many opinions refer to various legitimate functions the practices can perform, and many
more uphold practices even in the face of the prevailing judicial doctrine by simply failing to note the
presence of a practice that its doctrine would condemn. For an example of the latter possibility, see
Broadcast Music v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979), reh'g denied sub nom. CBS v. American Society of
Composers, Authors and Performers, 450 U.S. 1050 (1980).
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Admittedly, the courts now do purport to examine the economic func-
tions and likely competitive consequences of vertical territorial and cus-
tomer restraints, but their efforts even in this area are marred by their
adoption of the parimutuel approach we analyzed in Section IIIB3. And
despite the functional similarity of these practices and resale price main-
tenance, they have refused to take the latter out of the per se illegal cate-
gory (in the mistaken belief that vertical and horizontal price-fixing must
be treated the same). In short, although there have been some signs of
improvement, the courts' previous performance in this area was awful,
and the probability of further improvement seems much lower now than
it did ten years ago.11
The preceding discussion of the determinants of the competitive im-
pact and allocative efficiency of the various types of conduct covered by
the antitrust laws revealed that the relevant effects often critically depend
on the facts of the individual case. Starting in the late 1960s, many com-
mentators" 6 and several critically placed members of the Executive
Branch 7 have argued that instead of trying to ascertain the relevant
facts courts should simply hold (1) various vertical business practices per
se lawful and (2) horizontal and conglomerate mergers and joint ventures
lawful except in a very limited set of circumstances. I have already indi-
cated my belief that the overwhelming majority of vertical mergers and
vertical contractual arrangements (tie-ins, reciprocal-trading agreements,
vertical territorial restraints, and resale price maintenance agreements)
are lawful-that such practices rarely reduce competition-though I dis-
agree with the relevant commentators' and Executive Branch officers'
conclusion that such practices are virtually always allocatively efficient.
I want to conclude Part IV by commenting on (1) the arguments many
commentators and officials used to justify their recommendation that
courts should almost never declare horizontal and conglomerate mergers
and joint ventures unlawful as well as on (2) the related argument that
has been made more recently for the relaxation of antitrust standards in
cases that involve conduct (mergers, joint ventures, consortia) that will
supposedly promote collaboration in innovation, particularly in high-
technology industries.
115. I expressed considerable optimism on this issue in my essay The Burger Court, Antitrust,
and Economic Analysis, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 180,
180, 196-97 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).
116. See, eg., Easterbrook, The Limits to Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984).
117. The Reagan Administration's commitment to the position articulated in the text is mani-
fest in the United States Justice Department's various merger guidelines. Cf Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,283 (1984).
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The commentators that argued for a permissive policy toward merg-
ers and joint ventures in general attempted to justify their recommenda-
tions by making the following assertions: (1) horizontal mergers and joint
ventures that do not involve (a) MPs with very substantial market shares
and (b) one or more "markets" with significant concentration ratios or
HI indices rarely have significant anti-competitive consequences; (2)
conglomerate mergers and joint ventures that do not eliminate effective
potential competitors never reduce competition; (3) virtually all horizon-
tal and conglomerate mergers and joint ventures generate substantial effi-
ciencies; and (4) courts are not capable of distinguishing those mergers
and joint ventures that are illegal and undesirable 118 from those that are
not.
I will indicate why I disagree with each of these propositions. First,
as Part IVB2 argued, in an economy that does not consist of a series of
markets that have the kinds of characteristics market-oriented analyses
attribute to them, horizontal mergers and joint ventures between firms
with small shares of unconcentrated "markets" may very well decrease
competition significantly, inter alia because MPs or joint venturers may
be each others' closest competitors for a far higher percentage of each
others' customers than the traditional analysis supposes. Second and
similarly, as Part IVC argued, conglomerate mergers and joint ventures
that do not eliminate effective potential competitors may still reduce
competition by enabling the MPs (joint venturers) and their product-ri-
vals to make cross-"market" oligopolistic moves whose availability in-
creases their ability to contrive oligopolistic prices. Third, although the
extent to which mergers and joint ventures generate private efficiencies
that have allocative counterparts is an empirical question, both negative
and positive arguments suggest that the people I am criticizing have been
too optimistic on this issue. Thus, negatively, my arguments against
these commentators' and officials' contention that the relevant business
moves rarely reduce competition simultaneously undercuts their conten-
tion that the fact that mergers and joint ventures are rarely anti-competi-
tive implies that their profitability must have reflected their ability to
generate efficiencies-an argument that would in any case be undercut by
the existence of tax incentives to engage in mergers and joint ventures in
118. The relevant analysts implicitly assumed that all pro-competitive business conduct is allo-
catively efficient, that all business conduct that does not reduce competition is allocatively efficient,
that all business conduct that reduces competition is allocatively inefficient, that the overall desirabil-
ity of business conduct depends solely on its allocative efficiency, and that the antitrust laws require
the courts to hold illegal all undesirable business conduct and to hold legal all desirable business
conduct. As this article should have made clear, I disagree with each of these propositions.
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some situations (even if one were not convinced that such moves are
often made to take advantage of various investor-irrationalities). Posi-
tively, the argument that most mergers and joint ventures generate effi-
ciencies is undermined by empirical studies demonstrating that mergers
have actually decreased (1) the market shares of NPs relative to those of
their non-merging competitors 19 as well as (2) the rates of return and
share prices of MPs relative to the market rates of return and share
prices of non-merging firms in their markets.' 20 Since one would have
expected the anti-competitive impact of the relevant mergers to increase
the rate of return and share prices of merging firms relative to non-merg-
ing firms, this latter study is particularly damaging to the hypothesis that
most mergers generate significant efficiencies. Admittedly, the fourth
premise on which the relevant commentators have based their recom-
mendation that courts promulgate permissive merger and joint-venture
rules-that judges will not be able to distinguish bad mergers and joint
ventures from good ones-is difficult to assess. However, I am more op-
timistic about the potential ability of judges to make the relevant deter-
minations than the commentators I am criticizing, though as Part VB
will argue I would prefer the relevant determinations to be made by a
specialized court or agency or to be (partially) obviated by a system of
selling the right to engage in allegedly efficiency-creating mergers or joint
ventures that have some anti-competitive consequences. In any event,
because I disagree with all four premises on which the relevant commen-
tators and Executive Branch officials have based their proposal that
courts adopt permissive merger and joint-venture rules, I disagree with
the proposal as well.
12 1
More recently, a large number of commentators (including many of
the same people who supported permissive merger and joint-venture
rules in general) have argued that the antitrust laws should be relaxed to
permit mergers, joint ventures, research consortia, and various other
business agreements that pose significant anti-competitive risks but may
also foster useful research-related collaboration. 122 These commentators
119. Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. OF ECON. AND STAT., 259, 263-64 (1984).
120. D. RAVENSCRAFF & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
(1987).
121. See eg., Jorde & Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust: Balancing Competition and
Cooperation, 4 HIGH TECH. L.. 1 (1989) and Ordover & Baumol, Antitrust Policy and High Tech-
nology Industries, 4 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL 13 (1988).
122. In fact, the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 4302 (Supp. 1986),
has relaxed the antitrust laws in relation to joint research and development ventures to some (admit-
tedly uncertain) extent. For a discussion of the statute, see Jorde and Teece, supra note 121, at 50-
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have tried to justify their proposal in much the some way that their pred-
ecessors attempted to justify their claim that the antitrust laws' merger
and joint-venture rules should be relaxed in general-viz, (1) by asserting
that collaborative research, development, and commercialization efforts
will rarely reduce competition, (2) by claiming that such collaboration
will frequently generate substantial research-related economies that
could not be otherwise achieved, and (3) by casting doubt on the ability
of courts to distinguish desirable from undesirable research-related
collaboration.
All the reasons that led me to reject the policy argument for a gen-
eral relaxation of our merger and joint-venture rules incline me to reject
the proposal that the antitrust laws be relaxed in relation to research-
related collaboration. In addition, my inclination to reject such propos-
als is strengthened by the failure of their supporters to distinguish be-
tween product-innovation-related collaboration and production-process-
research-related collaboration 2 3 as well as by their failure to recognize
the number of respects in which and the extent to which reductions in
competition will cause resources to be misallocated (including their fail-
ure to recognize that reductions in price competition will increase the
misallocation associated with both [1] the fact that more resources are
devoted to product-innovation than is allocatively efficient and [2] the
fact that fewer resources are devoted to production-process research than
is allocatively efficient).
The analysis of Part IV has been largely theoretical. I did not want
to conclude this part without commenting on the empirical assumptions
that have led a significant number of commentators to recommend relax-
ations of our antitrust standards-relaxations to which I am basically
opposed.
V. AN IDEAL ANTITRUST REGIME: SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Part V will (A) summarize this article's implications for the substan-
tive antitrust-standards that would be ideal and (B) by examining two
institutional proposals whose desirability is implied (1) by my analysis of
the competitive-impact and allocative-efficiency consequences of the effi-
123. This distinction is important because the private profitability of product-innovation is in-
flated while that of production-process research is deflated. See the text accompanying notes 20-23
supra for an explanation of the product-innovation point. In general, see R. Markovits, Antitrust
and R&D Misallocation: A General-Equilibruim Distortion and Policy Analysis (unpublished man-
uscript available from the author).
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ciencies all kinds of mergers can generate and (2) by the general charac-
ter of the analysis I think is required to predict the competitive impact
and allocative efficiency of the various kinds of business acts and prac-
tices with which antitrust laws should be concerned.
A. Substantive Standards
Since the preceding sections have already explained my reasons for
supporting all components of the set of substantive antitrust standards I
believe would be ideal, I will simply summarize those standards at this
juncture. Before proceeding, however, I should note that the list that
follows (or at least its treatment of practices that tend to reduce QV-
investment competition) is based on the assumption that tax-and-subsidy
policies have been adopted to counteract the forces that lead us both (1)
to allocate too many resources to creating and using QV investments as
opposed to producing units of already-created goods and services (or do-
ing production-process research) and (2) to allocate too many resources
to QV-investment uses in some ARDEPPSes relative to others. On this
assumption, I would conclude that an ideal antitrust statute would pro-
hibit the following kinds of business acts or practices: (1) monopolistic
acts or practices whose profitability is ceterisparibus critically inflated by
their tendency to reduce the attractiveness of the offers against which the
actor(s) in question must compete--Le., (a) contrived oligopolistic pric-
ing, (b) threatening to retaliate or actually retaliating against a rival's
prospective or actual QV investment, and (c) engaging in predatory be-
havior in general; (2) a seller's taking advantage of the contextual margi-
nal costs his rivals would have to incur to charge his customers prices
equal to their conventional marginal costs-Le., a seller's intentionally
charging a price that exceeds the price he would have found profitable if
his rivals charged his customers prices equal to their conventional margi-
nal costs (a "radical" legal standard that many would find impractica-
ble); (3) a seller's engaging in natural oligopolistic pricing or (less
significantly in part because less probable) taking advantage of any natu-
ral oligopolistic investment-disincentives one or more of his rivals faced;
(4) a seller's engaging in an act or practice that either injures his custom-
ers and the customers of his product-rivals on balance by reducing the
attractiveness of the offers they receive from their inferior suppliers or
would do so if it did not generate enough efficiencies to offset the above
tendency unless the actor has paid for the right to engage in the act in
question under a system that authorizes the government to sell the right
to engage in practices that have some anti-competitive tendencies but are
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alleged to produce organizational allocative efficiencies as well;12 and (5)
a seller's engaging in an unnecessarily misallocative pricing practice-
employing certain statutorily-specified, 25 identifiable, functional types of
tie-ins and reciprocity that seem likely to be misallocative, engaging in
price discrimination in relation to customers they are best-placed to
serve, etc.
B. Institutional Arrangements
This section will discuss two categories of institutional arrangements
whose desirability is implied by the substantive standards just articu-
lated-one special institution and procedure that will have to be estab-
lished to implement the second (efficiency-related) part of the fourth
standard just delineated and one general proposal that reflects the techni-
cal character of the analysis that will have to be executed to implement
all the substantive standards that have just been recommended.
1. The Case for Setting Up a Governmental Office to Sell the Right
to Engage in an Allegedly Efficiency-Creating Merger That Has Some
Anti-competitive Tendencies (and to Calculate the Price of the Right in
Question). Most economists who have analyzed the optimal way for the
government to respond to the possible externalities that manufacturers or
others may generate have concluded that whenever feasible the govern-
ment should proceed (1) by requiring externality-producers to pay a tax
equal to the external costs they generate and allowing such parties to
generate as many externalities as they find profitable rather than (2) by
determining itself the amount of such externalities these parties may gen-
erate or the specific steps they must take to reduce the externalities they
produce. In brief, economists tend to prefer the former, decentralizing
tax-approach to the latter, centralized, command-and-control approach
because the decentralized method assigns the actual decision to private
actors who have better access to some information that is highly relevant
to the optimal choice (while correcting any distortion in these private
actors' incentives). Thus, to the extent that the private cost to a manu-
facturer of reducing the amount of externalities he generates by lowering
his unit output, changing his production-process or location, changing
the particular product-variants he produces, etc., correspond to the allo-
124. I propose this test instead of the current qualified competitive-impact test (which contains
a no-critical-organizational-alloative-efficiency criterion). For a further discussion of this proposal,
see infra Section VBL.
125. See Ideal Regime, supra note 2, 304-29.
[Vol. 38
THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS
cative cost of his taking these steps (externality-consequences aside) or to
the extent that the government can impose a second tax that will offset
any differences in such private and allocative costs without knowing the
magnitude of the private costs in question, the externality-tax will be
likely both to reduce "regulatory" transaction costs and to reduce regula-
tory-error costs by placing the relevant decisions in the hands of manu-
facturers who are better-informed than government regulators about
various determinants of the choice that is allocatively efficient.
Given this fact, it is surprising that economists have not recom-
mended that the government take an analogous approach when the
Pareto imperfection in question is not an externality but a reduction in
competition. In the merger context, the equivalent of the externality-tax
would be useful when a merger that had certain anti-competitive and
misallocative tendencies (the analogue of the externalities) was plausibly
alleged to generate certain efficiencies that would tend to increase both
competition and allocative efficiency (the analogue of the allocative cost-
savings or value-increases the externality-generating choice would gener-
ate if the externalities could be ignored). In this situation, a properly
designed "reduction-in-competition" tax might enable the government to
secure the outcome that would be most pro-competitive or most alloca-
tively efficient or most desirable overall (depending on the statute's goal)
without having to determine the magnitude of the efficiencies the merger
would generate.
Obviously, the task of calculating the appropriate tax-which would
be designed (1) to insure that the merger was effectuated if and only if it
was allocatively efficient (or perhaps was desirable overall, taking ac-
count of its distributive impact and political-structure consequences) and
(2) to prevent efficient (desirable) mergers from yielding higher profits
than net allocative-efficiency gains-will have to be assigned to some
government office (which also might perform various other technical in-
formation-gathering and analytic tasks). On the assumption that the rel-
evant statute is designed to maximize overall welfare and that in these
cases this goal will be achieved by setting a price that insures that all
those relevant mergers but only those relevant mergers that are alloca-
tively efficient will be profitable, the government office in question would
have to proceed in the following way. First, it would have to estimate
the difference between the merger's allocative efficiency and private prof-
itability on the assumption that it would generate no efficiencies: a task
that would require it inter alia to predict the merger's competitive impact
on this assumption. Second, it would have to calculate the relationship
1990]
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between the private benefits any efficiencies the merger might generate
would yield the MPs and the amount by which they would increase the
merger's allocative efficiency: an amount that would depend inter alia on
(a) the kind of efficiencies in question-fixed static, marginal static, static
that will carry over to new QV investments, or dynamic; (b) the static
competitive positions of the MPs--on the one hand, when the MPs were
originally best-placed, the private-value of any marginal efficiencies their
merger generated would be equal to (1) the product of the per-unit pri-
vate-marginal-cost reduction and the number of relevant units the MPs
originally produced plus (2) the profits the MPs made on any extra units
the efficiencies made it profitable for them to produce (the sum of the
relevant P-MR gaps) while the allocative-efficiency gains the efficiencies
in question generated will be equal to (1) the per-unit allocative-margi-
nal-cost reduction and the number of relevant units the MPs produced
pre-merger plus (2) the allocative-efficiency gains or losses generated by
the production of the extra units of output the static efficiencies made it
profitable for the MPs to produce post-merger; 126 (c) the barriers to ex-
126. The relevance of the MPs' pre-merger competitive-position distribution is too complicated
to explain in the textual hypothetical. For simplicity, I will focus on a merger that reduces the MPs'
marginal cost by a constant per-unit amount. Three cases are worth distinguishing when analyzing
the private value versus allocative-efficiency consequences of any such efficiencies a merger gener-
ates-cases in which the relevant MP is originally and remains the best-placed supplier of the rele-
vant buyer, cases in which the efficiencies in question make him best-placed, and cases in which the
efficiencies make him second-best-placed or close enough to second-best-placed to matter for oligo-
polistic reasons.
First, in relation to each customer the relevant MP was best-placed to serve pre-merger, the
private value (PV) of any such efficiencies will equal (1) the product of the per-unit private-marginal-
cost reduction in question and the MPs' pre-merger unit output plus (2) any extra profits the efficien-
cies generated by making it profitable for the merged companies to produce a higher unit output
than was profitable for its relevant antecedent (the area between his P and MR curves between his
pre-merger and post-merger outputs) while the allocative-efficiency gains the efficiencies generated
will equal (I) the product of the relevant MP's pre-merger output and the allocative-marginal-cost
reduction in question (which may not equal the private-marginal-cost reduction when monopoly,
externalities, or other Pareto imperfections distort the private cost of the relevant resources to the
producer in question) plus (2) the allocative-efficiency consequences of any associated increase in the
relevant MP's output (the area between his marginal allocative value [MLV] and marginal allocative
cost [MLC] curves between the output in question where externalities of consumption or monop-
sonistic, non-sovereign, or non-maximizing buyers may make MLV diverge from P and all kinds of
Pareto imperfections may make MLC diverge from MC).
Second, in relation to those customers the relevant MP is best-placed to serve post-merger but
was worse-than-best-placed to serve pre-merger, the private value to the relevant MP of the efficien-
cies that created this change in his position will equal the profits he makes on the sales in question
(which would be less per unit than the amount by which the merger reduces his marginal costs even
if he would not have to sacrifice profits on his original customers to take advantage of his new
position in relation to the additional buyers the efficiencies make him best-placed to serve.). The
allocative-efficiency gains that result will differ from the associated MP gains in that (1) they will
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pansion facing the MPs pre-merger relative to those of other relevant
potential expanders and competitors in the ARDEPPS in question-
which will determine whether any dynamic efficiencies or static efficien-
cies that will carry over to the MPs' new investments will increase QV-
investment competition; and (d) the allocative-efficiency value of any effi-
ciency-induced increase in competition of various kinds in the
ARDEPPS in question. And third, it would have to calculate the price
the MPs would have to be willing to pay for the right to consummate the
merger in question for it to be likely to be allocatively efficient.
A numerical example might be useful. Assume that one reached the
following two conclusions. First, absent any efficiencies, the relevant
merger would decrease allocative efficiency by $2 million and yield
$800,000 in profits (say, by freeing the MPs from each other's competi-
tion and facilitating both their and their rivals' contrived and natural
oligopolistic pricing). And second, given the character of the efficiencies
the merger would generate if it generated efficiencies of various sizes, the
competitive-position distribution of the MPs, their ability to expand rela-
tive to that of various other established and potential competitors, and
the distribution of those Pareto imperfections that affect the allocative-
efficiency consequences of increases in different types of competition in
the ARDEPPS in question, (a) a merger that generated efficiencies that
would be worth $500,000 to the MPs would increase allocative efficiency
by $300,000 on that account, (b) a merger that generated efficiencies that
would be worth $1 million to the MPs would increase allocative efficiency
by $1,200,000 on that account, (c) a merger that generated efficiencies
that would be worth $1,700,000 to the MPs would increase allocative effi-
ciency by $2 million and one cent on that account, and (d) any merger
that generated efficiencies worth more than $1,700,000 to the MPs would
increase allocative efficiency by more than $2 million and any merger
that generated efficiencies worth less than $1,700,000 would increase allo-
reflect differences between the private and allocative basic competitive advantages of the relevant MP
over the seller who was the relevant buyers' best-placed supplier pre-merger and (2) they will not
reflect the "contextual costs" the relevant MP had to incur to make sales to his new customers.
Third, in relation to those buyers the relevant MP is second-best-placed or close-to-second-best-
placed to serve, the private value of the efficiencies to the MP will be equal to any contrived oligo-
polistic margins he can obtain by using his improved position to threaten retaliation or promise
reciprocation while the associated allocative-efficiency gains will be equal to the allocative efficiency
of any extra output the relevant MP's rivals produce because the improvement in the MP's position
forces them to reduce their prices. Since, obviously, the private-profits-versus-allocative-efficiency-
gain ratio will vary from category to category, the overall ratio will depend on the relevant MP's or




cative efficiency by less than $2 million on that account. The relevant
government office would therefore conclude that it should charge the
MPs just enough for the right to consummate their merger to ensure that
they expect it to generate efficiencies that are worth $1,700,000 to them.
Since, ex hypothesis, the merger would yield them $800,000 in profit,
even if it did not generate any efficiencies, the appropriate fee or price
would be $2.5 million.127
Admittedly, this procedure is very complicated and difficult, in part
because it provides prospective MNPs with an incentive to misrepresent
the character of the efficiencies their merger will generate in the hope of
lowering the merger-fee they will be required to pay. But if one wants to
take the efficiencies mergers may generate into consideration, there is no
way to avoid the complications and difficulties the "reduction-in-compe-
tition" tax entails. In fact, the method just described is less complicated
than the command-and-control approach (the centrally administered
trade-off) the Justice Department's Guidelines propose without describ-
ing; although the implementers of the "reduction-in-competition" tax
will have to identify the type of efficiency any merger under considera-
tion will generate-fixed-cost static, marginal-cost static, static that will
carry over to any new QV investments the MPs make, or purely dy-
namic, they will not have to estimate the actual magnitude of the efficien-
cies that will be generated.
Discussions of the feasibility of counting any efficiencies a merger
would generate in favor of its legality have tended to focus on the diffi-
culty courts or any outside agency would have in determining the
(weighted average expected) magnitude of the efficiencies such a merger
would generate in the future (or indeed the magnitude of the efficiencies
it generated in the past). Why, then, has no one else ever considered
decentralizing the relevant choice by levying a tax to correct the incen-
tives of the prospective MPs-who presumably have better information
about at least the private value of the efficiencies their merger should be
expected to generate-and leaving the decision to them? Particularly
when one considers the popularity of pollution-taxes among economists,
it is hard to understand why the Justice Department 128 or the various
127. For an analogous analysis of the procedure such a bureau would follow if it were attempt-
ing to ensure that any merger that resulted was pro-competitive, see Review Article, supra note 8,
606-07 n. 71.
128. Although the Justice Department's various Guidelines all indicate that the fact that a
merger generates efficiencies should count for its legality, the Department has never indicated how it
would trade off any efficiencies a merger generated against its other anti-competitive or allocatively-
inefficient tendencies.
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economists who have recommended making the legality of efficiency-pro-
ducing horizontal mergers depend on some relevant welfare-tradeoff
1 29
have not even considered the "reduction-in-competition"-tax alternative
to centralized command-and-control merger-decisions. In my opinion,
this tax-alternative is feasible and would generate the same kinds of re-
ductions in regulatory transaction costs and regulatory-error costs that
have led economists to prefer externality-taxes over centralized pollu-
tion-controls.
2. The Case for Creating Specialized Antitrust Prosecutors, Courts,
and Agencies as well as Specialized Institutions for Collecting and Analyz-
ing the Policy-Significance of Data on Pareto Imperfections in General.
Obviously, one basic implication of this Article is that we cannot predict
the competitive impact, allocative efficiency, or overall desirability of
most business acts or practices (or their prohibition) without making a
substantial number of complicated factual determinations and assessing
their significance in a sophisticated way. In my opinion, the technical
character of good antitrust analysis establishes an overwhelming case for
specialized antitrust prosecutors and judges (as well as for trials by spe-
cialized judges instead of juries). Moreover, to the extent that certain
facts that are highly relevant in one antitrust case would also be relevant
in others, a strong case can probably be built for creating a specialized
antitrust agency to work on techniques for obtaining the relevant facts
and perhaps to provide testimony on those facts in individual cases. In-
deed, regardless of whether the antitrust law's standard of legality is al-
tered to take second-best considerations into account, a strong case can
also be built for creating a specialized agency to collect data on the vari-
ous Pareto imperfections in a systematic way, for in practice (1) the opti-
mal policy-response to a given imperfection in competition will often
depend not just on that imperfection itself and the distribution of similar
competitive imperfections throughout the economy but also on the distri-
bution of tax-imperfections and externality-imperfections throughout the
economy as well and (2) similar relationships will also affect the optimal
policy-response to taxes or externalities. In any event, the creation of
such agencies would enable us to take advantage of the relevant econo-
mies of scale, to collect data more slowly when doing so will enable us to
reduce the cost and/or increase the accuracy of the data in question, and
129. See, eg., Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisisted, 125 U. PA. L. REv.
699 (1977) and Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Off, 58 AM.
EcON. REv. 18 (1968), which also ignores all second-best considerations.
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to escape the tendency to make decisions on inappropriate first-best crite-
ria or on a highly inadequate information-base (as decision-makers are
prone to do when only a small percentage of the value of the data they
would really like to have in a given case relates to its use in that case-
e.g., when the decision in a given case ought to depend not on the extent
to which the prices of a small group of sellers are monopolistic but on the
extent to which their prices are more monopolistic than their weighted
average economy-wide counterpart).
We live in an age in which skepticism about decisions by experts is
common. Although I agree that many supposed experts have both
lacked any real expertise and been insensitive to a variety of considera-
tions to which their purported expertise did not relate, I am optimistic
that experts can be trained, that appropriate recruitment-processes can
be instituted, and that inappropriate political influence as well as sloppy
performance can be prevented by reasoned-elaboration requirements,
lifetime tenure, revolving-door policies, other types of politically insulat-
ing provisions, and peer review. Perhaps that as much as anything else
accounts for my preference for having antitrust and related cases handled
by experts operating out of specialized institutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
1990 marks the centennial of the Sherman Act. Although this re-
view of the basic structure of the federal antitrust statutes, of particular
aspects of their drafting, and of various features of their judicial interpre-
tation and operationalization has uncovered many deficiencies, I am con-
fident that the living American antitrust law, which has evolved out of
the Sherman Act, is vastly superior to its extant functional alternatives.
Moreover, the increased openness of the courts, the legislatures, and
their company to sophisticated economic argument makes me hopeful
that many of the deficiencies this article has delineated will be corrected
in the not-to-distant future. However, there is some risk that we may
abandon our valuable antitrust legacy on the unfounded, unduly optimis-
tic assumption that virtually all relevant business conduct is pro-competi-
tive, allocatively efficient, and desirable overall. I hope that this article
will make such an outcome less likely. The best way to honor the Sher-
man Act is to protect its contribution to American society.
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GLOSSARY
ARDEPPS Arbitrarily Designated Portion of Product Space
BCA Basic Competitive Advantage
BPA Buyer Preference Advantage
BPD Buyer Preference Disadvantage
CCA Contextual Cost Advantage
CCD Contextual Cost Disadvantage
CMC Contextual Martinal Costs
DD Demand
DD-MC Demand-Marginal-Cost Combination
HNOP Highest Non-Oligopolistic Price
HSNir Highest-Supernormal-Profit-Rate
L Retaliation Barrier to Entry
LC Allocative Cost
M Monopolistic Investment-Disincentive/Incentive
MC Conventional Marginal Cost
MCA Marginal Cost Advantage
MCD Marginal Cost Disadvantage
MLC Marginal Allocative Cost
MLV Marginal Allocative Value
MP Merger Partner
MPPG Marginal Physical Product of Factor F in Terms of
Product G
MR Marginal Revenue
MRP Marginal Revenue Product
O Oligopolistic Investment-Disincentive
OCA Overall Competitive Advantage
OLE Organization-Allocative-Efficiency
OM Contrived Oligopolistic Margin
P Price
PC Private Cost
PPR Production Process Research
PV Private value
QV investment Quality-or-Variety-Increasing Investment
R Risk Barrier to Entry
RPM Resale Price Maintenance
Rs Product Rivals
RUO Relative-Unit-Output
S Scale Barrier to Entry
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N New Entrant (used to indicate that the barrier to
which it is attached is a barrier to entry)
E Established Firm (used to indicate that the barrier to




lrD Profit-Differential Barrier to Entry
